In this major interpretation of the crisis of democracy in Italy after World War I, Douglas Forsyth uses unpublished documents in Italy's central state archives, as well as private papers, diplomatic and bank archives in Italy, France, Britain and the United States, to analyse monetary and financial policy in Italy from the outbreak of war until the march on Rome. The study focuses on real and perceived conflicts and often painful choices between great power politics, economic growth, macroeconomic stabilisation and the preservation or strengthening of democratic consensus. The key issue explored is why governments in Italy after World War I, although headed by left-liberal reformers, were unable to press ahead with the democratic reformism which had characterised the so-called 'Giolittian era', 1901–1914. Their failure paved the way for parliamentary deadlock and Mussolini's seizure of power.
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'Forsyth's study is impressively researched, well organized and clearly written.' Christopher Duggan, The Times Literary SupplementBook Description:
An important interpretation of the crisis of democracy in Italy after World War I. Professor Forsyth argues that liberal governments considered economic stability ahead of redistributive social policies and, in so doing, lost their electoral support and enabled Mussolini to rise to power.
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Descrizione libro Cambridge University Press, 2009. Printed Access Code. Condizione libro: New. book. Codice libro della libreria 0511523289