Brand New, Unread Copy in Perfect Condition. A+ Customer Service! Summary: 1. Divided government and interbranch bargaining; 2. A natural history of veto bargaining, 19451992; 3. Rational choice and the presidency; 4. Models of veto bargaining; 5. Explaining the patterns; 6. Testing the models; 7. Veto threats; 8. Interpreting history; 9. Conclusions. Codice inventario libreria
Riassunto: With one party controlling the presidency and the opposing party controlling Congress, the veto has inevitably become a critical tool of presidential power. Combining sophisticated game theory with unprecedented data, this book analyzes how divided party presidents use threats and vetoes to wrest policy concessions from a hostile Congress. Case studies of the most important vetoes in recent history add texture to the analysis, detailing how President Clinton altered the course of Newt Gingrich's Republican Revolution. Offering the first book-length analysis to bring rational choice theory to bear on the presidency, Veto Bargaining is a major contribution to our understanding of American politics in an age of divided party government.
Condizione libro: New
Descrizione libro Cambridge University Press, 2000. Condizione libro: Good. N/A. Ships from Reno, NV. Former Library book. Shows some signs of wear, and may have some markings on the inside. Codice libro della libreria GRP88302935
Descrizione libro Cambridge University Press, 2000. Condizione libro: very good. Gently used. Expect delivery in 2-3 weeks. Codice libro della libreria 9780521623919-3
Descrizione libro Cambridge University Press, 2000. Hardcover. Condizione libro: New. book. Codice libro della libreria 052162391X