5000 B.C. and Other Philosophical Fantasies

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9780312295172: 5000 B.C. and Other Philosophical Fantasies

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5000 B.C> and Other Philosophical Fantasies
1 Why Are You Truthful? 1 Why Are You Truthful? MORALIST: I have gathered you good people together on this occasion because I know that you are among the most truthful people on earth, and so I propose that we hold a symposium on truthfulness. I wish to learn from each of you your reasons for being truthful. Adrian, what is your reason for being truthful? ADRIAN: My reason is quite simple. It says in the Bible that one should be truthful, and I take the Bible seriously. Since my greatest duty on earth is obedience to the will of God and God commands me to be truthful, my reason for being truthful is obvious. MORALIST: Very good! And you, Bernard, why are you truthful? BERNARD: I also take the Bible very seriously. The one thing in the Bible that impresses me most is the Golden Rule: Do unto others as you would have others do unto you. Since I wish others to be truthful with me, I am accordingly truthful with them. MORALIST: Excellent! And you, Carey, what are your reasons for being truthful? CAREY: My reasons have nothing to do with religion. I am truthful on purely ethical grounds. I desire to be virtuous, and since truthfulnessis one of the virtues and lying is one of the vices, then to be virtuous it is necessary for me to be truthful. EPISTEMOLOGIST ( who is, strangely enough, in this group though he wasn't invited): I find this reason peculiar! Carey evidently doesn't value truthfulness in its own right but only because it belongs to the more general category of virtue, and it is this more general category that he values. Indeed, his very way of putting it: "To be virtuous it is necessary for me to be truthful," his very use of the word necessary suggests that he is reluctant to be truthful but is nevertheless truthful only as a means to another end, that end being virtue itself. This is what I find so strange! Furthermore, I think-- MORALIST: Sorry to interrupt you, old man, but it was not my intention that we criticize the speakers as they go along. I prefer on this occasion to let the speakers simply state their views; we can reserve critical analysis for another time. And so, Daniel, why are you truthful? DANIEL: My reasons are also nonreligious--or at least nontheistic. I am a great admirer of the ethics of Immanuel Kant. I realize that his ethical attitudes were, at least psychologically, tied up with his religious ones, but many people who reject Kant's theistic views nevertheless accept his moral ones. I am one such person. I am truthful out of obedience to Kant's categorical imperative, which states that one should never perform any act unless one wills that act to be universal law. Since it is obvious that if everybody lied there would be utter chaos, I clearly cannot will it to be universal law that everybody lies. The categorical imperative hence implies that I, too, should not lie. MORALIST: Very good! And you, Edward, what are your reasons for being truthful? EDWARD: My reasons are purely humanistic and utilitarian. It is obvious that truthfulness is beneficial to society, and since my main interest in life is to benefit society, then accordingly I am truthful. MORALIST: Splendid! And you, Frank, why are you truthful? FRANK: In order to live up to my name. Since my name is Frank, then it behooves me to be frank with people. MORALIST: Stop being facetious! This is a serious symposium! What about you, George, why are you truthful? GEORGE: Because I am a selfish bastard! MORALIST: What! GEORGE: Exactly! The few times I have lied, I have ended up getting it in the neck! It's not other people I care about; I care about myself. I don't want any trouble! I have simply learned from hard and bitter experience that honesty is the best policy. MORALIST: What about you, Harry? HARRY: My ethical orientation is rather similar to that of George. But instead of using the rather harsh phrase selfish bastard, I would prefer to classify myself as a hedonist; I perform only those acts calculated to maximize my pleasure in life. I am not as fanatical as George; I place some value on other people's happiness but not as much as on my own. And I have much rational evidence that in the long run I will be happiest if I am always truthful. MORALIST: So you are a hedonist! In other words, you are truthful because it gives you pleasure to be truthful, and you avoid lying because you find lying painful. Is that it? HARRY: Not quite. I do not necessarily derive immediate pleasure from being truthful. Indeed, sometimes it is immediately painful. But I am a thoughtful and rational person; I am always willing to sacrifice my immediate pleasures for the sake of my ultimate good. I always plan ahead. Therefore, I am truthful since as I told you I have rational evidence that my being truthful is best for me in the long run. MORALIST: What is this evidence? HARRY: That is too long a story for us to go into now. I think we should instead hear the views of the other speakers. MORALIST: Very good. What about you, Irving? IRVING: I am also a hedonist. MORALIST: That so far makes three of you! George, Harry, and you. IRVING: Yes, but I am not like the others. MORALIST: How SO? IRVING: You mean how not! By temperament, I feel very different from George, and unlike Harry I am not the rational type of hedonist. Rather, I am a mystical hedonist. MORALIST: A mystical hedonist? That's a strange combination! I have never heard that one before. What on earth do you mean by a mystical hedonist? IRVING (sadly): I don't know! MORALIST: You don't know? How come you don't know? IRVING: Well, you see, since I am a mystical hedonist, I am also a hedonist. I feel that if I knew what I meant by a mystical hedonist, I would be less happy than I am not knowing what I mean. Therefore, on hedonistic grounds it is better that I do not know what I mean by a mystical hedonist. MORALIST: But if you don't even know what you mean by a mystical hedonist, how can you possibly know that you are one? IRVING: Good question! As you say, since I am unable to define a mystical hedonist, I couldn't possibly have rational grounds for knowing that I am one. Yet, in fact, I do know that I am one. This is precisely where my mysticism comes in MORALIST: Oh, my God! This is too complicated for me! IRVING: Me, too. MORALIST: At any rate, what is your reason for being truthful? The same as Harry's? IRVING: The reason is the same, but my justification of the reason is totally different. MORALIST: I don't understand. Can you explain this? IRVING: Why, yes. Like Harry, I believe that my telling the truth is best for me in the long run. But unlike Harry, I have no rationalevidence for this. Indeed, all the rational evidence I have is quite to the contrary. Therefore, the rational thing for me to do is to lie. But I have a strange intuition that I had best tell the truth. And being a mystic, I trust my intuition more than my reason. Hence, I tell the truth. MORALIST: Most extraordinary! And what about you, Jacob? JACOB: My truthfulness is a matter of contingency, not choice. MORALIST: I don't understand you! JACOB: I have simply never had the opportunity to lie. MORALIST: I understand you even less! JACOB: My attitude is as follows: Obviously, no one in his right mind would ever think of lying to his friends; it only makes sense to lie to one's enemies. If any enemy ever threatened to harm me, I would not for a moment hesitate to lie to divert his attack. But since I have no enemies and never have had any enemies, the opportunity for me to lie has never presented itself. MORALIST: How singular! And what about you, Kurt; what are your reasons for being truthful? KURT: I have only one reason. I am truthful simply because I feel like being truthful; I have no other reason than that. MORALIST: But that is no reason! KURT: Of course it is a reason! As I just told you, it's my only reason. MORALIST: But your reason is no good! KURT: Whoever said that I had a good reason? I said that it's my reason; I didn't say it was a good one. MORALIST: Oh, but just because you feel like being truthful, it does not follow that you should be truthful. Of course, I believe that you should be truthful but not merely because you feel like it. There are many things I feel like doing, but I don't do them because I know that I shouldn't do them. Not everything that one feels like doing is necessarily right! So why is your feeling like being truthful an adequate justification of your being truthful? EPISTEMOLOGIST: I thought we weren't supposed to argue with the speakers. MORALIST: I shall ignore that remark. I repeat my question: Just because you feel like being truthful, why does it follow that you should be truthful? KURT: Should be truthful? Who the hell ever said that I should be truthful? MORALIST: Don't tell me now that you believe that you shouldn't be truthful! KURT: Of course not! I don't give a damn what I should or shouldn't do! MORALIST: Oh, come now; surely you want to do what you believe you ought to do! KURT: What I ought to do! I couldn't care less! Look, man, I don't give one hoot for all your ethics, morality, religion, rights and wrongs, oughts and shoulds! As I told you, I feel like being truthful and that is my only reason. MORALIST: But I am trying to explain to you that that reason is inadequate! KURT: I don't give a damm whether it is adequate or not! It so happens I feel like being truthful! Do you mind? MORALIST: No, I don't mind. I don't mind at all. Only you needn't be so belligerent about it! Now what about you, Larry? Why are you truthful? LARRY: Why does a tree grow? MORALIST: Look now, we are not here to play mystical games with each other. I asked you a serious question. LARRY: And I gave you a serious answer. MORALIST: Oh, come now, what does a tree growing have to do with your being truthful? LARRY: More perhaps than you realize. MORALIST: I wish that you would stop giving these cryptic responses! What are you, one of these Zen Buddhists or something? LARRY: Yes. MORALIST: Oh, no wonder you talk in this strange manner! But you can't tell me why you are truthful? LARRY: Can you tell me why a tree grows? MORALIST: I still don't see what the growth of a tree has to do with your being truthful. LARRY: More perhaps than you realize. MORALIST: So we are back to that again! You Zen men are the most frustrating creatures to talk to! LARRY: In that case, why do you talk to us? But I'm glad you called me a creature. That at least shows that you have some insight into the true relationship between me and a tree. MORALIST: Oh, really now, in what significant way are you like a tree? LARRY: In what significant way am I different? MORALIST: Oh, surely now, you regard yourself as a little more significant than a tree, don't you? LARRY: Not at all. MORALIST: But do you not realize that a tree is at a lower stage of life than a man? LARRY: I find your use of the word lower ill advised. It is psychologically misleading and sets an emotional tone that is tantamount to begging the question. I would prefer to say that a tree is at an earlier stage of life. MORALIST: Let's not be pedantic and quibble about words! In this context, lower and earlier mean exactly the same thing LARRY: Oh no they don't! Objectively they may have the same meaning in this context but subjectively they certainly do not. One would say that a child is at an earlier stage of life than an adult but surely not at a lower stage This latter mode of speech gives the impression that an adult is superior to a child, which I don't believe many would wish to do. MORALIST: All right, have it your way; so you're not superior to a tree. But why are you truthful? And please don't answer my question again with the question, "Why does a tree grow?" LARRY: If you tell me why a tree grows, then perhaps I can tell you why I am truthful. MORALIST: I still don't see the connection between the two! Why must I first tell you why a tree grows? LARRY: Because I have great difficulty understanding your use of the word why. I was hoping that if you told me why a tree grows then I could gather enough data on your use of this word to help me answer your question more satisfactorily. MORALIST: Oh, so our difficulty is semantical! In that case, I'll use a different word. What is your reason for being truthful? LARRY: Does everything have to have a reason? MORALIST: Well of course! LARRY: Really now! Does a tree have a reason for growing? MORALIST: Of course not. At least, I don't think so. LARRY: Then why should I have a reason for being truthful? MORALIST: Because you are not a tree! LARRY: So because I am not a tree, it follows that I should have a reason for being truthful? MORALIST: Oh heavens, you are only confusing matters! Look, a tree is not a conscious being; it has no free will and makes no choices. So one would hardly expect a tree to have a reason for growing, but one would expect you to have a reason for what you do! LARRY: I grant you that if I were not conscious then I would not possibly have a reason for anything I do. But it does not therefore follow that because I am conscious I must have a reason for everything I do. In particular, I have absolutely no reason for being truthful. MORALIST: No reason? None at all? LARRY: None whatsoever! MORALIST: Fantastic! In other words, you are in the same category as Kurt. You feel like being truthful and that is the only reason you are. LARRY: No, no, not at all! You totally miss my point! As Kurt told you, his feeling like being truthful is, for him, his reason for being truthful. But I have no reason at all! MORALIST: You mean that you don't even feel like being truthful? LARRY: What a strange non sequitur! Of course I feel like being truthful; otherwise I wouldn't be truthful. MORALIST: So I was right! That is your reason for being truthful. LARRY: I am sorry, but you are still confused. I both feel like being truthful and am truthful but there is no evidence that either of these two phenomena is the reason of the other. MORALIST: Look, I just can't believe that you have no reason at all for being truthful! You must have a reason; you just don't know what it is! LARRY: At this point, I am not sure just which of several possible meanings of the word reason you have in mind. When you ask the reason for my being truthful, are you asking for my motive or purpose in being truthful, or are you seeking the cause of my truthfulness? Or are you perhaps asking whether I am truthful out of some principle like virtue or duty or obedience to God or the desire to serve humanity or to be personally well off? Which of these meanings do you have in mind? MORALIST: Take your choice! LARRY: I would rather you choose. MORALIST: Very well then. Which of these principles you mentioned is relevant to your case? LARRY: None of them. MORALIST: Then what is the principle you follow? LARRY: None whatsoever. I am not truthful on principle. MORALIST: All right then, let's go over to another of your suggested meanings, cause. What is the cause of your being truthful? LARRY: I have no idea. MORALIST: Aren't you helpful! LARRY: I am trying to be. MORALIST: You certainly don't seem to be trying! At any rate, let's go on to the next possibility. What is your motive or purpose in being truthful? LARRY: I am not aware of any motive, and I certainly ...

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