Free Will, Indeterminacy, and Self-Determination

Deutschmann, Moritz

Editore: GRIN Verlag, 2013
ISBN 10: 3640315596 / ISBN 13: 9783640315598
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Riassunto: Seminar paper from the year 2007 in the subject Philosophy - Theoretical (Realisation, Science, Logic, Language), grade: A- (=1,25), University of California, Berkeley (Department of Philosophy), course: Collective Intentionality (John Searle), 18 entries in the bibliography, language: English, comment: The paper is a very good introduction to the current debate on free will. It engages one of the central questions of the debate, the conflict between compatibilists and incompatibilist views of free will. In the often confusing discussion it sticks to three influential texts: John Searle's "Freedom and Neurobiology", Harry Frankfurt's "Freedom of Will and the Concept of a Person" and Peter Strawson's "Freedom and Resentment". , abstract: Free will is one of the most fundamental presuppositions that we make in our everyday lives. At the same time, free will belongs to the concepts that are most difficult to integrate into a scientific idea of how the world works. This contrast has haunted philosophers for centuries, and although it seems that almost everything has already been said about this topic, there has been an animated debate in recent decades. In this paper, I would like to consider two of the positions adopted in this debate. At first, I would like to explore John Searle's interpretation of free will as a sequence of several moments of indeterminacy ("gaps") between the reasons for our actions and the actions themselves. I think the best way to understand his conception is to see it as an attempt to unite two different ideas about the relation between reasons and actions. On the one hand, the realist conception of Searle's philosophy presupposes that the reasons for our actions must have real causal power and are not only post facto justifications. On the other hand, Searle's understanding of rationality implies that reasons alone cannot be sufficient causes. In "Rationality in Action" Searle tries to bring both ideas together through the notion of an agen

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Titolo: Free Will, Indeterminacy, and ...
Casa editrice: GRIN Verlag
Data di pubblicazione: 2013
Condizione libro: very good

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Deutschmann, Moritz
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Descrizione libro GRIN Verlag, 2009. Condizione libro: New. This item is printed on demand for shipment within 3 working days. Codice libro della libreria LP9783640315598

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Descrizione libro GRIN Verlag, 2016. Paperback. Condizione libro: New. PRINT ON DEMAND Book; New; Publication Year 2016; Not Signed; Fast Shipping from the UK. No. book. Codice libro della libreria ria9783640315598_lsuk

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Descrizione libro GRIN Verlag, 2013. Paperback. Condizione libro: New. book. Codice libro della libreria 3640315596

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Moritz Deutschmann
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Descrizione libro GRIN Verlag. Paperback. Condizione libro: New. Paperback. 28 pages. Dimensions: 8.5in. x 5.5in. x 0.1in.Seminar paper from the year 2007 in the subject Philosophy - Theoretical (Realisation, Science, Logic, Language), grade: A- (1, 25), University of California, Berkeley (Department of Philosophy), course: Collective Intentionality (John Searle), 18 entries in the bibliography, language: English, comment: The paper is a very good introduction to the current debate on free will. It engages one of the central questions of the debate, the conflict between compatibilists and incompatibilist views of free will. In the often confusing discussion it sticks to three influential texts: John Searles Freedom and Neurobiology, Harry Frankfurts Freedom of Will and the Concept of a Person and Peter Strawsons Freedom and Resentment. , abstract: Free will is one of the most fundamental presuppositions that we make in our everyday lives. At the same time, free will belongs to the concepts that are most difficult to integrate into a scientific idea of how the world works. This contrast has haunted philosophers for centuries, and although it seems that almost everything has already been said about this topic, there has been an animated debate in recent decades. In this paper, I would like to consider two of the positions adopted in this debate. At first, I would like to explore John Searles interpretation of free will as a sequence of several moments of indeterminacy (gaps) between the reasons for our actions and the actions themselves. I think the best way to understand his conception is to see it as an attempt to unite two different ideas about the relation between reasons and actions. On the one hand, the realist conception of Searles philosophy presupposes that the reasons for our actions must have real causal power and are not only post facto justifications. On the other hand, Searles understanding of rationality implies that reasons alone cannot be sufficient causes. In Rationality in Action Searle tries to bring both ideas together through the notion of an agen This item ships from multiple locations. Your book may arrive from Roseburg,OR, La Vergne,TN. Paperback. Codice libro della libreria 9783640315598

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Moritz Deutschmann
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Descrizione libro GRIN Verlag, Germany, 2013. Paperback. Condizione libro: New. Auflage.. 216 x 140 mm. Language: English . Brand New Book ***** Print on Demand *****.Seminar paper from the year 2007 in the subject Philosophy - Theoretical (Realisation, Science, Logic, Language), grade: A- (=1,25), University of California, Berkeley (Department of Philosophy), course: Collective Intentionality (John Searle), 18 entries in the bibliography, language: English, comment: The paper is a very good introduction to the current debate on free will. It engages one of the central questions of the debate, the conflict between compatibilists and incompatibilist views of free will. In the often confusing discussion it sticks to three influential texts: John Searle s Freedom and Neurobiology, Harry Frankfurt s Freedom of Will and the Concept of a Person and Peter Strawson s Freedom and Resentment., abstract: Free will is one of the most fundamental presuppositions that we make in our everyday lives. At the same time, free will belongs to the concepts that are most difficult to integrate into a scientific idea of how the world works. This contrast has haunted philosophers for centuries, and although it seems that almost everything has already been said about this topic, there has been an animated debate in recent decades. In this paper, I would like to consider two of the positions adopted in this debate. At first, I would like to explore John Searle s interpretation of free will as a sequence of several moments of indeterminacy ( gaps ) between the reasons for our actions and the actions themselves. I think the best way to understand his conception is to see it as an attempt to unite two different ideas about the relation between reasons and actions. On the one hand, the realist conception of Searle s philosophy presupposes that the reasons for our actions must have real causal power and are not only post facto justifications. On the other hand, Searle s understanding of rationality implies that reasons alone cannot be sufficient causes. In Rationality in Action Searle tries to bring both ideas together through the notion of an agen. Codice libro della libreria AAV9783640315598

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