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Descrizione libro Condizione: New. Codice articolo 20142876-n
Descrizione libro PAP. Condizione: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000. Codice articolo L0-9780198703020
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Descrizione libro Paperback / softback. Condizione: New. This item is printed on demand. New copy - Usually dispatched within 5-9 working days. Codice articolo C9780198703020
Descrizione libro Condizione: New. Codice articolo ABLIING23Feb2215580043319
Descrizione libro Condizione: New. Book is in NEW condition. Codice articolo 0198703023-2-1
Descrizione libro Condizione: New. New! This book is in the same immaculate condition as when it was published. Codice articolo 353-0198703023-new
Descrizione libro Condizione: New. Codice articolo 20142876-n
Descrizione libro Soft Cover. Condizione: new. This item is printed on demand. Codice articolo 9780198703020
Descrizione libro Paperback. Condizione: new. Paperback. The claim that contemporary analytic philosophers rely extensively on intuitions as evidence is almost universally accepted in current meta-philosophical debates and it figures prominently in our self-understanding as analytic philosophers. No matter what area you happen to work in and what views you happen to hold in those areas, you are likely to think that philosophizing requires constructing cases and making intuitive judgments about those cases. This assumptionalso underlines the entire experimental philosophy movement: only if philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence are data about non-philosophers' intuitions of any interest to us. Our alleged relianceon the intuitive makes many philosophers who don't work on meta-philosophy concerned about their own discipline: they are unsure what intuitions are and whether they can carry the evidential weight we allegedly assign to them. The goal of this book is to argue that this concern is unwarranted since the claim is false: it is not true that philosophers rely extensively (or even a little bit) on intuitions as evidence. At worst, analytic philosophers are guilty of engaging in somewhatirresponsible use of 'intuition'-vocabulary. While this irresponsibility has had little effect on first order philosophy, it has fundamentally misled meta-philosophers: it has encouragedmeta-philosophical pseudo-problems and misleading pictures of what philosophy is. The standard view of philosophical methodology is that philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence. Herman Cappelen argues that this claim is false, and reveals how it has encouraged pseudo-problems, presented misguided ideas of what philosophy is, and misled exponents of metaphilosophy and experimental philosophy. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability. Codice articolo 9780198703020