Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions - Rilegato

Martin, Lisa L.

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9780691086248: Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions

Rilegato

ISBN 10: 0691086249 ISBN 13: 9780691086248

Casa editrice: Princeton Univ Pr, 1992

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When Saddam Hussein's army invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, the United States took the lead in organizing stringent economic sanctions against Iraq. Since unilateral sanctions rarely succeed, "coercive cooperation" was a necessity. This innovative study shows multilateral, or cooperative, sanctions are coercive not only in their pressure on their target but also in their origin: the sanctions themselves frequently result from coercive policies, with one interested state attempting to convince others to cooperate through persuasion, threats, and promises.
To analyze this process, Lisa Martin uses a novel methodology combining game-theoretic models, statistical analysis, and case studies. She tests her hypotheses against ninety-nine cases of economic sanctions since 1945 and then against four detailed case studies - the U.S.-led pipeline embargo, high-technology sanctions against the Soviet Union, U.S. sanctions against Latin American nations for human rights violations, and British sanctions against Argentina during the Falklands War. Martin emphasizes that credible commitments gain international cooperation, and she concludes that the involvement of international institutions and the willingness of the main "sender" to bear heavy costs are the central factors influencing credibility.

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Recensione:

"As Martin acknowledges at the end of her fine scholarly book--a sophisticated conceptual approach matched to a well-articulated argument--more study needs to be given to the actual politics and to the psychology of international sanctions."--Alan K. Henrickson, Harvard International Review
"A major theoretical and substantive contribution to the study of international cooperation and the imposition of economic sanctions."--Choice

"A major theoretical and substantive contribution to the study of international cooperation and the imposition of economic sanctions."--Choice

Contenuti:

	Figures
	Tables
	Preface
1	Introduction	3
	The Study of Economic Sanctions	4
	The Study of International Cooperation	7
	Methodology	10
Pt. 1	Theory and Data	13
2	Model and Hypotheses	15
	A Model of Economic Sanctions	16
	Identifying Cooperation Problems	25
	What Explains Cooperation?	31
	Bandwagoning	40
3	Measuring Cooperation and Explanatory Variables	46
	Measurement and Description: The Dependent Variable	46
	Measurement and Description: Explanatory Variables	54
4	Estimating Models of Cooperation	61
	Regression Analysis	62
	Ordered-Probit Analysis	67
	Event-Count Analysis	74
	The Effect of Declining Hegemony	86
Pt. 2	Case Studies	93
5	Human Rights in Latin America: Explaining Unilateral U.S. Sanctions	99
	Congress versus the President: U.S. Human-Rights Policy, 1973-76	101
	The Carter Administration	106
	Economic Sanctions and the Multilateral Development Banks	111
	Attitudes and Responses to U.S. Human-Rights Sanctions	119
	Pinochet's Chile: U.S. Leadership or Resistance?	124
6	The Falkland Islands Conflict	131
	The Falklands Crisis, 1982	132
	The Falklands and the European Community	138
	Sanctions and War: The Case of Ireland	153
	Responses of the United States, Latin America, and Others	159
7	Western Technology-Export Controls	169
	American, European, and Japanese Views on East-West Technology Transfer	171
	Institutional Coordination of Export Controls: CoCom	185
	Responding to the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, 1980	191
	Responding to Dissident Trials, 1978	198
8	The Polish Crisis and Gas-Pipeline Sanctions	204
	Martial Law in Poland and the Siberian Gas Pipeline	206
	The Effect of Declining Hegemony	225
	Siberian Gas and European Preferences	228
	The Grain Embargo: Why It Mattered	234
9	Conclusion	241
	Explaining International Cooperation on Economic Sanctions	241
	Additional Findings	247
	Implications for Theories of International Cooperation and Economic Sanctions	248
	Notes	253
	Bibliography	277
	Index	293