Paying for the Party: How Fundraising Demands Lead to Less Productive and Less Representative Legislatures - Rilegato

Kistner, Michael R.

Rilegato

ISBN 10: 022685020X ISBN 13: 9780226850207

Casa editrice: University of Chicago Press, 2026

Riassunto

A revealing, data-rich exploration of how American legislators transformed from active policymakers into party fundraisers.

Lawmakers in Congress and state legislatures across the United States spend enormous amounts of time and effort fundraising, not just for their own seats but for the party. Whether dialing for dollars or hosting high-priced fundraising events, the pursuit of campaign funds is now a massive part of the American legislator’s job description. What explains this transformation, and what are the consequences for public policy?

In Paying for the Party, Michael Kistner uses new theory and new data to answer these questions. He shows that state legislative party organizations―Democratic and Republican caucuses in capitols across the country―are responsible for turning their members into single-minded seekers of money. Parties reward legislators who contribute the most with powerful leadership and committee positions. Consequently, the members who now hold these agenda-setting positions are increasingly neither the most productive nor knowledgeable lawmakers, but rather those who can raise the most money. And when legislators are asked to raise more money, they skip committee hearings for fundraising events, enacting fewer substantive policies as a result. Paying for the Party shows that parties in contemporary American legislatures have hollowed out the policymaking capacity of their institutions and empowered a decidedly non-representative set of legislators.

Dettagli dell'edizione

• Editore: University of Chicago Press
• Data di pubblicazione: 2026
• Lingua: Inglese
• ISBN 10: 022685020X
• ISBN 13: 9780226850207
• Rilegatura: Copertina rigida
• Numero di pagine: 224
• Contatto del produttore: The University of Chicago Press; https://press.uchicago.edu/index.html; ; 5801 S. Ellis Avenue; Chicago; IL; 60637; U.S.A.
• Persona responsabile: non disponibile