Freedom, Responsibility and Obligation - Brossura

Edwards, Rem

Brossura

ISBN 10: 9401501548 ISBN 13: 9789401501545

Casa editrice: Springer, 1969

Riassunto

This work is conceived as a modem study of the relationships of the concept of human freedom with the moral concepts of responsibility and obligation and other closely allied notions. One pitfall into which writers on my sub- jects have occasionally fallen has been that of spending too much time in critically examining positions and arguments which no sane philosopher has ever offered. In order to guard against the danger of debating with "straw men," I have attempted to engage in critical conversations with several twentieth century writers on my theme. I have attempted to pay special at- tention to a handful of writers who have written extremely important and influential discussions and who are representatives of a diversity of per- spectives on the issues involved. In particular, I have taken note of the work of two determinists, Sir David Ross and Hastings Rashdall, a libertarian, C. A. Campbell, and a reprel>entative of the more recent linguistic-analytic approach, P. Nowell-Smith. Many other important writers have been brought in at crucial points in the conversation. But this is not a history of the problem in the 20th century. Rather, it is a critical, systematic study of a problem or set of related problems. This work may be divided roughly into two parts, a metaphysical-psycho- logical part comprising the first three chapters, and a metaethical-ethical part consisting of the last three chapters.

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Contenuti:

I: Is Choice Determined by the Strongest Motive?.- A. Motive and choice.- (1) Arguments against the deterministic thesis.- (a) Desires as causes.- (b) Definition and measurements of “strongest motive”.- (c) “Strongest motive” and the “parallelogram of forces”.- (d) “Strongest motive” and choice.- (e) Choice and the “universe of desire”.- II: Agency, Attention and Choice.- A. Agency.- (1) Attention.- (a) Shifts in attention and strongest motive.- (b) Paying attention and strongest motive.- (2) Choice.- (3) Moral choice.- III: Freedom Without a Substantive Self.- A. A libertarian interpretation of freedom.- B. Some objections.- (1) “Trying”.- (2) “Change” and “choice”.- (3) “Motives” and “reasons” for choosing.- (4) Continuity of character.- (5) Freedom and the unconscious.- IV: Freedom and Responsibility.- A. Responsibility and causation.- (1) “Causation” versus “accountability”.- (2) Determinism and the “ordinary” meaning of “responsibility”.- (3) “Indeterminism” and the “ordinary” meaning of “responsibility”.- (4) Relative self-identity and responsibility.- B. Responsibility and the non-voluntary.- V: Responsibility and Practice.- A. Praising, blaming and dispraising.- (1) “Reponsibility” and praising and blaming.- (2) “Utility” and praising and dispraising.- B. Punishment.- (1) “Retributive” reasons for punishing.- (2) “Corrective” reasons for punishing.- (3) “Deterrent” reasons for punishing.- VI: Responsibility and Obligation.- A. “Ought implies can”.- B. “Ought implies can” and common sense.- C. “Ought implies can” and the determinism-libertarianism controversy.- Works Cited.

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• Editore: Springer
• Data di pubblicazione: 1969
• ISBN 10: 9401501548
• ISBN 13: 9789401501545
• Rilegatura: Copertina flessibile
• Numero di pagine: 144