Open Skies: Transparency, Confidence-Building, and the End of the Cold War - Rilegato

Jones, Peter

Rilegato

ISBN 10: 0804790981 ISBN 13: 9780804790987

Casa editrice: Stanford Security Studies, 2014

Riassunto

This book recounts and analyzes the history of one of the best-kept diplomatic and security secrets of the last half-century—the Open Skies Treaty: a treaty that allows the U.S., the Russian Federation, and over 30 other signatories to fly unarmed reconnaissance aircraft over one another's territory. First proposed by President Eisenhower in 1955, shelved by succeeding administrations, re-launched by President George H. W. Bush in 1989, and finally ratified in 2002, the Treaty has been one of the most important security instruments of the 21st century—with over 1,000 flights logged to date providing confidence for the governments, intelligence communities, and militaries of former and potential adversaries.

Written by a professor and former diplomat who was deeply involved in the negotiations of the Open Skies Treaty from 1989 to 1995, this book is a meticulous work of political history that explores how Open Skies affected, and was affected by, the extraordinary times of its negotiation—during which the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union collapsed. But it is also a potential blueprint for future applications of the Open Skies concept by providing insights into the role that cooperative aerial monitoring can play in helping to transform other difficult relationships around the world. As such it will serve as a negotiation handbook for diplomats, bureaucrats, and politicians and as a case-study textbook for IR students and students of diplomacy.

Su questo libro

Informazioni sull?autore

Peter Jones teaches in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa, Canada.

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Open Skies

Transparency, Confidence-Building, and the End of the Cold War

By Peter Jones

STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

Copyright © 2014 Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University
All rights reserved.

ISBN: 978-0-8047-9098-7

Contents

Preface, 
Foreword by Sidney D. Drell, 
Introduction, 
1. From the First Open Skies Initiative to the Stockholm Conference, 
2. Open Skies Reborn, 
3. The Issues Explored, 
4. The Ottawa and Budapest Conferences, 
5. Interim Negotiations, 
6. The First Vienna Round, 
7. End-Game, 
8. Into Force and Into the Future, 
Conclusion, 
Notes, 
Bibliography, 
Index, 

CHAPTER 1

From the First Open Skies Initiative to the Stockholm Conference

May 1989 was not the first time the idea of an Open Skies regime was put forward. President Dwight D. Eisenhower proposed such a regime in Geneva in July of 1955 at the Four Power (U.S., USSR, UK, and France) Summit. The considerations that prompted the first initiative bear resemblance to those of the 1989 version. In both cases a small group of presidential advisors were instrumental in imposing a "top-down" initiative on an unwilling U.S. bureaucracy. In both cases the adoption of the initiative had a great deal to do with the political needs of the moment, and particularly a desire to publicly test the leadership of the USSR.

Indeed, historians—particularly those who have studied the 1955 Open Skies initiative with the benefit of access to declassified archives—are divided as to Eisenhower's motives. Some believe it represented a real desire to propose a measure that would have benefited both sides and reduced tensions and fear of surprise attack. Others regard it as having been a somewhat cynical ploy that was never intended to be accepted, but rather to expose the Soviet penchant for extreme secrecy and contrast it unfavorably with a U.S. willingness to "take risks for peace." In the latter connection, it will be recalled that desultory nuclear disarmament discussions were underway at this time, and there was a perception in many quarters that the United States was not prepared to entertain serious proposals for disarmament. In fact, we now know that there was a raging debate within the U.S. government over whether it would be possible to pursue serious negotiations on disarmament with the Soviets, who were widely perceived to be far ahead in conventional weaponry, and also fundamentally untrustworthy. Moreover, given that Eisenhower had decided to rely on the threat of massive nuclear retaliation for Soviet transgressions, even conventional ones, there were suspicions that the U.S. was simply not interested in seriously pursuing nuclear disarmament.

The idea for Open Skies arose during a meeting of a small group of analysts working for presidential advisor Nelson Rockefeller. Rockefeller, whose mandate was to "find ways to exploit Soviet vulnerabilities on information, ideology and international issues," had brought the group together in advance of the upcoming Geneva Summit. His charge to the group was to come up with initiatives that might be used by the president at the summit to demonstrate U.S. willingness to consider real arms control, and to test the Soviets' willingness to do the same. This group met at the Quantico Marine base in Virginia between June 5 and 10, 1955.

The Quantico panel was aware of the superiority enjoyed by the United States in most areas of the military competition, and especially in the nuclear sphere. Nevertheless, the extreme secrecy of the Soviet state made it difficult for U.S. planners to get a firm grip on the extent of Soviet military capability. There were also concerns that misperceptions might lead to an inadvertent escalation during a crisis. It will be remembered that surveillance satellites had not yet been deployed, and U.S. U2 reconnaissance flights did not yet exist.

The idea of cooperative aerial inspections was suggested by Max Millikan of the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), who had heard it discussed at a seminar in Cambridge, Massachusetts. The Quantico panel was impressed by the idea. They particularly liked the fact that it would test the Soviets' willingness to accept the kind of intrusive measures necessary for the verification of the disarmament proposals then under discussion. Open Skies was thus seen as a winwin: if the Soviets accepted it, the United States would gain access to vast areas it could not presently monitor; if the Soviets rejected it, a dramatic and easily understood public relations point would have been scored by a U.S. that would be seen as being prepared to accept intrusive inspections for peace against a USSR that was not. Accordingly, the group included a recommendation for some type of intrusive aerial inspection regime in their report to Rockefeller on June 10, 1955.

Rockefeller presented the idea to the president in early July. Eisenhower was attracted to it, but his secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, was leery. Although he had some reservations about the proposal itself, Dulles's main concern was that the president not be stampeded into making proposals for the sake of the moment that the United States might come to regret at a later date. It should also be said that an intense rivalry existed between Rockefeller and Dulles, with the latter being especially jealous of his prerogative as the main presidential advisor on foreign policy matters. Also involved in this discussion was presidential disarmament advisor Harold Stassen, who saw Open Skies as a way to shift U.S. nuclear disarmament proposals from an "all or nothing" approach to one in which specific issues—such as the inspection regime that would be necessary for disarmament—could be tackled one by one. In this, Stassen was also opposed by Dulles, who did not believe that the Soviets were interested in real disarmament and could not be trusted. Dulles was concerned that Soviet disarmament proposals were a propaganda ploy designed to undermine U.S. public support for continued development of nuclear weapons and to split the Western alliance, and he believed that the United States should avoid discussion of them.

When Eisenhower left for Geneva, then, Open Skies was not on his list of matters to be raised. Instead, Dulles had won, and the president went to Geneva prepared to listen to whatever the Soviets might offer. It had, after all, been their idea to hold the summit in the first place. Indeed, both Eisenhower and Dulles had been leery of the whole summit idea, fearing that little of substance would be accomplished and that the Soviets might score a propaganda victory at the West's expense. But they recognized that their allies, France and the UK, were keen on the summit for their own internal political reasons and that world opinion was also receptive to the idea. Eisenhower therefore agreed to Dulles's advice on Open Skies but asked Rockefeller to have members of his staff familiar with the plan in Geneva, in case he changed his mind.

As the summit unfolded, Eisenhower became uneasy at the fact that little of substance was being proposed by either side. The U.S. news media was becoming somewhat restive, and the president wanted to make a statement of "drama and substance." Rockefeller once again raised the idea of Open Skies during an evening meeting in the president's quarters. This time the president was prepared to accept the idea and overruled Dulles.

The next day, July 18, 1955, Eisenhower made a statement intended to lay the ground for Open Skies. In it the president spoke of the dangers of surprise attack in the nuclear age:

Perhaps, therefore, we should consider whether the problem of the limitation of armament may not best be approached by seeking—as a first step—dependable ways to supervise and inspect military establishments, so that there can be no frightful surprises, whether by sudden attack or by secret violation of agreed restrictions.

This statement was treated as little more than a part of a wide-ranging opening statement. Eisenhower did, however, take the opportunity of a meeting with Soviet defense minister Zhukov on July 20 (the two had collaborated closely during the war and were personal acquaintances) to test Zhukov's possible reaction to the idea of inspections. Eisenhower asked Zhukov what he might think of the idea of an inspection system "of large installations, such as airfields, long-range bombers and guided missile factories that could not be hidden." Zhukov indicated acceptance in principle: "[W]hile its detail should be studied, he [Zhukov] was, in principle, in full agreement with the President's remarks." Zhukov went on to say that he understood that the purpose of the inspections would be to provide a guarantee against surprise attack.

It is unclear if Zhukov fully understood what Eisenhower was proposing in this discussion. Zhukov may have believed that Eisenhower was raising some variant of an idea that the USSR had itself proposed on May 10, 1955, for a far-reaching agreement to prohibit nuclear weapons and reduce conventional arms. The May 10 proposal included as its verification system the idea of a set of ground inspections at fixed points, such as ports, major road and rail arteries, airports, and so on. The May 10 Soviet proposal had been rejected by the United States as insufficient, an attempt to divide the allies and an attempt to capitalize on the Soviet conventional military superiority, but perhaps Zhukov felt that Eisenhower wanted to explore a part of it further.

The next day, on the morning of July 21, 1955, Eisenhower delivered the Open Skies proposal. After stating that "[no] sound and reliable agreement can be made unless it is completely covered by an inspection and reporting system, adequate to support every portion of the agreement," Eisenhower stated:

I should address myself principally to the delegates from the Soviet Union, because our two great countries admittedly possess new and terrible weapons in quantities which do give rise in other parts of the world, or reciprocally, to fears and dangers of surprise attack. I propose, therefore, that we take a practical step, that we begin an arrangement, very quickly, as between ourselves—immediately. These steps would include: to give each other a complete blueprint of our military establishments, from beginning to end, from one end of our countries to the other; lay out the establishments and provide blueprints to each other. Next, to provide within our countries facilities for aerial photography to the other country—we to provide you the facilities within our country, ample facilities for aerial reconnaissance, where you make all the pictures you choose and take them to your country to study, you to provide exactly the same facilities for us.... Likewise we will make more easily attainable a comprehensive and effective system of disarmament, because what I propose, I assure you, would be but a beginning.

The effect of Eisenhower's proposal was considerable. The leaders of France and the UK immediately offered to support the plan (the UK's prime minister had been briefed by Eisenhower that morning). The Soviet delegation expressed interest, but more cautiously. Nevertheless, as he recorded in his memoirs, Eisenhower had some hope when the meeting ended:

For a time it appeared that the intransigent Soviet refusal to permit any useful inspection system in the USSR might be effectively shaken. The proposal, Bulganin declared, seemed to have real merit, and the Soviets would give it complete and sympathetic study at once. The tone of his talk seemed as encouraging as his words.

Once the microphones were switched off, however, the Soviets lost no time in expressing their true feelings over the idea. That same day Khrushchev informed the president that he did not agree with Bulganin's public statements:

From that moment until the final adjournment of the conference, I wasted no more time probing Mr. Bulganin; I devoted myself exclusively to an attempt to persuade Mr. Khrushchev on the merit of the Open Skies plan, but to no avail. He said the idea was nothing more than a bald espionage plot against the USSR, and to this line of argument he stubbornly adhered.

The reasons for Soviet suspicion of the first Open Skies proposal would prove quite similar to their initial suspicions of the 1989 proposal. Certain segments of the Soviet military were concerned that the United States would use unfettered overflights to gain information that could improve their targeting of the USSR. As one analyst later noted:

[In] 1955 the United States possessed all the necessary weapons for a counterforce nuclear attack against the Soviet Union. The major obstacle to confidence that such an attack could be carried out without a massive Soviet counter-attack was the lack of accurate and complete targeting data. The US Strategic Air Command was faced with a rapidly expanding target list.... In this context, the Open Skies plan can be seen as a military intelligence measure of the highest importance, one which would strengthen the weakest link in the US nuclear war-fighting plans.

Moreover, as Vladislav Zubok, a Russian scholar of the period, notes, "Essentially, this proposal [Open Skies] ... was a last minute attempt of the US experts in psychological warfare to top evident Soviet propagandist achievements with one spectacular initiative." Zubok continues:

The Soviet reaction to Open Skies at the Geneva Conference was ... justified by the existing rules of the Cold War; the US would have gained from aerial intelligence much more than the Soviet Union, and, besides, at that time the effectiveness of the Soviet "deterrent" still relied predominantly on the preservation of uncertainty and ignorance in the US about the true size of the Soviet strategic arsenal (in reality it was almost nonexistent, with the exception of a few "Myasischev" bombers that could make one-way flights to the United States but could not return).

Although the Soviets had killed the idea, it received a generally positive reception from the Western press. For this reason, the Soviets could not appear unwilling to discuss it. Over the next few years, fitful talks were conducted. Various proposals were put forward to implement Open Skies in stages in different geographical locations. As in 1989, Canada became interested in the idea. Ottawa would later propose a trial Open Skies regime in the Arctic that the Soviets would quickly reject. Other allies, most notably France and Germany, would be suspicious of various other plans for regional applications of aerial inspections in different zones of Europe, which they saw as potentially weakening the alliance or otherwise creating tendencies that could have encouraged the German public toward neutrality.

Interestingly, ideas surfaced in the Open Skies talks of this period that would arise thirty-five years later. The Soviets, for example, argued that any flight conducted over their territory, or the territory of their allies, would have to be on a host-country supplied aircraft. They also asked that they be entitled to overfly U.S. bases in third countries. Many years later, a Soviet diplomat, who had spent several years as ambassador to Washington, wrote that Open Skies had been discussed at a presidium meeting after the Geneva Conference. Khrushchev insisted that Eisenhower had been bluffing and took the view "that no one in the US Congress would agree to allow Soviet planes to fly over, say, the Capitol in Washington." This raises the intriguing possibility that Khrushchev, who was known for an impetuous streak, might have been tempted to agree to Open Skies in the expectation that the United States would then publicly walk back from it. However we shall never know, because the Politburo "would not even hear of letting American planes fly over Soviet territory and rejected Khrushchev's tactic."

Despite the discussions on the idea of applying Open Skies in different geographic zones, which went on for some years, the United States decided after Geneva that it would not prove acceptable to Moscow. Accordingly, Washington went ahead with a program designed to fill its knowledge gaps by unilateral means. The U2 high-altitude reconnaissance plane was under development at the time Eisenhower went to Geneva in 1955. It was succeeded by more advanced reconnaissance aircraft and by surveillance satellites. Interestingly, Open Skies would intersect with the U2 one more time. At the Paris Summit in May of 1960, Eisenhower wanted to make one last attempt to get Soviet agreement to some version of an Open Skies regime. But the summit exploded before he could do so when Khrushchev made public the fact that the USSR had shot down Francis Gary Powers's U2 shortly before the summit and demanded an apology. Eisenhower refused, and the summit collapsed.

In a sense, however, the Open Skies proposal lived up to one of the aims of the Quantico panel; it tested the Soviets' willingness to accept intrusive inspections, and they were found wanting in a very public way. Over the succeeding years, Western politicians would point to the Soviet refusal to accept Open Skies as proof of the sinister, totalitarian character of the Soviet government. Although some of this rhetoric might have been, as the Canadian foreign minister would later say, "forced, but nevertheless justified," it was effective in pointing out the differences between the USSR and the West in a dramatic way that the public would readily understand. As one Soviet officer would later say:

We believed for a long time that everything—or virtually everything relating to the military sphere—should be shrouded in an impenetrable veil of secrecy and the thicker this veil of secrecy, the more secure we supposedly are. But it transpired that excessive secrecy did not enhance but weakened our security since the opposing side could believe—and often did—that we were hatching most perfidious plans in secret and preparing most unpredictable actions.

(Continues...)

Excerpted from Open Skies by Peter Jones. Copyright © 2014 Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. Excerpted by permission of STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS.
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Dettagli dell?edizione

• Editore: Stanford Security Studies
• Data di pubblicazione: 2014
• Lingua: Inglese
• ISBN 10: 0804790981
• ISBN 13: 9780804790987
• Rilegatura: Copertina rigida
• Numero di pagine: 244
• Contatto del produttore: non disponibile
• Persona responsabile: non disponibile