Evolution of the Social Contract - Brossura

Skyrms, Brian

Brossura

ISBN 10: 1107434289 ISBN 13: 9781107434288

Casa editrice: Cambridge University Press, 2014

Riassunto

In this new edition of Evolution of the Social Contract, Brian Skyrms uses evolutionary game theory to analyze the genesis of social contracts and investigates social phenomena including justice, communication, altruism, and bargaining. Featuring new material on evolution and information transfer, and including recent developments in game theory and evolution literature, his book introduces and applies appropriate concepts of equilibrium and evolutionary dynamics, showing how key issues can be modeled as games and considering the ways in which evolution sometimes supports, and sometimes does not support, rational choice. He discusses topics including how bargaining with neighbors promotes sharing of resources, the diversity of behavior in ultimatum bargaining in small societies, the Prisoner's Dilemma, and an investigation into signaling games and the spontaneous emergence of meaningful communication. His book will be of great interest to readers in philosophy of science, social science, evolutionary biology, game and decision theory, and political theory.

Su questo libro

Recensione

'This second edition is an important update of Brian Skyrms' important book. Game theorists in evolutionary biology, economics and philosophy will continue to profit from, and enjoy, Skyrms' groundbreaking work.' Elliott Sober, University of Wisconsin, Madison

Descrizione del libro

This new edition of Brian Skyrms' acclaimed book applies game theory to an analysis of the origins of social contracts. Featuring new material and an updated bibliography, it will be of great interest to readers in the philosophy of science, social science, evolutionary biology, game and decision theory, and political theory.

Su questa edizione

• Editore: Cambridge University Press
• Data di pubblicazione: 2014
• ISBN 10: 1107434289
• ISBN 13: 9781107434288
• Rilegatura: Copertina flessibile
• Numero edizione: 2
• Numero di pagine: 166