federation of american scientists (6 risultati)

Condizione: Good. Good condition. A copy that has been read but remains intact. May contain markings such as bookplates, stamps, limited notes and highlighting, or a few light stains.

Paperback. Condizione: Very Good. No Jacket. May have limited writing in cover pages. Pages are unmarked. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less 1.01.

Paperback. Condizione: Good. Some markings in a clean trade paperback.

Paperback. Condizione: Very Good. First Edition. A VERY GOOD, bright, clean, tight copy sans rips/tears, stains, markings, discoloration, etc. ILLUSTRATED in black-and-white photography with accompanying descriptive captions. "From the authors' "About this Book" section: "Do not try reading this book cover to cover; you'll never make it. There's no plot and very little character development. We have tried to make each chapter more or less self-contained. However, we wrote this guide with three audiences in mind: activist citizen coalitions, investigators (journalistic, congressional and/or academic) and policy professors/students. Serving the needs of these three distinct constituencies in one book presents certain challenges. For some audiences there might be too much detail; for others not enough. Hopefully the layout will make it easy for readers to find points of interest by browsing and skimming the text." 121 pages. LG7.

Wraps. Condizione: Very good. Presumed first edition/first printing. [3], 68, [1] pages. Includes illustrations. Endnotes. From Wikipedia: "Stockpile stewardship refers to the United States program of reliability testing and maintenance of its nuclear weapons without the use of nuclear testing. Because no new nuclear weapons have been developed by the United States since 1992, even its youngest weapons are at least 21 years old. Aging weapons can fail or act unpredictably in a number of ways: the high explosives that condense their fissile material can chemically degrade, their electronic components can suffer from decay, their radioactive plutonium/uranium cores are potentially unreliable, and the isotopes used by thermonuclear weapons may be chemically unstable as well. Since the United States has also not tested nuclear weapons since 1992, this leaves the task of its stockpile maintenance resting on the use of simulations (using non-nuclear explosives tests and supercomputers, among other methods) and applications of scientific knowledge about physics and chemistry to the specific problems of weapons aging (the latter method is what is meant when various agencies refer to their work as "science-based"). It also involves the manufacture of additional plutonium "pits" to replace ones of unknown quality, and finding other methods to increase the lifespan of existing warheads and maintain a confident nuclear deterrent. Most work for stockpile stewardship is undertaken at United States Department of Energy National Laboratories, mostly at Los Alamos National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the Nevada Test Site, and Department of Energy productions facilities, which employ around 27,500 personnel and cost billions of dollars per year to operate. The Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program is a United States Department of Energy program to ensure that the nuclear capabilities of the United States are not eroded as nuclear weapons age. It costs more than $4 billion annually to test nuclear weapons and build advanced science facilities, such as the National Ignition Facility (NIF). Such facilities have been deemed necessary under the program since President Bill Clinton agreed to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996." From an on-line posting: "Ivan Oelrich, Ph.D. is the Senior Fellow for the Strategic Security Program at the Federation of American Scientists. His introduction to national security began at the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), a federally-funded research and development center supporting the Office of the Secretary of Defense with studies and analyses, where he evaluated new technologies for defense applications, and supported the START and INF Treaty negotiations. Oelrich left IDA for a one-year fellowship at the Center for Science and International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, where he wrote on conventional arms control limits. On his return to Washington, DC, he accepted a position as a senior analyst at the Office of Technology Assessment, an agency of the U.S. Congress where he investigated the needs of the military industrial base and wrote a treatise on friendly fire prompted by experience in the Persian Gulf War. Returning to IDA, Oelrich focused on environmental restoration of lands belonging to the U.S. Departments of Defense and Energy, characterizing the cleanup liability, evaluating innovative cleanup technologies, calculating the economic benefits of environmental laboratory automation and developing administrative procedures for the long term environmental stewardship of military lands. He also provided technical support to the negotiating team of the land mine arms control treaty. Oelrich focused on emerging nuclear threats at the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency where he supported General Shalikashvili's review of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Spiral bound wraps. Condizione: Good. Various paginations (around 200 pages). Illustrations. Footnotes. Includes agenda, list of attendees, and multiple appendices. Format is approximately 8.5 inches by 11 inches. Some ink marks noted. Included among the attendees were representatives from national nuclear weapons design laboratories, foreign ministries, military agencies, nuclear energy research laboratories, nuclear regulatory bodies, universities, and public interest organizations. Key participants were Fred McGoldrick, Victor Clipchenko, General Yakovlev, Christopher Paine, Robert DeGrasse, Ray Kidder, Vadim Simonenko, Spurgeon Keeney, Richard Garwin, Frank Von Hippel, William Dircks, Andrei Glukhov, Alexander Dmitriev, Laurin Dodd, Thomas Cochran, William Sutcliffe, Alex Devolpi, Victor Murogov, Matthew Bunn, Madelyn Creedon, Robert Civiak, Victor Gilensky, Nelson Sievering, Leonard Spector, and Jeremy Stone. Rare surviving copy. This meeting was hopeful, since it was reported that under Secretary Hazel O'Leary's leadership the Department of Energy position had moved from opposing the Comprehensive Test Ban to supporting it. During the workshop it was noted that it was important to broaden the nonproliferation discussion because the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty did not, by itself, insure that nuclear weapons would not be build by additional countries. A principal issue raised was whether the negotiations could be accelerated so as to have in place, by the beginning of the NPT Review Conference, an agreement in principle on a CTB, if not final treaty language. Presumed First Edition, First printing thus. Produced by Xerox-like reproduction methods.