People do things for reasons. But philosophers have disagreed sharply about how 'reasons explanations' of actions actually work and hence about their implications for human freedom and autonomy. The dominant view in contemporary philosophy is the (Humean) idea that the beliefs and desires that constitute our reasons for acting simply cause us to act as we do.
Fred Schueler seeks to replace such causal views, arguing that they leave out two essential elements of these explanations. Reasons explanations are inherently teleological in the sense that the agent's reasons always explain the purpose for which he acted. They are also inherently normative since it is always possible that an agent's reasons for doing something are not good reasons. Schueler argues that causal accounts of reasons explanations make no sense of either of these features; he argues instead for an account based on practical deliberation, our ability to evaluate the reasons we accept.
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Schueler has offered a valuable contribution to the literature on reasons explanations of action. Reasons and Purposes is a worthwhile read for philosophers and psychologists interested in the nature and explanations of human action, as well as those working on human rationality. It presents new challenges to causalists; and it should prove to be a valuable resource for those dissatisfied with causalist proposals. (Philosophical Psychology)
G. F. Schueler is in the Department of Philosophy, University of New Mexico.
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Condizione: New. People act for reasons. But what is it to act for a reason? This is what the author investigates. He rejects the dominant view that the beliefs and desires that constitute our reasons for acting simply cause us to act as we do, and argues instead for a view centred on practical deliberation, our ability to evaluate the reasons we accept. Num Pages: 192 pages, bibliography. BIC Classification: HPC; HPM; HPQ. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 223 x 144 x 15. Weight in Grams: 341. . 2003. hardcover. . . . . Codice articolo V9780199250370
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Hardcover. Condizione: new. Hardcover. People do things for reasons. But philosophers have disagreed sharply about how 'reasons explanations' of actions actually work and hence about their implications for human freedom and autonomy. The dominant view in contemporary philosophy is the (Humean) idea that the beliefs and desires that constitute our reasons for acting simply cause us to act as we do.Fred Schueler seeks to replace such causal views, arguing that they leave out twoessential elements of these explanations. Reasons explanations are inherently teleological in the sense that the agent's reasons always explain the purpose for which he acted. They are also inherentlynormative since it is always possible that an agent's reasons for doing something are not good reasons. Schueler argues that causal accounts of reasons explanations make no sense of either of these features; he argues instead for an account based on practical deliberation, our ability to evaluate the reasons we accept. What is it to act for a reason? This is what Fred Schueler investigates. He rejects the dominant view that the beliefs and desires that constitute our reasons for acting simply cause us to act as we do, and argues instead for a view centred on practical deliberation, our ability to evaluate the reasons we accept. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability. Codice articolo 9780199250370
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Hardcover. Condizione: new. Hardcover. People do things for reasons. But philosophers have disagreed sharply about how 'reasons explanations' of actions actually work and hence about their implications for human freedom and autonomy. The dominant view in contemporary philosophy is the (Humean) idea that the beliefs and desires that constitute our reasons for acting simply cause us to act as we do.Fred Schueler seeks to replace such causal views, arguing that they leave out twoessential elements of these explanations. Reasons explanations are inherently teleological in the sense that the agent's reasons always explain the purpose for which he acted. They are also inherentlynormative since it is always possible that an agent's reasons for doing something are not good reasons. Schueler argues that causal accounts of reasons explanations make no sense of either of these features; he argues instead for an account based on practical deliberation, our ability to evaluate the reasons we accept. What is it to act for a reason? This is what Fred Schueler investigates. He rejects the dominant view that the beliefs and desires that constitute our reasons for acting simply cause us to act as we do, and argues instead for a view centred on practical deliberation, our ability to evaluate the reasons we accept. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability. Codice articolo 9780199250370
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