Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings - Brossura

Brossura

ISBN 10: 019514581X ISBN 13: 9780195145816

Casa editrice: OUP USA, 2002

Riassunto

Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings is an ideal text for introductory, advanced undergraduate, and graduate courses in the philosophy of mind and related areas. The most comprehensive collection of its kind, this volume ranges from the classical contributions of Descartes to the leading edge of the discipline. Three of the selections are being published here for the first time, while many other articles have been revised especially for this volume. Extensive sections cover foundational issues, the nature of consciousness, the nature of mental content, and miscellaneous issues. Each section opens with an in-depth introduction by the editor.

Su questo libro

Recensione:

a splendid introduction to the subject ... offers an attractive, timely alternative to the more empirically engaged perspective of Lycan's Mind and Cognition. Teachers, students, and non-specialists looking for a comprehensive overview of issues in the general philosophy of mind, de-emphasizing empirical concerns, need look no further. (Philip Robbins, Philosophical Psychology)

Contenuti:

• Preface
• 1. FOUNDATIONS
• A. Dualism
• 1: René Descartes: Meditations on First Philosophy (II and VI)
• 2: René Descartes: Passions of the Soul (Excerpt)
• 3: Thomas H. Huxley: On the Hypothesis That Animals Are Automata, and Its History (Excerpt)
• 4: Raymond M. Smullyan: An Unfortunate Dualist
• B. Behaviorism
• 5: Gilbert Ryle: Descartes' Myth
• 6: Rudolf Carnap: Psychology in Physical Language (Excerpt)
• 7: Hilary Putnam: Brains and Behavior
• C. The Identity Theory
• 8: U. T. Place: Is Consciousness a Brain Process?
• 9: J. J. C. Smart: Sensations and Brain Processes
• 10: Herbert Feigl: The "Mental" and the "Physical" (Excerpt)
• D. Functionalism
• 11: Hilary Putnam: The Nature of Mental States
• 12: David M. Armstrong: The Causal Theory of the Mind
• 13: David Lewis: Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications
• 14: Ned Block: Troubles with Functionalism (Excerpt)
• 15: Martine Nida-Rümelin: Pseudonormal Vision: An Actual Case of Qualia Inversion?
• E. Other Psychophysical Relations
• 16: C. D. Broad: Mechanism and Its Alternatives (Excerpt)
• 17: Donald Davidson: Mental Events
• 18: Jerry A. Fodor: Special Sciences
• 19: Jaegwon Kim: Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction
• 20: Terence Horgan: From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of a Material World (Excerpt)
• 21: Frank Jackson: Finding the Mind in the Natural World
• F. Mental Causation
• 22: Jaegwon Kim: The Many Problems of Mental Causation (Excerpt)
• 23: Stephen Yablo: Mental Causation
• 2. CONSCIOUSNESS
• A. General
• 24: Ned Block: Concepts of Consciousness
• 25: Thomas Nagel: What Is It Like to Be a Bat?
• 26: Daniel C. Dennett: Quining Qualia
• 27: David J. Chalmers: Consciousness and Its Place in Nature
• B. The Knowledge Argument
• 28: Frank Jackson: Epiphenomenal Qualia
• 29: David Lewis: What Experience Teaches
• 30: Brian Loar: Phenomenal States (Second Version)
• 31: Daniel Stoljar: Two Conceptions of the Physical
• C. Modal Arguments
• 32: Saul A. Kripke: Naming and Necessity (Excerpt)
• 33: Christopher S. Hill: Imaginability, Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem (Excerpt)
• 34: Grover Maxwell: Rigid Designators and Mind-Brain Identity (Excerpt)
• D. The Explanatory Gap
• 35: Joseph Levine: Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap
• 36: Paul M. Churchland: The Rediscovery of Light
• 37: Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker: Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap
• 38: Colin McGinn: Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?
• E. Higher-Order Thought and Representationalism
• 39: David M. Rosenthal: Explaining Consciousness
• 40: Fred Dretske: Conscious Experience
• 41: Christopher Peacocke: Sensation and the Content of Experience: A Distinction
• 42: Michael Tye: Visual Qualia and Visual Content Revisited
• 43: Sydney Shoemaker: Introspection and Phenomenal Character
• 3. CONTENT
• A. The Nature of Intentionality
• 44: Franz Brentano: The Distinction between Mental and Physical Phenomena (Excerpt)
• 45: Roderick M. Chisholm: "Intentional Inexistence" (Excerpt)
• 46: Fred Dretske: A Recipe for Thought
• 47: Ruth Garrett Millikan: Biosemantics
• 48: Robert Brandom: Reasoning and Representing
• 49: Terence Horgan and John Tienson: The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality
• B. Propositional Attitudes
• 50: Wilfrid Sellars: Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind (Excerpt)
• 51: Jerry A. Fodor: Propositional Attitudes
• 52: Daniel C. Dennett: True Believers: The Intentional Strategy and Why It Works
• 53: Paul M. Churchland: Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes
• C. Internalism and Externalism
• 54: Hilary Putnam: The Meaning of "Meaning" (Excerpt)
• 55: Tyler Burge: Individualism and the Mental (Excerpt)
• 56: David J. Chalmers: The Components of Content (Revised Version)
• 57: Michael McKinsey: Anti-individualism and Privileged Access
• 58: Anthony Brueckner: What an Anti-individualist Knows A Priori
• 59: Andy Clark and David J. Chalmers: The Extended Mind
• 4. MISCELLANEOUS
• 60: Derek Parfit: Reductionism and Personal Identity
• 61: A. J. Ayer: Freedom and Necessity
• 62: Bertrand Russell: Analogy
• 63: John R. Searle: Can Computers Think?

Su questa edizione

• Editore: OUP USA
• Data di pubblicazione: 2002
• ISBN 10: 019514581X
• ISBN 13: 9780195145816
• Rilegatura: Copertina flessibile
• Numero di pagine: 690
• Redattore: Chalmers David J.