Articoli correlati a Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility
Sinossi
Applying advances in game theory to the study of nuclear deterrence, Robert Powell examines the foundations of deterrence theory. Game-theoretic analysis allows the author to explore some of the most complex and problematic issues in deterrence theory, including the effects of first-strike advantages, limited retaliation, and the number of nuclear powers in the international system on the dynamics of escalation. With the formalizations he develops, the author is able to demonstrate the fundamental similarity of the two seemingly disparate deterrrent strategies that have evolved in response to the nuclear revolution and the condition of mutually assured destruction: the strategy of limited retaliation. The author argues that the logic underlying both strategies centres on a search for ways to make the use of force or the threat of its use credible when any use of force might escalate to mutual devastation.
Le informazioni nella sezione "Riassunto" possono far riferimento a edizioni diverse di questo titolo.
Recensione
"...the most serious and most productive application of the formal game theory to the study of deterrence and the outbreak of war...this is the first book-length treatment I have seen that makes successful use of game theory in exploring the most elusive aspects of this subject." Thomas Schelling, author of The Strategy of Conflict
Descrizione del libro
Applying advances in game theory to the study of nuclear deterrence, Robert Powell examines the foundations of deterrence theory. Game-theoretic analysis allows the author to explore some of the most complex and problematic issues in deterrence theory, including the effects of first-strike advantages, limited retaliation, and the number of nuclear powers in the international system on the dynamics of escalation.
Le informazioni nella sezione "Su questo libro" possono far riferimento a edizioni diverse di questo titolo.
- EditoreCambridge University Press
- Data di pubblicazione1990
- ISBN 10 0521375274
- ISBN 13 9780521375276
- RilegaturaCopertina rigida
- LinguaInglese
- Numero di pagine240
Compra nuovo
Visualizza questo articolo
EUR 95,50
EUR 14,08 per la spedizione da Regno Unito a U.S.A.
Destinazione, tempi e costi
Risultati della ricerca per Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility
Foto dell'editore
Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility
Editore:
Cambridge University Press, 1990
ISBN 10: 0521375274
ISBN 13: 9780521375276
Antico o usato
Rilegato
Da: Phatpocket Limited, Waltham Abbey, HERTS, Regno Unito
Valutazione del venditore 5 su 5 stelle
Condizione: Good. Your purchase helps support Sri Lankan Children's Charity 'The Rainbow Centre'. Ex-library, so some stamps and wear, but in good overall condition. Our donations to The Rainbow Centre have helped provide an education and a safe haven to hundreds of children who live in appalling conditions. Codice articolo Z1-C-084-03927
Quantità: 1 disponibili
Foto dell'editore
Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility
Da: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Regno Unito
Valutazione del venditore 5 su 5 stelle
Condizione: New. In. Codice articolo ria9780521375276_new
Quantità: Più di 20 disponibili
Immagini fornite dal venditore
Nuclear deterrence theory : the search for credibility / Robert Powell
Editore:
Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1990
ISBN 10: 0521375274
ISBN 13: 9780521375276
Antico o usato
Rilegato
Prima edizione
Da: MW Books, New York, NY, U.S.A.
Valutazione del venditore 5 su 5 stelle
First Edition. Fine cloth copy in a near-fine, very slightly edge-nicked and dust-dulled dust-wrapper, now mylar-sleeved. Remains particularly well-preserved overall; tight, bright, clean and strong. Physical description: viii, 230 pages; 21cm. Notes:Includes bibliographical references and index. Contents: Preface; 1. Introduction; 2. The nuclear revolution and the problem of credibility; 3. The dynamics of nuclear brinkmanship; 4. Stability and longer brinkmanship crises; 5. Crisis stability in the nuclear age; 6. Stability and the lack of control; 7. The strategy of limited retaliation; 8. An appraisal; Appendix: some introductory notes on game theory; References; Index.Subjects: Deterrence (Strategy). Nuclear warfare.Nuclear energy Political aspects. Deterrence (Strategy). Nuclear warfare.Dissuasion (Stratégie)Guerre nucléaire. nuclear wars. Deterrence (Strategy)Nuclear warfare. Deterrence (Strategy)Nuclear warfare. Nuclear Weapons. Nuclear Deterrence. AbschreckungAtomstrategie. Deterrence (Strategy). Nuclear warfare.Nuclear weapons. Deterrence. International peace and security.Nuclear power Political aspects 1 Kg. Codice articolo 383753
Quantità: 1 disponibili
Foto dell'editore
Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility
Da: Lucky's Textbooks, Dallas, TX, U.S.A.
Valutazione del venditore 5 su 5 stelle
Condizione: New. Codice articolo ABLIING23Feb2416190000910
Quantità: Più di 20 disponibili
Immagini fornite dal venditore
Nuclear deterrence theory : the search for credibility / Robert Powell
Editore:
Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1990
ISBN 10: 0521375274
ISBN 13: 9780521375276
Antico o usato
Rilegato
Prima edizione
Da: MW Books Ltd., Galway, Irlanda
Valutazione del venditore 5 su 5 stelle
First Edition. Fine cloth copy in a near-fine, very slightly edge-nicked and dust-dulled dust-wrapper, now mylar-sleeved. Remains particularly well-preserved overall; tight, bright, clean and strong. Physical description: viii, 230 pages; 21cm. Notes:Includes bibliographical references and index. Contents: Preface; 1. Introduction; 2. The nuclear revolution and the problem of credibility; 3. The dynamics of nuclear brinkmanship; 4. Stability and longer brinkmanship crises; 5. Crisis stability in the nuclear age; 6. Stability and the lack of control; 7. The strategy of limited retaliation; 8. An appraisal; Appendix: some introductory notes on game theory; References; Index.Subjects: Deterrence (Strategy). Nuclear warfare.Nuclear energy Political aspects. Deterrence (Strategy). Nuclear warfare.Dissuasion (Stratégie)Guerre nucléaire. nuclear wars. Deterrence (Strategy)Nuclear warfare. Deterrence (Strategy)Nuclear warfare. Nuclear Weapons. Nuclear Deterrence. AbschreckungAtomstrategie. Deterrence (Strategy). Nuclear warfare.Nuclear weapons. Deterrence. International peace and security.Nuclear power Political aspects 1 Kg. Codice articolo 383753
Quantità: 1 disponibili
Foto dell'editore
Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility
Print on DemandDa: Revaluation Books, Exeter, Regno Unito
Valutazione del venditore 5 su 5 stelle
Hardcover. Condizione: Brand New. 238 pages. 9.50x6.25x1.00 inches. In Stock. This item is printed on demand. Codice articolo __0521375274
Quantità: 1 disponibili
Foto dell'editore
Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility
Da: California Books, Miami, FL, U.S.A.
Valutazione del venditore 5 su 5 stelle
Condizione: New. Codice articolo I-9780521375276
Quantità: Più di 20 disponibili
Foto dell'editore
Nuclear Deterrence Theory (Hardcover)
Editore:
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990
ISBN 10: 0521375274
ISBN 13: 9780521375276
Nuovo
Rilegato
Da: CitiRetail, Stevenage, Regno Unito
Valutazione del venditore 5 su 5 stelle
Hardcover. Condizione: new. Hardcover. Applying recent advances in game theory to the study of nuclear deterrence, Robert Powell examines the foundations of deterrence theory. Game-theoretic analysis allows the author to explore some of the most complex and problematic issues in deterrence theory, including the effects of first-strike advantages, limited retaliation, and the number of nuclear powers in the international system on the dynamics of escalation. With the formalizations he develops, the author is able to demonstrate the fundamental similarity of the two seemingly disparate deterrrent strategies that have evolved in response to the nuclear revolution and the condition of mutually assured destruction: the strategy of limited retaliation. The author argues that the logic underlying both strategies centers on a search for ways to make the use of force or the threat of its use credible when any use of force might escalate to mutual devastation. By providing an analytic framework in which questions about nuclear deterrence may be asked more precisely and the consequences of different strategies explored more extensively, the book provides a foundation for further advances in deterrence theory.An appendix offers the nonspecialist an introduction to game theory and to the models the author develops in the text. Applying advances in game theory to the study of nuclear deterrence, Robert Powell examines the foundations of deterrence theory. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability. Codice articolo 9780521375276
Quantità: 1 disponibili
Foto dell'editore
Nuclear Deterrence Theory (Hardcover)
Editore:
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990
ISBN 10: 0521375274
ISBN 13: 9780521375276
Nuovo
Rilegato
Da: Grand Eagle Retail, Fairfield, OH, U.S.A.
Valutazione del venditore 5 su 5 stelle
Hardcover. Condizione: new. Hardcover. Applying recent advances in game theory to the study of nuclear deterrence, Robert Powell examines the foundations of deterrence theory. Game-theoretic analysis allows the author to explore some of the most complex and problematic issues in deterrence theory, including the effects of first-strike advantages, limited retaliation, and the number of nuclear powers in the international system on the dynamics of escalation. With the formalizations he develops, the author is able to demonstrate the fundamental similarity of the two seemingly disparate deterrrent strategies that have evolved in response to the nuclear revolution and the condition of mutually assured destruction: the strategy of limited retaliation. The author argues that the logic underlying both strategies centers on a search for ways to make the use of force or the threat of its use credible when any use of force might escalate to mutual devastation. By providing an analytic framework in which questions about nuclear deterrence may be asked more precisely and the consequences of different strategies explored more extensively, the book provides a foundation for further advances in deterrence theory.An appendix offers the nonspecialist an introduction to game theory and to the models the author develops in the text. Applying advances in game theory to the study of nuclear deterrence, Robert Powell examines the foundations of deterrence theory. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability. Codice articolo 9780521375276
Quantità: 1 disponibili
Immagini fornite dal venditore
Nuclear Deterrence Theory
Da: moluna, Greven, Germania
Valutazione del venditore 5 su 5 stelle
Condizione: New. Applying advances in game theory to the study of nuclear deterrence, Robert Powell examines the foundations of deterrence theory.InhaltsverzeichnisPreface 1. Introduction 2. The nuclear revolution and the problem of credibility 3. Codice articolo 446933366
Quantità: Più di 20 disponibili