Organization with Incomplete Information: Essays in Economic Analysis: A Tribute to Roy Radner - Rilegato

Rilegato

ISBN 10: 0521553008 ISBN 13: 9780521553001

Casa editrice: Cambridge University Press, 1998

Riassunto

This collection provides a definitive and accessible account of recent research in the theory of decision-making and organization-design with incomplete information.

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Descrizione del libro

This collection contains essays that provide definitive and accessible accounts of recent research on some of the most important topics in the theory of decision-making and organization-design with incomplete information. Aimed primarily at non-specialists, some of the essays indicate the limitations of accepted paradigms and suggest directions of future research.

Contenuti

Introduction: searching for paradigms Mukul Majumdar; 1. Equilibrium with incomplete markets in a sequence economy Wayne Shafer; 2. The existence of rational expectations equilibrium: a retrospective Beth Allen and James S. Jordan; 3. Rational expectations and rational learning Lawrence E. Blume and David Easley; 4. Dynamic games in organizational theory Roy Radner; 5. The equilibrium existence problem in general Markovian games Prajit Dutta and Rangarajan Sundaram; 6. A practical person's guide to mechanism selection: some lesson from experimental economics Andrew Schotter; 7. Organizations with an endogenous number of information processing agents Timothy Van Zandt; 8. A modular network model of bounded rationality Kenneth R. Mount and Stanley Reiter.

Dettagli dell'edizione

• Editore: Cambridge University Press
• Data di pubblicazione: 1998
• Lingua: Inglese
• ISBN 10: 0521553008
• ISBN 13: 9780521553001
• Rilegatura: Copertina rigida
• Numero di pagine: 358
• Redattore: Majumdar Mukul
• Contatto del produttore: Cambridge University Press; https://www.cambridge.org/; ; Via Honduras,15; Pomezia; Italia; 71; Italia