Germ Gambits: The Bioweapons Dilemma, Iraq and Beyond (Stanford Security Studies)

Smithson, Amy

Editore: Stanford Security Studies
ISBN 10: 0804775524 / ISBN 13: 9780804775526
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0804775524 Crisp, clean, unread hardcover with light shelfwear, missing dust jacket and a publisher's mark to one edge - Nice!. Codice inventario libreria

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Riassunto: Arms control and nonproliferation treaties are among the fingers in the dike preventing the unthinkable nuclear, biological, and chemical catastrophe. For decades the ability to ascertain whether states are hiding germ weapons programs has been nonexistent because the 1975 bioweapons ban has no inspection measures. Yet, in 1995 a small United Nations inspection corps pulled off a spectacular verification feat in the face of concerted resistance from Iraq's Saddam Hussein and popular skepticism that it was even possible to conduct effective biological inspections. Working from sketchy intelligence?and hampered by the Iraqis' extensive concealment and deception measures?the inspectors busted open Iraq's cover stories and wrested a confession of biowarfare agent production from Baghdad. This rigorously researched book tells that compelling story through the firsthand accounts of the inspectors who, with a combination of intrepidness, ingenuity, and a couple of lucky breaks, took the lid off Iraq's bioweapons program and pulled off an improbable victory for peace and international security. The book concludes by drawing lessons from this experience that should be applied to help arrest future bioweapons programs, by placing the Iraq bioweapons saga in the context of other manmade biological risks, and by making recommendations to reduce those risks.

While written as an engaging, analytical historical narrative that explains what the biological inspectors knew, when and how they knew it, and how they outmaneuvered the Iraqis, this book's real contributions are the inspectors' blueprint to "get it right" with regard to the verification challenges associated with the bioweapons ban, and the author's roadmap to address the overall biological threats facing the world today.

L'autore: Amy Smithson is a Senior Fellow at the Washington, D.C. Office of the James Martin Center for Non-proliferation Studies where she researches issues related to chemical and biological weapons proliferation, threat reduction mechanisms, and homeland security. Before joining the James Martin Center, she worked at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Henry L. Stimson Center—where she founded the Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Project. Previously, she worked for Pacific-Sierra Research Corporation and the Center for Naval Analyses. The author, co-author, or editor of 16 books and book-length reports, as well as numerous articles, Dr. Smithson has appeared frequently before Congress and is a regular commentator in the electronic and print media.

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Titolo: Germ Gambits: The Bioweapons Dilemma, Iraq ...
Casa editrice: Stanford Security Studies
Legatura: Hardcover
Condizione libro: Very Good

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Smithson, Amy
Editore: Stanford Security Studies
ISBN 10: 0804775524 ISBN 13: 9780804775526
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Descrizione libro Stanford Security Studies. Hardcover. Condizione libro: Very Good. 0804775524 Crisp, clean, unread hardcover with light shelfwear, missing dust jacket and a publisher's mark to one edge - Nice!. Codice libro della libreria Z0804775524Z2

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Smithson, Amy E.
Editore: Stanford University Press, Palo Alto (2011)
ISBN 10: 0804775524 ISBN 13: 9780804775526
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Descrizione libro Stanford University Press, Palo Alto, 2011. Hardcover. Condizione libro: New. 384 pages. Hardcover with dustjacket. New book. MILITARY. Arms control and nonproliferation treaties are among the fingers in the dike preventing the unthinkable nuclear, biological, and chemical catastrophe. For decades the ability to ascertain whether states are hiding germ weapons programs has been nonexistent because the 1975 bioweapons ban has no inspection measures. Yet, in 1995 a small United Nations inspection corps pulled off a spectacular verification feat in the face of concerted resistance from Iraq's Saddam Hussein and popular skepticism that it was even possible to conduct effective biological inspections. Working from sketchy intelligenceÑand hampered by the Iraqis' extensive concealment and deception measuresÑthe inspectors busted open Iraq's cover stories and wrested a confession of biowarfare agent production from Baghdad. This rigorously researched book tells that compelling story through the firsthand accounts of the inspectors who, with a combination of intrepidness, ingenuity, and a couple of lucky breaks, took the lid off Iraq's bioweapons program and pulled off an improbable victory for peace and international security. The book concludes by drawing lessons from this experience that should be applied to help arrest future bioweapons programs, by placing the Iraq bioweapons saga in the context of other manmade biological risks, and by making recommendations to reduce those risks. While written as an engaging, analytical historical narrative that explains what the biological inspectors knew, when and how they knew it, and how they outmaneuvered the Iraqis, this book's real contributions are the inspectors' blueprint to "get it right" with regard to the verification challenges associated with the bioweapons ban, and the author's roadmap to address the overall biological threats facing the world today. Amy Smithson is a Senior Fellow at the Washington, D.C. Office of the James Martin Center for Non-proliferation Studies where she researches issues related to chemical and biological weapons proliferation, threat reduction mechanisms, and homeland security. Before joining the James Martin Center, she worked at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Henry L. Stimson CenterÑwhere she founded the Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Project. Previously, she worked for Pacific-Sierra Research Corporation and the Center for Naval Analyses. The author, co-author, or editor of 16 books and book-length reports, as well as numerous articles, Dr. Smithson has appeared frequently before Congress and is a regular commentator in the electronic and print media. "The Biological Weapons Convention crucially lacks means of ensuring that State Parties are in compliance. Using empirical evidence from the investigation of Iraq's biological weapons program, this book provides evidence that verification of the Convention could be effectively strengthened. It should be required reading for all involved with the Convention."ÑMalcolm Dando, Professor of International Security, University of Bradford (Key Words: Bioweapons, Iraq, Biological Weapons Convention, Arms Control, Nonproliferation, Amy E. Smithson, Military). book. Codice libro della libreria 74095X1

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Descrizione libro Stanford Security Studies, 2016. Paperback. Condizione libro: New. PRINT ON DEMAND Book; New; Publication Year 2016; Not Signed; Fast Shipping from the UK. No. book. Codice libro della libreria ria9780804775526_lsuk

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Descrizione libro Stanford University Press, United States, 2011. Hardback. Condizione libro: New. 229 x 152 mm. Language: English . Brand New Book ***** Print on Demand *****. Arms control and nonproliferation treaties are among the fingers in the dike preventing the unthinkable nuclear, biological, and chemical catastrophe. For decades the ability to ascertain whether states are hiding germ weapons programs has been nonexistent because the 1975 bioweapons ban has no inspection measures. Yet, in 1995 a small United Nations inspection corps pulled off a spectacular verification feat in the face of concerted resistance from Iraq s Saddam Hussein and popular skepticism that it was even possible to conduct effective biological inspections. Working from sketchy intelligence-and hampered by the Iraqis extensive concealment and deception measures-the inspectors busted open Iraq s cover stories and wrested a confession of biowarfare agent production from Baghdad. This rigorously researched book tells that compelling story through the firsthand accounts of the inspectors who, with a combination of intrepidness, ingenuity, and a couple of lucky breaks, took the lid off Iraq s bioweapons program and pulled off an improbable victory for peace and international security.The book concludes by drawing lessons from this experience that should be applied to help arrest future bioweapons programs, by placing the Iraq bioweapons saga in the context of other manmade biological risks, and by making recommendations to reduce those risks. While written as an engaging, analytical historical narrative that explains what the biological inspectors knew, when and how they knew it, and how they outmaneuvered the Iraqis, this book s real contributions are the inspectors blueprint to get it right with regard to the verification challenges associated with the bioweapons ban, and the author s roadmap to address the overall biological threats facing the world today. Codice libro della libreria APC9780804775526

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Descrizione libro Stanford Security Studies. Hardcover. Condizione libro: New. Hardcover. 384 pages. Dimensions: 9.0in. x 6.0in. x 1.0in.Arms control and nonproliferation treaties are among the fingers in the dike preventing the unthinkable nuclear, biological, and chemical catastrophe. For decades the ability to ascertain whether states are hiding germ weapons programs has been nonexistent because the 1975 bioweapons ban has no inspection measures. Yet, in 1995 a small United Nations inspection corps pulled off a spectacular verification feat in the face of concerted resistance from Iraqs Saddam Hussein and popular skepticism that it was even possible to conduct effective biological inspections. Working from sketchy intelligenceand hampered by the Iraqis extensive concealment and deception measuresthe inspectors busted open Iraqs cover stories and wrested a confession of biowarfare agent production from Baghdad. This rigorously researched book tells that compelling story through the firsthand accounts of the inspectors who, with a combination of intrepidness, ingenuity, and a couple of lucky breaks, took the lid off Iraqs bioweapons program and pulled off an improbable victory for peace and international security. The book concludes by drawing lessons from this experience that should be applied to help arrest future bioweapons programs, by placing the Iraq bioweapons saga in the context of other manmade biological risks, and by making recommendations to reduce those risks. While written as an engaging, analytical historical narrative that explains what the biological inspectors knew, when and how they knew it, and how they outmaneuvered the Iraqis, this books real contributions are the inspectors blueprint to get it right with regard to the verification challenges associated with the bioweapons ban, and the authors roadmap to address the overall biological threats facing the world today. This item ships from multiple locations. Your book may arrive from Roseburg,OR, La Vergne,TN. Hardcover. Codice libro della libreria 9780804775526

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Descrizione libro Stanford University Press, United States, 2011. Hardback. Condizione libro: New. 229 x 152 mm. Language: English . Brand New Book ***** Print on Demand *****.Arms control and nonproliferation treaties are among the fingers in the dike preventing the unthinkable nuclear, biological, and chemical catastrophe. For decades the ability to ascertain whether states are hiding germ weapons programs has been nonexistent because the 1975 bioweapons ban has no inspection measures. Yet, in 1995 a small United Nations inspection corps pulled off a spectacular verification feat in the face of concerted resistance from Iraq s Saddam Hussein and popular skepticism that it was even possible to conduct effective biological inspections. Working from sketchy intelligence-and hampered by the Iraqis extensive concealment and deception measures-the inspectors busted open Iraq s cover stories and wrested a confession of biowarfare agent production from Baghdad. This rigorously researched book tells that compelling story through the firsthand accounts of the inspectors who, with a combination of intrepidness, ingenuity, and a couple of lucky breaks, took the lid off Iraq s bioweapons program and pulled off an improbable victory for peace and international security.The book concludes by drawing lessons from this experience that should be applied to help arrest future bioweapons programs, by placing the Iraq bioweapons saga in the context of other manmade biological risks, and by making recommendations to reduce those risks. While written as an engaging, analytical historical narrative that explains what the biological inspectors knew, when and how they knew it, and how they outmaneuvered the Iraqis, this book s real contributions are the inspectors blueprint to get it right with regard to the verification challenges associated with the bioweapons ban, and the author s roadmap to address the overall biological threats facing the world today. Codice libro della libreria APC9780804775526

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