Both Truman and Eisenhower combined bully pulpit activity with presidentially directed messages voiced by surrogates whose words were as orchestrated by the administration as those delivered by the presidents themselves. A Review of the private strategizing sessions concerning propaganda activity and the actual propaganda disseminated by the Truman and Eisenhower administrations reveals how they both militarized propaganda operations, allowing the president of the United States to serve as the commander-in-chief of propaganda activity. As the presidents minimized congressional control over propaganda operations, they institutionalized propaganda as a presidential tool, expanded the means by which they and their successors could perform the rhetorical presidency, and increased presidential power over the country's Cold War message, naturalizing the Cold War ideology that resonates yet today. Of particular interest to scholars and students of political communication, the modern presidency, and Cold War history.
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SHAWN J. PARRY-GILES is Assistant Professor of Communication, Affiliate Assistant Professor of Women's Studies, and the Director of the Center for Political Communication Civic Leadership in the Department of Communication, University of Maryland./e Parry-Giles has published in numerous communication journals.Review:
?Mobilization of public opinion has been a central concern for 20th-century US presidents. Inspired especially by Jeffrey Tulis's The Rhetorical Presidency (CH, Apr'88), recent studies of the presidency have looked primarily at such "great communicators" as the Roosevelts, Kennedy, and Reagan. Parry-Giles (Univ. of Maryland) directs attention to the dark underside of the bully pulpit: the use of covert, camouflaged, and manipulative rhetorical practices intended to buttress the power of the office while shielding it from congressional scrutiny and public criticism. In so doing, the author makes a persuasive case for regarding Truman and Eisenhower as important institutional innovators. Making effective use of archival material (some of it only recently declassified), Parry-Giles documents the mid-20th-century shift of emphasis in national propaganda policy from news dissemination to psychological warfare, from openly debated to deeply clandestine initiatives, from legislative involvement to executive control. She discusses how members of Truman's Psychological Strategy Board (created in 1951) were confident that that board's "very existence" was unknown to most members of Congress, and how secrecy--rhetorical surrogates, "plausible deniability"--became hallmarks of the information initiatives implemented by better-known entities such as the CIA. Rekindled enthusiasm for such measures since 9/11 makes this fine book timely as well as relevant. All levels.?-Choice
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Descrizione libro Praeger Publishers, 2001. Hardcover. Condizione libro: New. Codice libro della libreria SONG0275974634
Descrizione libro Praeger, 2001. Hardcover. Condizione libro: New. Codice libro della libreria DADAX0275974634
Descrizione libro Praeger Pub Text, 2001. Hardcover. Condizione libro: Brand New. 230 pages. 9.25x6.25x1.00 inches. In Stock. Codice libro della libreria __0275974634
Descrizione libro Praeger, 2001. Hardcover. Condizione libro: New. book. Codice libro della libreria 0275974634