This is a study of how and why the Byzantine empire lost many of its most valuable provinces to Islamic conquerors in the seventh century, provinces that included Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia and Armenia. It investigates conditions on the eve of those conquests, mistakes in Byzantine policy toward the Muslims, the course of the military campaigns, and the problem of local official and civilian collaboration with the Muslims. It also seeks to explain how after some terrible losses the Byzantine government achieved some intellectual rationalization of its disasters and began the complex process of transforming and adapting its fiscal and military institutions and political controls in order to prevent further disintegration.
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The Byzantine empire lost many of its most valuable provinces to Islamic conquerors in the seventh century, including Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia and Armenia. This study investigates the eve of the conquests, as well as how the Byzantine government eventually came to rationalize its disasters.From the Back Cover:
This book presents an enquiry into a fundamental historical problem in early Byzantine history: why the Byzantine Empire failed to contain emergent Islam in the new religion's initial years, and in particular how and why the Byzantines first lost Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia, and Armenia before partial recovery.
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Descrizione libro Cambridge University Press, 1992. Hardcover. Condizione libro: New. Codice libro della libreria P110521411726