Excerpt from Agency Problems, Financial Contracting, and Predation
We conclude these introductory remarks by contrasting our paper to three related literatures. The first is the recent game-theoretic work on predation.4 This literature shares with ours the feature that predation is rational. It differs, however, in that predation is viewed as an attempt to convince rivals that it would be unprofitable to remain in the industry; predation changes rivals' beliefs about industry demand or the predator's costs. In our paper, there is common knowledge that production in each period is a positive net present value investment.5 Thus, predation does not work by changing rivals' beliefs. Rather, predation adversely affects the agency relationship between the firm and its creditors.
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Paperback. Condizione: New. No Jacket. Print on Demand. Understand how competition and financing shape corporate risk and incentives.This rigorous analysis examines how agency problems in financial contracting can invite predation in competitive markets. It builds a clear framework showing how the design of contracts between firms and investors influences both funding decisions and managers' incentives, and it explains when predation helps or hurts in a multi-period setting. The work contrasts different ways predation can unfold and how observability of contracts changes strategic choices for both investors and rivals. How refinancing and internal funds affect a firm's incentives and exit decisions over time How predatory actions by rivals can emerge and how contracts can deter or enable them Solutions that balance deterring predation with maintaining strong managerial incentives What contract observability means for real-world financing and corporate governanceIdeal for readers interested in finance, corporate strategy, and economic theory, exploring how capital structure and market competition interact in practice. This book is a reproduction of an important historical work, digitally reconstructed using state-of-the-art technology to preserve the original format. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in the book. print-on-demand item. Codice articolo 9781332248551_0
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