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Descrizione libro Condizione: New. Codice articolo 13969846-n
Descrizione libro Condizione: New. Book is in NEW condition. Codice articolo 0199601380-2-1
Descrizione libro Condizione: New. New! This book is in the same immaculate condition as when it was published. Codice articolo 353-0199601380-new
Descrizione libro HRD. Condizione: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000. Codice articolo L1-9780199601387
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Descrizione libro Condizione: New. Codice articolo 13969846-n
Descrizione libro Hardcover. Condizione: new. Hardcover. The concept of luck has played an important role in debates concerning free will and moral responsibility, yet participants in these debates have relied upon an intuitive notion of what luck is. Neil Levy develops an account of luck, which is then applied to the free will debate. He argues that the standard luck objection succeeds against common accounts of libertarian free will, but that it is possible to amend libertarian accounts so that they are no morevulnerable to luck than is compatibilism. But compatibilist accounts of luck are themselves vulnerable to a powerful luck objection: historical compatibilisms cannot satisfactorily explain how agents can takeresponsibility for their constitutive luck; non-historical compatibilisms run into insurmountable difficulties with the epistemic condition on control over action. Levy argues that because epistemic conditions on control are so demanding that they are rarely satisfied, agents are not blameworthy for performing actions that they take to be best in a given situation. It follows that if there are any actions for which agents are responsible, they are akratic actions; but even these areunacceptably subject to luck. Levy goes on to discuss recent non-historical compatibilisms, and argues that they do not offer a viable alternative to control-based compatibilisms. He suggests that luck underminesour freedom and moral responsibility no matter whether determinism is true or not. The concept of luck plays an important role in debates concerning free will and moral responsibility. It may seem that if our actions are not determined, they are too luck-based to be free. Neil Levy presents an original account of luck and argues that it undermines our freedom and moral responsibility no matter whether determinism is true or not. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability. Codice articolo 9780199601387
Descrizione libro Hardback. Condizione: New. This item is printed on demand. New copy - Usually dispatched within 5-9 working days. Codice articolo C9780199601387
Descrizione libro Condizione: New. Codice articolo ABLIING23Feb2215580055300
Descrizione libro HRD. Condizione: New. New Book. Delivered from our UK warehouse in 4 to 14 business days. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000. Codice articolo L1-9780199601387