This volume collects the best work representative of the theory of decision making under risk and uncertainty. Thirteen articles present extensions and alternatives to expected utility theory explaining behavior in and out of the laboratory, including activity in financial markets, crimes of passion, and the Ellsberg paradox. These contributions on the theory of individual behavior are complemented by five studies reporting the design, execution, and implications of experiments that test alternative theories. Finally, the implications of the interaction of individuals under risk and uncertainty in markets and negotiation are explored in ten papers. Throughout, the approach taken reflects the multidisciplinary nature of the research. The contributors include economists, psychologists, statisticians, and management scientists, each writing to make their work critically comprehensible to the wider audience.
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I: Expected Utility Theory: Extensions. Nontransitive Preferences and Normative Decision Theory; P.C. Fishburn. Healthy Scepticism as an Expected-Utility Evolution of the Ellsberg Paradox; J.B. Kadane. Intertemporal Risk-Aversion and Calibration Uncertaintly May Explain Violations of the Independence Axiom; R.F. Bordley, G.B. Hazen. Decision Versus Policy: An Expected Utility Resolution of the Ellsberg Paradox; G.B. Hazen. Comparative Statics for Endogenous Risk; J.F. Shogren. Deterministic Transformations: Some Comparative Statistics Results; M.B. Ormiston. Defining the Mean-Preserving Spread: 3-PT Versus 4-PT; E. Rasmusen, E. Petrakis. II: Expected Utility Theory: Alternatives. A Descriptive Model and a Decision Technique; O. Hagen. Risk Aversion Measures with Expected and Non-Expected Utility; A. Montesano. Linear Lexocographic State-Depended Utility; I.H. Lavalle, P.C. Fishburg. On the Foundations of Decision Making Under Partial Information; D. Rios Insua. The Bayesian Model of Conditional Preference and Trade Under Uncertainty; T. Philipson. Consumption Style as Choice Under Risk Static Choice, Dynamic Irrationality and Crimes of Passion; J. Rothenberg. III: Evidence from Experiments. The Effect of Explicit Probability Estimates on Violations of Subjective Expected Utility Theory in the Allais Paradox; I. Erev. Testing Alternative Representations of Behavior Under Uncertainty; G. Gigliotti, B. Sopher. Generic Utility: Measurements of Risk Functions and their Robustness; R. Krzysztofowicz. Studies on Judgmental Probablilty Forecasting; G. Rowe, G. Wright, F. Bolger. Risk Attitude, Strength of Preference and Relative Risk Attitude: An Assessment with Multiple Indicators; A. Smidts. IV: Information, Learning and Equilibrium. A Simple Model of Partial Information Exchange Among Individuals with Different Subjective Probabilities; B. Allen. Tests for a Reservation Wage Effect; J.C. Cox, R.L Oaxaca. Market Uncertainty and Belief Formation with a Finite Number of Events; B.R. Munier. Arbitrage, Rationality, and Equilibrium; R.F. Nau, K.F. McCardle. Adaptive Behavior in Games; P. McAllister. An Experimental Investigation of Focal Points in Coordination and Bargaining: Some Preliminary Results; J. Mehta, C. Starmer, R. Sugden. Some Versions of Newcomb's Problem are Prisoners' Dilemmas; J.H. Sobel. Foundations for the Theory of Rational Choice with Vague Priors; K. Nehring. Public Knowledge About Indoor Radon: The Effects of Risk Communication; A. Bostrom, C.J. Atman, B. Fischoff, M.G. Morgan. Risk Perceptions and Risk Taking in the Presence of Multiple Risks; S.R. Elliott, M. McKee.
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Da: Ammareal, Morangis, Francia
Hardcover. Condizione: Très bon. Ancien livre de bibliothèque. Couverture différente. Ammareal reverse jusqu'à 15% du prix net de cet article à des organisations caritatives. ENGLISH DESCRIPTION Book Condition: Used, Very good. Former library book. Different cover. Ammareal gives back up to 15% of this item's net price to charity organizations. Codice articolo D-584-479
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gebundene Ausgabe. Condizione: Gut. 260 Seiten Das hier angebotene Buch stammt aus einer teilaufgelösten Bibliothek und kann die entsprechenden Kennzeichnungen aufweisen (Rückenschild, Instituts-Stempel.); der Buchzustand ist ansonsten ordentlich und dem Alter entsprechend gut. In ENGLISCHER Sprache. Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 625. Codice articolo 2232171
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Condizione: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. As desired, the infonnation demand correspondence is single valued at equilibrium prices. Hence no planner is needed to assign infonnation allocations to individuals. Proposition 4. For any given infonnation price system p E . P (F *), almost every a E A de. Codice articolo 5966610
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Da: BuchWeltWeit Ludwig Meier e.K., Bergisch Gladbach, Germania
Buch. Condizione: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -As desired, the infonnation demand correspondence is single valued at equilibrium prices. Hence no planner is needed to assign infonnation allocations to individuals. Proposition 4. For any given infonnation price system p E . P (F \*), almost every a E A demands a unique combined infonnation structure (although traders may be indifferent among partial infonnation sales from different information allocations, etc. ). In particular, the aggregate excess demand correspondence for net combined infonnation trades is a continuous function. Proof Uniqueness fails only if an agent can obtain the same expected utility from two or more net combined infonnation allocations. If this happens, appropriate slight perturbations of personal probability vectors destroy the equality unless the utility functions and wealth allocations were independent across states. Yet, when utilities and wealths don't depend on states in S, no infonnation to distinguish the states is desired, so that the demand for such infonnation structures must equal zero. To show the second claim, recall that if the correspondence is single valued for almost every agent, then its integral is also single valued. Finally, note that an upper hemicontinuous (by Proposition 2) correspondence which is single valued everywhere is, in fact, a continuous function. [] REFERENCES Allen, Beth (1986a). 'The Demand for (Differentiated) Infonnation'; Review of Economic Studies. 53. (311-323). Allen, Beth (1986b). 'General Equilibrium with Infonnation Sales'; Theory and Decision. 21. (1-33). Allen, Beth (1990). 'Infonnation as an Economic Commodity'; American Economic Review. 80. (268-273). 272 pp. Englisch. Codice articolo 9780792319047
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Buch. Condizione: Neu. Decision Making Under Risk and Uncertainty | New Models and Empirical Findings | J. Geweke | Buch | ix | Englisch | 1992 | Springer Netherland | EAN 9780792319047 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg, juergen[dot]hartmann[at]springer[dot]com | Anbieter: preigu Print on Demand. Codice articolo 102564926
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Buch. Condizione: Neu. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -As desired, the infonnation demand correspondence is single valued at equilibrium prices. Hence no planner is needed to assign infonnation allocations to individuals. Proposition 4. For any given infonnation price system p E . P (F \*), almost every a E A demands a unique combined infonnation structure (although traders may be indifferent among partial infonnation sales from different information allocations, etc. ). In particular, the aggregate excess demand correspondence for net combined infonnation trades is a continuous function. Proof Uniqueness fails only if an agent can obtain the same expected utility from two or more net combined infonnation allocations. If this happens, appropriate slight perturbations of personal probability vectors destroy the equality unless the utility functions and wealth allocations were independent across states. Yet, when utilities and wealths don't depend on states in S, no infonnation to distinguish the states is desired, so that the demand for such infonnation structures must equal zero. To show the second claim, recall that if the correspondence is single valued for almost every agent, then its integral is also single valued. Finally, note that an upper hemicontinuous (by Proposition 2) correspondence which is single valued everywhere is, in fact, a continuous function. [] REFERENCES Allen, Beth (1986a). 'The Demand for (Differentiated) Infonnation'; Review of Economic Studies. 53. (311-323). Allen, Beth (1986b). 'General Equilibrium with Infonnation Sales'; Theory and Decision. 21. (1-33). Allen, Beth (1990). 'Infonnation as an Economic Commodity'; American Economic Review. 80. (268-273).Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg 272 pp. Englisch. Codice articolo 9780792319047
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Condizione: New. pp. 276. Codice articolo 26541413
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