Bringing together powerful new tools from set theory and the philosophy of language, this book proposes a solution to one of the few unresolved paradoxes from antiquity, the Paradox of the Liar. Treating truth as a property of propositions, not sentences, the authors model two distinct conceptions of propositions: one based on the standard notion used by Bertrand Russell, among others, and the other based on J.L. Austin's work on truth. Comparing these two accounts, the authors show that while the Russellian conception of the relation between sentences, propositions, and truth is crucially flawed in limiting cases, the Austinian perspective has fruitful applications to the analysis of semantic paradox. In the course of their study of a language admitting circular reference and containing its own truth predicate, Barwise and Etchemendy also develop a wide range of model-theoretic techniques--based on a new set-theoretic tool, Peter Aczel's theory of hypersets--that open up new avenues in logical and formal semantics.
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Book by Barwise Jon Etchemendy John
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EUR 16,92 per la spedizione da U.S.A. a Italia
Destinazione, tempi e costiDa: Better World Books, Mishawaka, IN, U.S.A.
Condizione: Good. First Edition. Former library book; may include library markings. Used book that is in clean, average condition without any missing pages. Codice articolo GRP102794169
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Da: Miki Store, San Jose, CA, U.S.A.
hardcover. Condizione: Good. Condizione sovraccoperta: NO DUST JACKET. Pages are crisp and clean, no marking. Cover is good. Binding is tight/good. NO DUST JACKET. ex-library book with normal library stamps & stickers. Codice articolo ka-bs28
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Da: Ted Kottler, Bookseller, Redondo Beach, CA, U.S.A.
Hardcover. Condizione: Fine. Condizione sovraccoperta: Fine. 1st Edition. xii, 185 pp. Original cloth. Near Fine, in near fine dust jacket. 'Jon Barwise and John Etchemendy propose that the liar sentence (which they interpret as synonymous with the Strengthened Liar) is ambiguous. They base this conclusion on a distinction they make between a 'denial' and a 'negation'. If the liar means 'It is not the case that this statement is true' then it is denying itself. If it means 'This statement is not true' then it is negating itself. They go on to argue, based on their theory of 'situational semantics', that the 'denial liar' can be true without contradiction while the 'negation liar' can be false without contradiction' ('Liar Paradox' entry on Wikipedia). Codice articolo 18070
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