What, ultimately, is there good reason to do? Proposing a unified theory of agent-dependent reasons and agent-independent reasons, this work holds that principles which assign reasons to agents are valid if and only if they make maximally good sense in the light of relevant data and background theories. The theory avoids problems encountered by views associated with Nagel, Parfit, Brandt, Hubin, Gert, Baier, and Tiberius, amongst others. By what criteria should a normative theory of ultimate reasons be judged? Plausible meta-level criteria emerge from a process of identifying the criteria that have been used, sometimes unwittingly, by various theorists; categorizing and evaluating the criteria in the light of each other; and proposing revisions on that basis. This method escapes the drawbacks of rival approaches, such as those associated with Parfit, Gert, and Darwall. The resulting criteria cast a favourable light on the proposed normative theory of ultimate reasons.
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Acknowledgments. Introduction. 1. Some Rival Reasons Theories. 2. The Inclusive Data View. 3. A Rival Approach: Darwall's Argument. 4. Are We Limited to a Particular Tradition? 5. Parfit-Inspired Candidates for Meta-Level Criteria. 6. Brandt-Inspired Candidates for Meta-Level Criteria. 7. Selecting and Using Meta-Level Criteria. Bibliography of Works Cited. Index.
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