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Editore: Oxford University Press, 2013
ISBN 10: 0199662576ISBN 13: 9780199662579
Da: HPB Inc., Dallas, TX, U.S.A.
Libro
Paperback. Condizione: Very Good. Connecting readers with great books since 1972! Used books may not include companion materials, and may have some shelf wear or limited writing. We ship orders daily and Customer Service is our top priority!.
Editore: Oxford University Press (UK), 2013
ISBN 10: 0199662576ISBN 13: 9780199662579
Da: ThriftBooks-Atlanta, AUSTELL, GA, U.S.A.
Libro
Paperback. Condizione: Good. No Jacket. Pages can have notes/highlighting. Spine may show signs of wear. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less 0.88.
Editore: Oxford University Press (UK), 2013
ISBN 10: 0199662576ISBN 13: 9780199662579
Da: ThriftBooks-Dallas, Dallas, TX, U.S.A.
Libro
Paperback. Condizione: Very Good. No Jacket. Former library book; May have limited writing in cover pages. Pages are unmarked. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less 0.88.
Editore: Oxford University Press, USA, 2013
ISBN 10: 0199662576ISBN 13: 9780199662579
Da: Ergodebooks, Houston, TX, U.S.A.
Libro
Paperback. Condizione: Used: Good.
Editore: Oxford University Press, 2013
ISBN 10: 0199662576ISBN 13: 9780199662579
Da: LibraryMercantile, Humble, TX, U.S.A.
Libro
Condizione: very good.
Editore: Oxford University Press, 2013
ISBN 10: 0199662576ISBN 13: 9780199662579
Da: LibraryMercantile, Humble, TX, U.S.A.
Libro
Condizione: new.
Editore: Oxford University Press, 2013
ISBN 10: 0199662576ISBN 13: 9780199662579
Da: GoldenWavesOfBooks, Fayetteville, TX, U.S.A.
Libro
Paperback. Condizione: new. New. Fast Shipping and good customer service.
Editore: Oxford University Press, 2013
ISBN 10: 0199662576ISBN 13: 9780199662579
Da: Wizard Books, Long Beach, CA, U.S.A.
Libro
Paperback. Condizione: new. New.
Editore: Oxford University Press, 2013
ISBN 10: 0199662576ISBN 13: 9780199662579
Da: Front Cover Books, Denver, CO, U.S.A.
Libro
Condizione: new.
Editore: Oxford University Press, 2013
ISBN 10: 0199662576ISBN 13: 9780199662579
Da: GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, U.S.A.
Libro
Condizione: New.
Editore: Oxford University Press, 2013
ISBN 10: 0199662576ISBN 13: 9780199662579
Da: GoldenDragon, Houston, TX, U.S.A.
Libro
Paperback. Condizione: new. Buy for Great customer experience.
Editore: Oxford University Press, 2013
ISBN 10: 0199662576ISBN 13: 9780199662579
Da: Byrd Books, Austin, TX, U.S.A.
Libro
Paperback. Condizione: very good. In Used Condition.
Editore: Oxford University Press, 2013
ISBN 10: 0199662576ISBN 13: 9780199662579
Da: GoldBooks, Denver, CO, U.S.A.
Libro
Paperback. Condizione: very good. Very Good Copy. Customer Service Guaranteed.
Editore: Oxford University Press, 2013
ISBN 10: 0199662576ISBN 13: 9780199662579
Da: GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, U.S.A.
Libro
Condizione: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.
Editore: OUP Oxford, 2013
ISBN 10: 0199662576ISBN 13: 9780199662579
Da: PBShop.store US, Wood Dale, IL, U.S.A.
Libro Print on Demand
PAP. Condizione: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.
Editore: Oxford University Press, 2013
ISBN 10: 0199662576ISBN 13: 9780199662579
Da: GoldBooks, Denver, CO, U.S.A.
Libro
Paperback. Condizione: new. New Copy. Customer Service Guaranteed.
Editore: Oxford University Press, 2013
ISBN 10: 0199662576ISBN 13: 9780199662579
Da: Ergodebooks, Houston, TX, U.S.A.
Libro
Paperback. Condizione: New.
Editore: Oxford University Press(UK), 2013
ISBN 10: 0199662576ISBN 13: 9780199662579
Da: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Regno Unito
Libro Print on Demand
Condizione: New. PRINT ON DEMAND Book; New; Fast Shipping from the UK. No. book.
Editore: Oxford University Press(UK) 2013-01, 2013
ISBN 10: 0199662576ISBN 13: 9780199662579
Da: Chiron Media, Wallingford, Regno Unito
Libro
PF. Condizione: New.
Editore: Oxford University Press, 2013
ISBN 10: 0199662576ISBN 13: 9780199662579
Da: booksXpress, Bayonne, NJ, U.S.A.
Libro
Soft Cover. Condizione: new.
Editore: Oxford University Press, 2013
ISBN 10: 0199662576ISBN 13: 9780199662579
Da: THE SAINT BOOKSTORE, Southport, Regno Unito
Libro Print on Demand
Paperback / softback. Condizione: New. This item is printed on demand. New copy - Usually dispatched within 5-9 working days.
Editore: Oxford University Press, 2013
ISBN 10: 0199662576ISBN 13: 9780199662579
Da: GreatBookPricesUK, Castle Donington, DERBY, Regno Unito
Libro
Condizione: New.
Editore: Oxford University Press, 2013
ISBN 10: 0199662576ISBN 13: 9780199662579
Da: Lucky's Textbooks, Dallas, TX, U.S.A.
Libro
Condizione: New.
Editore: Oxford University Press, 2013
ISBN 10: 0199662576ISBN 13: 9780199662579
Da: GreatBookPricesUK, Castle Donington, DERBY, Regno Unito
Libro
Condizione: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.
Editore: Oxford University Press, 2013
ISBN 10: 0199662576ISBN 13: 9780199662579
Da: California Books, Miami, FL, U.S.A.
Libro
Condizione: New.
Editore: Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013
ISBN 10: 0199662576ISBN 13: 9780199662579
Da: Grand Eagle Retail, Wilmington, DE, U.S.A.
Libro
Paperback. Condizione: new. Paperback. Mind, Brain, and Free Will presents a powerful new case for substance dualism (the theory that humans consist of two parts body and soul) and for libertarian free will (that humans have some freedom to choose between alternatives, independently of the causes which influence them). Richard Swinburne begins by analysing the criteria for one event or substance being the same event or substance as another one, and the criteria for an event beingmetaphysically possible; and then goes on to analyse the criteria for beliefs about these issues being rational or justified. Given these criteria, he then proceeds to argue that pure mental events (including consciousevents) are distinct from physical events and interact with them. He claims that no result from neuroscience or any other science could show that there is no such interaction, and illustrates this claim by showing that recent scientific work (such as Libet's experiments) has no tendency whatever to show that our intentions do not cause brain events. Swinburne goes on to argue for agent causation, that-to speak precisely-it is we, and not our intentions, that cause our brain events. It ismetaphysically possible that each of us could acquire a new brain or continue to exist without a brain; and so we are essentially souls. Brain events and conscious events are so different from each otherthat it would not be possible to establish a scientific theory which would predict what each of us would do in situations of moral conflict. Hence given a crucial epistemological principle (the Principle of Credulity), we should believe that things are as they seem to be: that we make choices independently of the causes which influence us. According to Swinburne's lucid and ambitious account, it follows that we are morally responsible for our actions. Richard Swinburne presents a powerful case for substance dualism and libertarian free will. He argues that pure mental and physical events are distinct, and defends an account of agent causation in which the soul can act independently of bodily causes. We are responsible for our actions, and the findings of neuroscience cannot prove otherwise. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.
Editore: OUP Oxford, 2013
ISBN 10: 0199662576ISBN 13: 9780199662579
Da: PBShop.store UK, Fairford, GLOS, Regno Unito
Libro Print on Demand
PAP. Condizione: New. New Book. Delivered from our UK warehouse in 4 to 14 business days. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.
Editore: OUP Oxford, 2013
ISBN 10: 0199662576ISBN 13: 9780199662579
Da: Revaluation Books, Exeter, Regno Unito
Libro
Paperback. Condizione: Brand New. 288 pages. 9.21x0.71x6.06 inches. In Stock.
Editore: OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2013
ISBN 10: 0199662576ISBN 13: 9780199662579
Da: Hafa Adai Books, Moncks Corner, SC, U.S.A.
Libro
Condizione: very good.
Editore: Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013
ISBN 10: 0199662576ISBN 13: 9780199662579
Da: AussieBookSeller, Truganina, VIC, Australia
Libro
Paperback. Condizione: new. Paperback. Mind, Brain, and Free Will presents a powerful new case for substance dualism (the theory that humans consist of two parts body and soul) and for libertarian free will (that humans have some freedom to choose between alternatives, independently of the causes which influence them). Richard Swinburne begins by analysing the criteria for one event or substance being the same event or substance as another one, and the criteria for an event beingmetaphysically possible; and then goes on to analyse the criteria for beliefs about these issues being rational or justified. Given these criteria, he then proceeds to argue that pure mental events (including consciousevents) are distinct from physical events and interact with them. He claims that no result from neuroscience or any other science could show that there is no such interaction, and illustrates this claim by showing that recent scientific work (such as Libet's experiments) has no tendency whatever to show that our intentions do not cause brain events. Swinburne goes on to argue for agent causation, that-to speak precisely-it is we, and not our intentions, that cause our brain events. It ismetaphysically possible that each of us could acquire a new brain or continue to exist without a brain; and so we are essentially souls. Brain events and conscious events are so different from each otherthat it would not be possible to establish a scientific theory which would predict what each of us would do in situations of moral conflict. Hence given a crucial epistemological principle (the Principle of Credulity), we should believe that things are as they seem to be: that we make choices independently of the causes which influence us. According to Swinburne's lucid and ambitious account, it follows that we are morally responsible for our actions. Richard Swinburne presents a powerful case for substance dualism and libertarian free will. He argues that pure mental and physical events are distinct, and defends an account of agent causation in which the soul can act independently of bodily causes. We are responsible for our actions, and the findings of neuroscience cannot prove otherwise. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability.