We have a certain amount of sadness as we read of the bankruptcy of Delphi Corporation, and the losses and downsizing of General Motors (GM) and Ford. GM and Ford were the world leaders in automobile manufacturing, the richest companies in the world. What happened? Could it have been prevented? And have they, and we, learned a very important lesson to not repeat the mistakes from past? The very purpose of this book is to examine what were the principle things that did go wrong and to give modern managers specific guidelines to think about today to be internationally competitive.
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In my own personal journey, studying Toyota and the other leading Japanese manufacturers these past twenty five years, I was continually amazed at what I discovered and was continually puzzled why GM and Ford did not do what I did, learn from the best and then to forcefully apply the new methodologies in their companies.
On my first study mission to Japan in February 1981, I visited the American Embassy in Tokyo and met with the information officer. His job was to study the best Japanese technologies and to have that information translated to English to help American companies stay abreast of what was happening in Japan. I was furious at him to have not discovered what Toyota was doing to go from producers of "junk" to world class. His budget, millions of dollars, to spend on translations was hundreds times greater than mine.
Somehow, I was surely blessed to have met Dr. Shigeo Shingo, Mr. Taiichi Ohno, Dr. Ryuji Fukuda, Seiichi Nakajima, Dr. Yoji Akao, Hiroyuki Hirano, Shigehiro Nakamura, Bunji To-zawa, Iwao Kobayashi, Kenichi Sekine and others who were willing to share their information with Americans and allowed me to publish their Japanese books in English.
It shortly became obvious to me from my frequent visits to Japan, 63 as of this date, that the Toyota Production System (TPS) was the most important and the most valuable to study. At first, when I met Mr. Taiichi Ohno, vice-president of manufacturing at Toyota, I asked him to let me have things in writing about TPS. He said, "Norman, we don't have things written down, for it is always changing." I felt that he was just reluctant to share the information that was making Toyota so successful. But, I was perseverant. I wouldn't stop searching for information to share with companies in the West. I magically found Dr. Shingo, co-creator with Ohno of TPS, and he graciously allowed me to publish all of his books in English. After a few years Mr. Ohno also gave me permission to publish also his books in English.
But, why wouldn't GM and Ford do the same? Why wouldn't they locate, translate and publish everything available on Toyota? It is still a mystery to me. In 1984, Toyota decided to open a joint venture plant with GM, NUMMI, to share their production system with GM. Virtually, all of Toyota's secrets were now available to GM. Why didn't GM study carefully the JIT/LEAN concepts and apply them? And through the books I subsequently published, when I owned Productivity Press, most of what Toyota was doing was available to everyone.From the Author:
Delphi management’s reaction to their clear failure to generate lean manufacturing financial success is also typical. Rather than delve into why they failed to achieve Toyota-like cost reductions and inventory turnover rates, they are blaming their bankruptcy on the ‘legacy costs’ – pension and health care commitments – they are obligated to pay based on contracts GM signed with the UAW long ago. They also blame the failure on the hourly wage rates they are contractually bound to pay their Union employees, and they are trying either through direct negotiation or through the force of the bankruptcy court to cut wage rates by two thirds. They also blame energy and material costs and are bantering about plans to close more U.S. plants and move more production work to lower cost countries.
This scenario has played itself out over and over again in the United States in the twenty or thirty years since Toyota began to take huge chunks of market share from the big American compa-nies through its high powered, lean manufacturing strategy. One American company after another has found itself unable to go head to head with lean Asian competitors, has failed in its own lean manufacturing initiative, and then pursued a strategy of outsourc-ing work from the U.S. to some low labor cost country.
The objective of this book is to explore the near unanimous failure of the big, publicly held American manufacturers to become Toyota type lean manufacturers. The fault seems to lie in the basic financial assumptions that form the core of manufacturing man-agement. The evolution of lean manufacturing through Henry Ford and the Toyoda family is outlined and compared to the origi-nation and evolution of traditional American management from Alfred Sloan and General Motors through today.
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Descrizione libro PCS Press, 2005. Paperback. Condizione libro: New. Codice libro della libreria DADAX0971243638
Descrizione libro PCS Press, 2005. Paperback. Condizione libro: New. Never used!. Codice libro della libreria P110971243638
Descrizione libro PCS Press, 2005. Paperback. Condizione libro: Brand New. 304 pages. 8.40x5.40x0.70 inches. In Stock. Codice libro della libreria 0971243638