Law and Economics - Rilegato

Rilegato

ISBN 10: 0415410835 ISBN 13: 9780415410830

Casa editrice: Routledge, 2007

Edited and introduced by a leading academic in the field, this is a new Routledge Major Work in the Critical Concepts in Law series. Law and Economics is a five-volume collection of canonical and cutting-edge research on the application of economic theory - primarily microeconomics and the basic concepts of welfare economics―to the examination of the formation, structure, processes and economic impact of law and legal institutions. Economic concepts have been applied to explain and clarify legal issues, not only with respect to competition law, but also in respect of a wide range of non-market activities, ranging from issues of tortuous liability and compensation, to family matters and crime. Law and Economics has influenced legislation and the development of Anglo-American case law and has become a central part of legal and economic education and research at some of the most prestigious universities on both sides of the Atlantic.

This collection provides users with a collection of original articles that represent the source materials upon which each of the various Law and Economics schools of thought are founded―including the Chicago approach and the New Haven School; public-choice theory and modern civic republicanism; institutional law and economics and the new institutional economics; social norms and law and economics; and Austrian law and economics. As well as the editor’s selection of foundational texts, his collection also brings together and makes readily accessible the very best of cutting-edge research in Law and Economics.
Including a newly written introduction to each school of thought, a comprehensive index, and a chronological table of the articles, Law and Economics is a unique and valuable research resource for both student and scholar.

Le informazioni nella sezione "Riassunto" possono far riferimento a edizioni diverse di questo titolo.

Contenuti:

VOLUME 1: CHICAGO LAW AND ECONOMICS
1. Melvin W. Reder, ‘Chicago Economics: Permanence and Change’, Journal of Economic Literature, 20, 1, 1982, pp. 1–10, 36–8.
2. Ronald H. Coase, ‘Law and Economics at Chicago’, Journal of Law and Economics, 36, 1993, pp. 239–54.
3. Ronald H. Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, Journal of Law and Economics, 3, 1960, pp. 1–44.
4. Guido Calabresi, ‘Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts’, Yale Law Journal, 70, 4, 1961, pp. 499–553.
5. Steven G. Medema, ‘Legal Fiction: The Place of the Coase Theorem in Law and Economics’, Economics and Philosophy, 15, 1999, pp. 209–33.
6. Charles K. Rowley, ‘Wealth Maximization in Normative Law and Economics’, George Mason Law Review, 6, 4, 1998, pp. 971–96.
7. Paul H. Rubin, ‘Micro and Macro Legal Efficiency: Supply and Demand’, Supreme Court Economic Review, 13, 2005, pp. 19–34.
8. Thomas W. Merrill and Henry E. Smith, ‘What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?’, Yale Law Journal, 111, 2, Nov. 2001, pp. 357–98.
9. Eric Posner, ‘Economic Analysis of Contract Law after Three Decades: Success or Failure?’, Yale Law Journal, 112, 2003, pp. 829–80.
10. James R. Hackney, Jr., ‘Law and Neoclassical Economics: Science, Politics, and the Reconfiguration of American Tort Law Theory’, Law and History Review, 15, 1997, pp. 275–322.
11. William Kovacic and Carl Shapiro, ‘Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14, 2000, pp. 43–60.
12. Fred S. McChesney, ‘Talking ’Bout My Antitrust Generation’, Regulation, Fall 2004, pp. 48–55.
13. A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, ‘The Economic Theory of the Public Enforcement of Law’, Journal of Economic Literature, 38, 1, 2000, pp. 45–76.
14. James Ryerson, ‘The Outrageous Pragmatism of Judge Richard Posner’, Lingua Franca, 10, 4, 2000, pp. 1–17.
VOLUME 2: PUBLIC CHOICE
15. William Breit, ‘Creating the Virginia School: Charlottesville as an Academic Environment in the 1960s’, Economic Inquiry, 25, 4, 1987, pp. 645–57.
16. Peter Boettke, ‘James M. Buchanan and the Rebirth of Political Economy’, in Richard P. F. Holt and Steven Pressman (eds.), Economics and Its Discontents: Twentieth Century Dissenting Economists (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1998), pp. 21–39.
17. James M. Buchanan, ‘Political Economy: 1957–82’, in James M. Buchanan (ed.), Liberty, Market and the State (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1986), pp. 8–18.
18. James M. Buchanan, ‘The Public Choice Perspective’, in James M. Buchanan (ed.), Liberty, Market and the State (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1986), pp. 19–27.
19. James M. Buchanan, ‘The Domain of Constitutional Economics’, Constitutional Political Economy, 1, 1, 1990, pp. 1–18.
20. Gordon Tullock, ‘The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft’, Western Economic Journal, 5, 3, 1967, pp. 224–32.
21. Anne O. Krueger, ‘The Political Economy of the Rest-Seeking Society’, American Economic Review, 64, 3, 1974, pp. 291–303.
22. Robert D. Tollison, ‘Is the Theory of Rent-Seeking Here to Stay?’, in Charles K. Rowley (ed.), Democracy and Public Choice (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1987), pp. 143–57.
23. Gordon Tullock, ‘Rent Seeking and the Law’, in Jos� Casas Pardo and Friedrich Schneider (eds.), Current Issues in Public Choice (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1996), pp. 179–88.
24. Daniel A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey, ‘Interest Groups and the Political Process’, in Law and Public Choice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp. 12–37.
25. Andr� Blais and St�phane Dion, ‘Are Bureaucrats Budget Maximizers? The Niskanen Model and Its Critics’, Polity, 22, 4, 1990, pp. 655–74.
26. Morten Egeberg, ‘Bureaucrats as Public Policy-Makers and Their Self Interests’, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 7, 2, 1995, pp. 157–67.
27. Maxwell L. Stearns, ‘Restoring Positive Law and Economics: Introduction to Public Choice Theme Issue’, George Mason Law Review, 6, 4, 1998, pp. 709–44.
28. Erin Ann O’Hara, ‘Opting Out of Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis of Contractual Choice of Law’, Vanderbilt Law Review, 53, 5, 2000, pp. 1551–604.
29. Richard L. Revesz, ‘Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis’, Harvard Law Review, 115, 2, 2001, pp. 555–78.
30. Paul Rubin, ‘Public Choice and Tort Reform’, Public Choice, 124, 1–2, 2005, pp. 223–36.
31. Tom Ginsburg, ‘Ways of Criticizing Public Choice’, University of Illinois Law Review, 4, 2002, pp. 1139–66.
32. Guido Pincione, ‘Should Law Professors Teach Public Choice Theory?’, Chicago-Kent Law Review, 79, 2, 2004, pp. 451–70.
33. David A. Skeel, Jr., ‘Public Choice and the Future of Public-Choice Influenced Legal Scholarship’, Vanderbilt Law Review, 50, 3, 1997, pp. 647–76.
VOLUME 3: INSTITUTIONAL LAW AND ECONOMICS AND NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS
Part 1: Institutional Law and Economics
34. John R. Commons, ‘Institutional Economics’, American Economic Review, 21, 4, 1931, pp. 648–57.
35. Malcolm Rutherford, ‘Institutional Economics: Then and Now’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15, 3, 2001, pp. 173–94.
36. John R. Commons, ‘Law and Economics’, Yale Law Journal, 34, 4, 1925, pp. 371–82.
37. Warren J. Samuels and A. Allan Schmid, ‘Introduction’, Law and Economics: An Institutional Perspective (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishing, 1981), pp. 1–6.
38. A. Allan Schmid, ‘A General Paradigm of Institutions and Performance’, Property, Power, and Public Choice: An Inquiry into Law and Economics (New York: Praeger, 1987), pp. 3–24.
39. A. Allan Schmid, ‘Property in a Social Context’, Property, Power, and Public Choice: An Inquiry into Law and Economics (New York: Praeger, 1987), pp. 25–35.
40. Warren J. Samuels, ‘The Legal-Economic Nexus’, George Washington Law Review, 57, 6, 1989, pp. 1556–78.
41. Daniel W. Bromley, ‘Property Rights: Locke, Kant, Peirce and the Logic of Volitional Pragmatism’, in Harvey Martin Jacobs (ed.), Private Property in the 21st Century: The Future of an American Ideal (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2004), pp. 19–30.
42. Arild Vatn, ‘Environmental Resources, Property Regimes, and Efficiency’, Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 19, 5, 2001, pp. 665–80.
43. Geoffrey M. Hodgson, ‘What Are Institutions?’, Journal of Economic Issues, 40, 1, 2006, pp. 1–25.
Part 2: New Institutional Economics
44. Oliver E. Williamson, ‘The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock/Looking Ahead’, ISNIE Newsletter, Fall 1999, pp. 9–20.
45. Rudolf Richter, ‘The New Institutional Economics: Its Start, its Meaning, its Prospects’, European Business Organization Law Review, 6, 2, 2005, pp. 161–200.
46. Douglass C. North, ‘Transaction Costs, Institutions, and Economic History’, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 140, 1984, pp. 7–17.
47. Douglass C. North, ‘An Introduction to Institutions and Institutional Change’, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 3–10.
48. Douglass C. North, ‘Institutions, Economic Theory, and Economic Performance’, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 107–17.
49. Yoram Barzel, ‘The Property Rights Model’, Economic Analysis of Property Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 1–12.
50. Barry R. Weingast, ‘The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development’, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 11, 1, 1995, pp. 1–31.
51. Oliver E. Williamson, ‘Transaction Cost Economics and Organization Theory’, Industrial and Corporate Change, 2, 1, 1993, pp. 107–56.
52. Claude M�nard, ‘The Economics of Hybrid Organizations’, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 160, 3, 2004, pp. 345–76.
53. Richard A. Posner, ‘The New Institutional Economics Meets Law and Economics’, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 149, 1, 1993, pp. 73–87.
54. Robert C. Ellickson, ‘Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms’, Journal of Legal Studies, 27, 2, 1998, pp. 537–52.

VOLUME 4:SOCIAL NORMS AND LAW AND ECONOMICS
55. Kenneth J. Koford and Jeffrey B. Miller, ‘Habit, Custom, and Norms in Economics’, in Kenneth J. Koford and Jeffrey B. Miller (eds.), Social Norms and Economic Institutions (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991), pp. 21–36.
56. Richard Posner, ‘Social Norms and the Law: An Economic Approach’, The American Economic Review, 87, 2, 1997, pp. 365–9.
57. Richard H. McAdams, ‘The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms’, Michigan Law Review, 96, 2, 1997, pp. 338–75, 391–433.
58. Robert Cooter, ‘Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of Internalized Norms’, Virginia Law Review, 86, 8, 2000, pp. 1577–601.
59. Lawrence Lessig, ‘Social Meaning and Social Norms’, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 144, 5, 1996, pp. 2181–9.
60. Cass R. Sunstein, ‘Social Norms and Social Roles’, Columbia Law Review, 96, 4, 1996, pp. 903–31, 947–68.
61. Eric Posner, ‘Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and Law’, Journal of Legal Studies, 27, 2, 1998, pp. 765–98.
62. Lawrence E. Mitchell, ‘Understanding Norms’, University of Toronto Law Journal, 49, 2, 1999, pp. 177–225, 235–48.
63. Jeffrey Rosen, ‘The Social Police’, The New Yorker, 20 and 27 Oct. 1997, pp. 170–81.
64. Lawrence Lessig, ‘The New Chicago School’, Journal of Legal Studies, 27, 2, 1998, pp. 661–91.
65. Lisa Bernstein, ‘Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry’, Journal of Legal Studies, 21, 1, 1992, pp. 115–57.
66. Eric A. Feldman, ‘The Tuna Court: Law and Norms in the World’s Premier Fish Market’, California Law Review, 94, 2, 2006, pp. 1–47.
VOLUME 5: NEW HAVEN SCHOOL, MODERN CIVIC REPUBLICANISM, AUSTRIAN LAW AND ECONOMICS
Part 1: New Haven School
67. Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral’, Harvard Law Review, 85, 6, 1972, pp. 1089–128.
68. Guido Calabresi, ‘The Renaissance of Accident Law Plans’, The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis (New Haven: Yale University, 1970), pp. 3–16.
69. Guido Calabresi, ‘Goals and Subgoals of Accident Law’, The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis (New Haven: Yale University, 1970), pp. 24–33.
70. Susan Rose-Ackerman, ‘Progressive Law and Economics: And the New Administrative Law’, Yale Law Journal, 98, 2, 1988, pp. 341–68.
71. Bruce A. Ackerman and Richard B. Stewart, ‘Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case for Market Incentives’, Columbia Journal of Environmental Law, 13, 2, 1988, pp. 171–99.
72. John J. Donohue, ‘Opting for the British Rule, or If Posner and Shavell Can’t Remember the Coase Theorem, Who Will?’, Harvard Law Review, 104, 5, 1991, pp. 1093–119.
Part 2: Modern Civic Republicanism
73. Frank Michelman, ‘Law’s Republic’, Yale Law Journal, 97, 8, 1988, pp. 1493–537.
74. Cass R. Sunstein, ‘Beyond the Republican Revival’, Yale Law Journal, 97, 8, 1988, pp. 1539–90.
75. Jonathon Poisner, ‘A Civic Republican Perspective on the National Environmental Policy Act’s Process for Citizen Participation’, Environmental Law, 26, 1, 1996, pp. 53–94.
Part 3: Austrian Law and Economics
76. Roy E. Cordato, ‘Introduction’, Welfare Economics and Externalities in an Open-Ended Universe: A Modern Austrian Perspective (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992), pp. 1–10, 12–13.
77. Roy E. Cordato, ‘The Genealogy of the Austrian Position’, Welfare Economics and Externalities in an Open-Ended Universe: A Modern Austrian Perspective (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992), pp. 15–37.
78. Gregory Scott Crespi, ‘Exploring the Complicationist Gambit: An Austrian Approach to the Economic Analysis of Law’, Notre Dame Law Review, 73, 2, 1998, pp. 315–55, 369–83.
79. Linda A. Schwartzstein, ‘An Austrian Economic View of the Legal Process’, Ohio State Law Journal, 55, 5, 1994, pp. 1049–78.
80. Rob Teijl and Rudi W. Holzhauer, ‘The Impact of the Austrian School on Law and Economics’, in Boudewijn Bouckaert and Gerrit De Geest (eds.), Essays in Law and Economics II: Contract Law, Regulation, and Reflections on Law and Economics (Antwerp: Maklu Utigevers, 1995), pp. 248–65.