Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining - Rilegato

 
9780521267571: Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining

Sinossi

This book provides a comprehensive picture of the new developments in bargaining theory.

Le informazioni nella sezione "Riassunto" possono far riferimento a edizioni diverse di questo titolo.

Descrizione del libro

Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining provides a comprehensive picture of the new developments in bargaining theory. It especially shows the way the use of axiomatic models has been complemented by the new results derived from strategic models.

Contenuti

Preface; 1. Editor's introduction and overview Alvin E. Roth; 2. Disagreement in bargaining: models with incomplete information Kalyan Chatterjee; 3. Reputations in games and markets Robert Wilson; 4. An approach to some noncooperative game situations with special attention to bargaining Robert W. Rosenthal; 5. Infinite-horizon models of bargaining with one-sided incomplete information Drew Fudenberg, David Levine and Jean Tirole; 6. Choice of conjectures in a bargaining game with incomplete information Ariel Rubinstein; 7. Analysis of two bargaining problems with incomplete information Roger B. Myerson; 8. Sequential bargaining mechanisms Peter C. Cramton; 9. The role of risk aversion in a simple bargaining model Martin J. Osborne; 10. Risk sensitivity and related properties for bargaining solutions Stef Tijs and Hans Peters; 11. Axiomatic theory of bargaining with a variable population: a survey of recent results William Thomson; 12. Toward a focal-point theory of bargaining Alvin E. Roth; 13. Bargaining and coalitions K. G. Binmore; 14. Axiomatic approaches to coalitional bargaining Sergiu Hart; 15. A comment on the Coase theorem William Samuelson; 16. Disclosure of evidence and resolution of disputes: who should bear the burden of proof? Joel Sobel; 17. The role of arbitration and the theory of incentives Vincent P. Crawford.

Le informazioni nella sezione "Su questo libro" possono far riferimento a edizioni diverse di questo titolo.

Altre edizioni note dello stesso titolo

9780521022743: Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining

Edizione in evidenza

ISBN 10:  0521022746 ISBN 13:  9780521022743
Casa editrice: Cambridge University Press, 2008
Brossura