Normal Accidents: Living With High-Risk Technologies - Brossura

Perrow, Charles

Brossura

ISBN 10: 0691004129 ISBN 13: 9780691004129

Casa editrice: Princeton Univ Pr, 1999

Riassunto

Normal Accidents analyzes the social side of technological risk. Charles Perrow argues that the conventional engineering approach to ensuring safety--building in more warnings and safeguards--fails because systems complexity makes failures inevitable. He asserts that typical precautions, by adding to complexity, may help create new categories of accidents. (At Chernobyl, tests of a new safety system helped produce the meltdown and subsequent fire.) By recognizing two dimensions of risk--complex versus linear interactions, and tight versus loose coupling--this book provides a powerful framework for analyzing risks and the organizations that insist we run them.


The first edition fulfilled one reviewer's prediction that it "may mark the beginning of accident research." In the new afterword to this edition Perrow reviews the extensive work on the major accidents of the last fifteen years, including Bhopal, Chernobyl, and the Challenger disaster. The new postscript probes what the author considers to be the "quintessential 'Normal Accident'" of our time: the Y2K computer problem.

Su questo libro

Informazioni sull?autore

Charles Perrow is Professor of Sociology at Yale University. His other books include The Radical Attack on Business, Organizational Analysis: A Sociological View, Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay, and The AIDS Disaster: The Failure of Organizations in New York and the Nation.

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NORMAL ACCIDENTS

Living with High-Risk TechnologiesBy CHARLES PERROW

Princeton University Press

Copyright © 1999 Princeton University Press
All right reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-691-00412-9

Contents

Abnormal Blessings............................................................................................viiIntroduction..................................................................................................31. Normal Accident at Three Mile Island.......................................................................152. Nuclear Power as a High-Risk System: Why We Have Not Had More TMIs—But Will Soon.....................323. Complexity, Coupling, and Catastrophe......................................................................624. Petrochemical Plants.......................................................................................1015. Aircraft and Airways.......................................................................................1236. Marine Accidents...........................................................................................1707. Earthbound Systems: Dams, Quakes, Mines, and Lakes.........................................................2328. Exotics: Space, Weapons, and DNA...........................................................................2569. Living with High-Risk Systems..............................................................................304Afterword.....................................................................................................353Postscript: The Y2K Problem...................................................................................388List of Acronyms..............................................................................................413Notes.........................................................................................................415Bibliography..................................................................................................426Index.........................................................................................................441

Chapter One

Normal Accident at Three Mile Island

Our first example of the accident potential of complex systems is the accident at the Three Mile Island Unit 2 nuclear plant near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, on March 28, 1979. I have simplified the technical details a great deal and have not tried to define all of the terms. It is not necessary to understand the technology in any depth. What I wish to convey is the interconnectedness of the system, and the occasions for baffling interactions. This will be the most demanding technological account in the book, but even a general sense of the complexity will suffice if one wishes to merely follow the drama rather than the technical evolution of the accident.

TMI is clearly our most serious nuclear power plant accident to date. The high drama of the event gripped the nation for a fortnight, as reassurance gave way to near panic, and we learned of a massive hydrogen bubble and releases that sent pregnant women and others fleeing the area. The President of the United States toured the plant while two feeble pumps, designed for quite other duties, labored to keep the core from melting further. (One of them soon failed, but fortunately by the time the second pump failed the system had cooled sufficiently to allow for natural circulation.) The subsequent investigations and law suits disclosed a seemingly endless story of incompetence, dishonesty, and cover-ups before, during, and after the event; indeed, new disclosures were appearing as this book went to press. Yet, as we shall see in chapter 2 when we examine other accidents, the performance of all concerned—utility, manufacturer, regulatory agency, and industry—was about average. Rather sizeable bits and pieces of the TMI disaster can be found elsewhere in the industry; they had just never been put together so dramatically before.

Unit 2 at Three Mile Island (TMI) had a hard time getting underway at the end of 1978. Nuclear plants are always plagued with start-up problems because the system is so complex, and the technology so new. Many processes are still not well understood, and the tolerances are frightfully small for some components. A nuclear plant is also a hybrid creation—the reactor itself being complex and new and carefully engineered by one company, while the system for drawing off the heat and using it to turn turbines is a rather conventional, old, and comparatively unsophisticated system built by another company. Unit 2 may have had more than the usual problems. The maintenance force was overworked at the time of the accident and had been reduced in size during an economizing drive. There were many shutdowns, and a variety of things turned out, in retrospect, to be out of order. But one suspects that it was not all that different from other plants; after a plant sustains an accident, a thorough investigation will turn up numerous problems that would have gone unnoticed or undocumented had the accident been avoided. Indeed, in the 1982 court case where the utility, Metropolitan Edison, sued the builder of the reactor, Babcock and Wilcox, the utility charged the builder with an embarrassing number of errors and failures, and the vendor returned the favor by charging that the utility was incompetent to run their machine. But Metropolitan Edison runs other machines, and Babcock and Wilson have built many reactors that have not had such a serious accident. We know so much about the problems of Unit 2 only because the accident at Three Mile Island made it a subject for intense study; it is probably the most well-documented examination of organizational performance in the public record. At last count I found ten published technical volumes or books on the accident alone, perhaps one hundred articles, and many volumes of testimony.

The accident started in the cooling system. There are two cooling systems. The primary cooling system contains water under high pressure and at high temperature that circulates through the core where the nuclear reaction is taking place. This water goes into a steam generator, where it bathes small tubes circulating water in a quite separate system, the secondary cooling system, and heats this water in the secondary system. This transfer of heat from the primary to the secondary system keeps the core from overheating, and uses the heat to make steam. Water in the secondary system is also under high pressure until it is called upon to turn into steam, which drives the turbines that generate the electric power. The accident started in the secondary cooling system.

The water in the secondary system is not radioactive (as is the water in the primary system), but it must be very pure because its steam drives the finely precisioned turbine blades. Resins get into the water and have to be removed by the condensate polisher system, which removes particles that are precipitated out.

The polisher is a balky system, and it had failed three times in the few months the new unit had been in operation. After about eleven hours of work on the system, at 4:00 A.M. on March 28, 1979, the turbine tripped (stopped). Though the operators did not know why at the time, it is believed that some water leaked out of the polisher system—perhaps a cupful—through a leaky seal.

Seals are always in danger of leaking, but normally it is not a problem. In this case, however, the moisture got into the instrument air system of the plant. This is a pneumatic system that drives some of the instruments. The moisture interrupted the air pressure applied to two valves on two feedwater pumps. This interruption "told" the pumps that something was amiss (though it wasn't) and that they should stop. They did. Without the pumps, the cold water was no longer flowing into the steam generator, where the heat of the primary system could be transferred to the cool water in the secondary system. When this flow is interrupted, the turbine shuts down, automatically—an automatic safety device, or ASD.

But stopping the turbine is not enough to render the plant safe. Somehow, the heat in the core, which makes the primary cooling system water so hot, has to be removed. If you take a whistling tea kettle off the stove and plug its opening, the heat in the metal and water will continue to produce steam, and if it cannot get out, it may explode. Therefore, the emergency feedwater pumps came on (they are at H in Figure 1.1; the regular feedwater pumps which just stopped are above them in the figure). They are designed to pull water from an emergency storage tank and run it through the secondary cooling system, compensating for the water in that system that will boil off now that it is not circulating. (It is like pouring cold water over your plugged tea kettle.) However, these two pipes were unfortunately blocked; a valve in each pipe had been accidently left in a closed position after maintenance two days before. The pumps came on and the operator verified that they did, but he did not know that they were pumping water into a closed pipe.

The President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island (the Kemeny Commission) spent a lot of time trying to find out just who was responsible for leaving the valves closed, but they were unsuccessful. Three operators testified that it was a mystery to them how the valves had gotten closed, because they distinctly remembered opening them after the testing. You probably have had the same problem with closing the freezer door or locking the front door; you are sure you did, because you have done it many times. Operators testified at the Commission's hearings that with hundreds of valves being opened or closed in a nuclear plant, it is not unusual to find some in the wrong position—even when locks are put on them and a "lock sheet" is maintained so the operators can make an entry every time a special valve is opened or closed.

Accidents often involve such mysteries. A safety hatch on a Mercury spacecraft prematurely blew open (it had an explosive charge for opening it) as the recovery helicopter was about to pick it up out of the water after splashdown. Gus Grissom, the astronaut, insisted afterwards that he hadn't fired it prematurely or hit it accidentally. It just blew by itself. (He almost drowned.) It is the old war between operators and the equipment others have designed and built. The operators say it wasn't their fault; the designers say it wasn't the fault of the equipment or design. Ironically, the astronauts had insisted upon the escape hatch being put in as a safety device in case they had to exit rapidly; it is not the only example we shall uncover of safety devices increasing the chances of accidents. The Three Mile Island operators finally had to concede reluctantly that large valves do not close by themselves, so someone must have goofed.

There were two indicators on TMI's gigantic control panel that showed that the valves were closed instead of open. One was obscured by a repair tag hanging on the switch above it. But at this point the operators were unaware of any problem with emergency feedwater and had no occasion to make sure those valves, which are always open except during tests, were indeed open. Eight minutes later, when they were baffled by the performance of the plant, they discovered it. By then much of the initial damage had been done. Apparently our knowledge of these plants is quite incomplete, for while some experts thought the closed valves constituted an important operator error, other experts held that it did not make much difference whether the valves were closed or not, since the supply of emergency feedwater is limited and worse problems were appearing anyway.

With no circulation of coolant in the secondary system, a number of complications were bound to occur. The steam generator boiled dry. Since no heat was being removed from the core, the reactor "scrammed." In a scram the graphite control rods, 80 percent silver, drop into the core and absorb the neutrons, stopping the chain reaction. (In the first experiments with chain reactions, the procedure was the same—"drop the rods and scram"; thus the graphic term scram for stopping the chain reaction.) But that isn't enough. The decaying radioactive materials still produce some heat, enough to generate electricity for 18,000 homes. The "decay heat" in this 40-foot-high stainless steel vessel, taller than a three-story building, builds up enormous temperature and pressure. Normally there are thousands of gallons of water in the primary and secondary cooling systems to draw off the intense heat of the reactor core. In a few days this cooling system should cool down the core. But the cooling system was not working.

There are, of course, ASDs to handle the problem. The first ASD is the pilot-operated relief valve (PORV), which will relieve the pressure in the core by channeling the water from the core through a big vessel called a pressurizer, and out the top of it into a drain pipe (called the "hot leg"), and down into a sump. It is radioactive water and is very hot, so the valve is a nuisance. Also, it should only be open long enough to relieve the pressure; if too much water comes through it, the pressure will drop so much that the water can flash into steam, creating bubbles of steam, called steam voids, in the core and the primary cooling pipes. These bubbles will restrict the flow of coolant, and allow certain spots to get much hotter than others—in particular, spots by the uranium rods, allowing them to start fissioning again.

The PORV is also known by its Dresser Industries' trade name of "electromatic relief valve." (Dresser Industries is the firm that sponsored ads shortly after the accident saying that actress Jane Fonda was more dangerous than nuclear plants. She was starring in the China Syndrome, a popular movie playing at the time that depicted a near meltdown in a nuclear plant.) It is expected to fail once in every fifty usages, but on the other hand, it is seldom needed. The President's Commission turned up at least eleven instances of it failing in other nuclear plants (to the surprise of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the builder of the reactor, Babcock and Wilcox, who only knew of four) and there had been two earlier failures in the short life of TMI-Unit 2. Unfortunately, it just so happened that this time, with the block valves closed and one indicator hidden, and with the condensate pumps out of order, the PORV failed to reseat, or close, after the core had relieved itself sufficiently of pressure.

This meant that the reactor core, where the heat was building up because the coolant was not moving, had a sizeable hole in it—the stuck-open relief valve. The coolant in the core, the primary coolant system, was under high pressure, and was ejecting out through the stuck valve into a long curved pipe, the "hot leg," which went down to a drain tank. Thirty-two thousand gallons, one third of the capacity of the core, would eventually stream out. This was no small pipe break someplace as the operators originally thought; the thing was simply uncorked, relieving itself when it shouldn't.

Since there had been problems with this relief valve before (and it is a difficult engineering job to make a highly reliable valve under the conditions in which it must operate), an indicator had recently been added to the valve to warn operators if it did not reseat. The watchword is "safety" in nuclear plants. But, since nothing is perfect, it just so happened that this time the indicator itself failed, probably because of a faulty solenoid, a kind of electromagnetic toggle switch. Actually, it wasn't much of an indicator, and the utility and supplier would have been better off to have had none at all. Safety systems, such as warning lights, are necessary, but they have the potential for deception. If there had been no light assuring them the valve had closed, the operators would have taken other steps to check the status of the valve, as operators did in a similar accident at another plant a year and a half before. But if you can't believe the lights on your control panel, an army of operators would be necessary to check every part of the system that might be relevant. And one of the lessons of complex systems and TMI is that any part of the system might be interacting with other parts in unanticipated ways.

The indicator sent a signal to the control board that the valve had received the impulse to shut down. (It was not an indication that the valve had actually shut down; that would be much harder to provide.) So the operators noted that all was fine with the PORV, and waited for reactor pressure to rise again, since it had dropped quickly when the valve opened for a second. The cork stayed off the vessel for two hours and twenty minutes before a new shift supervisor, taking a fresh look at the problems, discovered it.

We are now, incredibly enough, only thirteen seconds into the "transient," as engineers call it. (It is not a perversely optimistic term meaning something quite temporary or transient, but rather it means a rapid change in some parameter, in this case, temperature.) In these few seconds there was a false signal causing the condensate pumps to fail, two valves for emergency cooling out of position and the indicator obscured, a PORV that failed to reseat, and a failed indicator of its position. The operators could have been aware of none of these.

(Continues...)

Excerpted from NORMAL ACCIDENTSby CHARLES PERROW Copyright © 1999 by Princeton University Press. Excerpted by permission of Princeton University Press. All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.
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Dettagli dell?edizione

• Editore: Princeton Univ Pr
• Data di pubblicazione: 1999
• ISBN 10: 0691004129
• ISBN 13: 9780691004129
• Rilegatura: Copertina flessibile
• Lingua: Inglese
• Numero di pagine: 386
• Contatto del produttore: non disponibile