Game Theoretic Risk Analysis of Security Threats: 128 - Brossura

Brossura

ISBN 10: 1441946888 ISBN 13: 9781441946881

Casa editrice: Springer, 2011

Riassunto

Game Theoretic Risk Analysis of Security Threats introduces reliability and risk analysis in the face of threats by intelligent agents. More specifically, game-theoretic models are developed for identifying optimal and/or equilibrium defense and attack strategies in systems of varying degrees of complexity. The book covers applications to networks, including problems in both telecommunications and transportation. However, the book’s primary focus is to integrate game theory and reliability methodologies into a set of techniques to predict, detect, diminish, and stop intentional attacks at targets that vary in complexity. In this book, Bier and Azaiez highlight work by researchers who combine reliability and risk analysis with game theory methods to create a set of functional tools that can be used to offset intentional, intelligent threats (including threats of terrorism and war). These tools will help to address problems of global security and facilitate more cost-effective defensive investments.

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Dalla quarta di copertina

Game Theoretic Risk Analysis of Security Threats introduces reliability and risk analysis in the face of threats by intelligent agents. More specifically, game-theoretic models will be developed for identifying optimal and/or equilibrium defense and attack strategies in systems of varying degrees of complexity. The book covers applications to networks, including problems in both telecommunications and transportation. However, the book s primary focus is to integrate game theory and reliability methodologies into unified techniques to predict, detect, diminish, and stop intentional attacks at targets that vary in complexity.

 

In this book, leading researchers combine reliability and risk analysis with game theory methods to create a set of functional tools that can be used by security personnel to offset intentional, intelligent threats (including the threats of terrorism and war). This means a comprehensive treatment of such problems must consider two aspects: (1) the structure of the system to be protected and (2) the adaptive nature of the threat (that is, beyond the static nature of the threat). The book provides a set of scientific tools for analyzing and applying game-theoretic reliability problems in the presence of intentional, intelligent threats. These scientific tools address problems of global safety and create more cost-effective defensive investments.

 

Dettagli dell'edizione

• Editore: Springer
• Data di pubblicazione: 2011
• Lingua: Inglese
• ISBN 10: 1441946888
• ISBN 13: 9781441946881
• Rilegatura: Copertina flessibile
• Numero di pagine: 248
• Redattore: Bier Vicki M., Azaiez M. Naceur
• Contatto del produttore: ProductSafety@springernature.com; ProductSafety@springernature.com; ; Poststr. 9; Darmstadt; 64293; Germania