Beyond US Hegemony?: Assessing the Prospects for a Multipolar World - Brossura

Amin, Samir

Brossura

ISBN 10: 1842777092 ISBN 13: 9781842777091

Casa editrice: Zed Books, 2006

Riassunto

In this major new work - the result of a lifetime of intellectual engagement - one of the developing world's most famous thinkers reflects on the times we live in. He argues that US hegemony has reached a dangerous new level under George Bush Jr, and that the US President's hubristic militarism will both lead to a never-ending cycle of wars and block all hopes of social and democratic progress, not just in developing countries, but in the North as well.

Samir Amin also rejects the highly ideological notion that the current form of neoliberal capitalism - 'really existing capitalism' in which imperialism is an integral and permanent part - is an inevitable future for humanity, or in fact socially or politically tolerable. At the same time, he is not opposed to globalization as such; indeed he believes the whole world today is irrevocably connected, and that solidarity in diversity is the key to the struggle for a better world.

In the body of the book, Amin provides a perspicacious analysis of tendencies within the rich countries - the US, Europe and Japan; the rising powers - China and India; the likely future trajectory of post-Soviet Russia; and the developing world. The central question he pursues is whether there are other hegemonic blocs that may emerge in time to circumscribe American power, and constrain free market capitalism and force it to adjust to demands other than its narrow central economic logic.

This important and thought-provoking book identifies the key global campaigns Samir feels progressives should launch around the world. 'Another world is possible.' But, he warns, the diverse citizens' movements loosely gathered together in the World Social Forum must bite the political bullet and recognise that they can only transform the world if they seek political power.

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Informazioni sull?autore

Samir Amin is Director of the Third World Forum in Dakar, Senegal; and a co-founder of the World Forum for Alternatives.
Samir Amin is Director of the Third World Forum in Dakar, Senegal; and a co-founder of the World Forum for Alternatives.

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Beyond Us Hegemony?

Assessing the Prospects for a Multipolar World

By Samir Amin, Patrick Camiller

Zed Books Ltd

Copyright © 2006 Samir Amin
All rights reserved.

ISBN: 978-1-84277-709-1

Contents

Introduction, 1, 
1 The triad: America, Europe and Japan — united or fragmented?, 8, 
2 Does the rise of China challenge the imperialist order?, 25, 
3 Russia out of the tunnel?, 49, 
4 India, a great power?, 69, 
5 Can solidarity be rebuilt among the countries of the South?, 84, 
6 Reform of the UN as a part of multipolar globalization, 112, 
7 Conclusions, 146, 
APPENDIX I Multipolarity in the twentieth century, 165, 
APPENDIX II Further reading, 175, 
Index, 185, 

CHAPTER 1

The triad: America, Europe and Japan — united or fragmented?

The phase of the global deployment of capitalism, which began in 1945 but was impeded until the collapse of the post-war social orders (welfare state, Sovietism, national populism in the South), is characterized by the emergence of a collective imperialism. The 'triad' (that is, the United States plus its Canadian external province, Europe west of the Polish frontier, and Japan — to which we should add Australia and New Zealand) defines the area of this collective imperialism. It 'manages' the economic dimension of capitalist globalization through the institutions at its service (WTO, IMF, World Bank, OECD), and the political–military dimension through Nato, whose responsibilities have been redefined so that it can in effect substitute itself for the United Nations.

Yet the current moment in this phase is also characterized by a US offensive to impose its own leadership on the triad, involving a conception of 'military control of the planet' worked out by the George W. Bush administration. The question that immediately arises is whether this is a viable conception. Are the triad partners forced to accept US leadership, either in the stark forms unilaterally decided by Washington or with some 'concessions' that allow for a less unbalanced division of responsibilities and benefits? Or are we heading towards a radical, if gradual, challenge to Atlanticism (and the complementary asymmetrical alliance between the USA and Japan), and therefore towards the breaking up of the triad? In both cases, we need to be clear what the different developments would entail for North–South relations.

In the immediate term, the United States enjoys an evident strategic advantage: its project is the only one that is clearly and openly formulated and, by virtue of the initiatives taken by Washington, the only one that is actually in play. Up to now its partners in the international community — the triad allies and the rest — have done nothing more than respond to those initiatives, whether by falling into line, accepting with bad grace or seeking to limit some of the consequences they find most troubling to themselves. None has a really positive alternative to guide its strategy, and in a thoroughly disorganized manner each places the immediate emphasis on what it considers to be the defence of its own interests.

The question we posed does not admit of a simple answer, for the contemporary world has been undergoing a number of massive changes. Europe, now the largest trading power, has embarked on a common project of political construction that will probably rule out a return to the internecine wars of its past. Japan has become a major economic power, and a large part of Asia is heading along the road of accelerated development. The United States, for its part, has made a sensational comeback, while the disappearance of 'actually existing socialism' has helped to spread the idea that capitalism is the only possible future for all nations. In these conditions, the geometry of possible rapprochement among the different poles of power and wealth has become extremely complex.

To see our way more clearly, we may usefully start by analysing the project of the US ruling class and identifying its strengths and weaknesses. Then we shall consider how Europe — or the different Europes — and Japan are responding to the challenge, and which conditions need to be fulfilled if the various options of the triad partners are to take effect. This analysis will allow us to clarify the nature of possible conflicts within the triad, and to identify the terrain on which they might occur. It will also enable us to begin discussion on what the various scenarios would entail for North–South relations.

The project of the American ruling class: extension of the Monroe doctrine to the rest of the world

The project that the US ruling class has cherished since 1945 now has five objectives: (i) to neutralize and subjugate the other triad partners (Europe and Japan) and to minimize their capacity to act outside the American fold; (ii) to establish military control over Nato and to 'Latin Americanize' the former parts of the Soviet world; (iii) to assert undivided control over the Middle East and its oil resources; (iv) to break up China, to ensure the subordination of the other major states (India, Brazil), and to prevent the constitution of any regional blocs that might renegotiate the terms of globalization; and (v) to marginalize regions in the South that are of no strategic interest.

The project, which was devised after Potsdam and grounded on the American nuclear monopoly, has always assigned a key role to its military dimension. In a very short time the United States put in place a global military strategy, divided the globe into a number of regions, and created several 'Military Commands' to take responsibility for each. The aim was not only to encircle the USSR (and China) but also to make Washington the worldwide master of last resort: in other words, to extend to the whole planet the Monroe doctrine that had already staked its claim to run the New World in accordance with its own 'national interests'.

The main instrument in the current US drive for hegemony is therefore military. Such hegemony would in turn guarantee that of the triad over the global system, but the allies of the United States would have to accept their subaltern status, as Britain and Japan already do, and to recognize its necessity without feeling even any 'cultural' qualms. This means, however, that the talk of economic strength with which European politicians regale their local constituencies would lose all purchase on reality. If Europe places itself entirely on the ground of mercantile disputes, without advancing any project of its own, it will have been defeated in advance. People in Washington are well aware of that.

The project implies that the 'sovereign national interests of the United States' should hold sway over all other principles defining what is regarded as legitimate political behaviour; it leads to systematic distrust of all international law.

The ruling class of the United States freely proclaims that it will not 'tolerate' the reconstitution of any economic or military power capable of challenging its global domination. To this end, it has given itself the right to wage 'preventive wars', with three main potential adversaries in mind.

First, the dismemberment of the Russian Federation, following that of the USSR, is a major strategic objective for the United States. Until now the Russian ruling class does not appear to have understood this. It seemed convinced that, having lost the war, it could go on to win the peace — as Germany and Japan did before it. What it forgot was that Washington needed the recovery of its two wartime enemies, precisely in order to face down the Soviet challenge. The new conjuncture is different, as the United States no longer has a serious rival. Its option is therefore to destroy its defeated Russian adversary once and for all. Has Putin finally understood this? Is Russia beginning to shake off its illusions?

Second, the huge size and economic success of China are such that the United States is seriously worried, and here too has a strategic goal of dismembering the country.

Europe comes third in the list, as seen by the new lords of the earth. Up to now, however, the North American establishment does not appear to be so uneasy about its relations with Europe. The unconditional Atlanticism of some countries (Britain and the EU's new servile members in the East), the 'shifting sands' of Europeanism itself, the convergent interests of dominant capital within the triad's collective imperialism: all this is tending to roll back the European project, or to maintain it as the European 'section' of the US project. Washington's diplomatic efforts have managed to keep Germany in tow; the reunification and conquest of Eastern Europe have even appeared to strengthen the Atlantic alliance, as Germany has ostensibly been encouraged to resume its traditional Drang nach Osten (witness Berlin's role in breaking up Yugoslavia through the hasty recognition of Slovenian and Croatian independence) and otherwise asked to steer in the American wake. Is a change of course currently under way? The German political class appears hesitant, perhaps divided, in its choice of strategy.

The alternative to Atlanticist alignment calls instead for the strengthening of a Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis, which could become the backbone of a European system independent of Washington.

The prevailing opinion is that US military power is only the tip of the iceberg, prolonging its economic as well as political and cultural superiority. In my view, however, the United States has no decisive economic advantages within the system of collective imperialism; on the contrary, scarcely any of its sectors could be certain of seeing off competitors in the kind of truly open market imagined by liberal economists. Evidence of this is the fact that the US trade deficit keeps growing year after year, having soared from $100 billion in 1989 to $500 billion in 2002, and that this deficit involves practically every segment of the productive system. The competition between Ariane and Nasa space rockets, or between Airbus and Boeing, testifies to the vulnerability of the American advantage. Indeed, without extra-economic means that violate the 'liberal' principles imposed on its rivals, the United States would probably not be able to compete with Europe or Japan in high technology, with China, Korea and other industrial countries of Asia and Latin America in ordinary manufactured products, or with Europe and the Southern Cone of Latin America in agriculture.

The US economy lives as a parasite off its partners in the global system, with virtually no national savings of its own. The world produces while North America consumes. The advantage of the United States is that of a predator whose deficit is covered by what others agree, or are forced, to contribute. Washington uses various means to make up for its deficiencies: for example, repeated violations of the principles of liberalism, arms exports, and the hunting down of oil super-profits (which involves the periodic felling of producers: one of the real motives behind the wars in Central Asia and Iraq). But the fact is that the bulk of the American deficit is covered by capital inputs from Europe and Japan, China and the South, rich oil-producing countries and comprador classes from all regions, including the poorest, in the Third World — to which should be added the debt-service levy that is imposed on nearly every country in the periphery of the global system. The American superpower depends from day to day on the flow of capital that sustains the parasitism of its economy and society. The vulnerability of the United States therefore represents a serious danger for Washington's project.

The hegemonist strategy of the United States, which operates within the framework of the new collective imperialism, seeks nothing less than to establish Washington's military control over the entire planet. This is the means to ensure privileged access to all of the world's natural resources, and to compel subaltern allies, Russia, China and the whole third world to swallow their status as vassals. Military control of the planet is the means to impose, as a last resort, the draining of 'tribute' through political violence — as a substitute for the 'spontaneous' flow of capital that offsets the American deficit, the Achilles heel of US hegemony. The aim of this strategy is neither to ensure open markets for all (which exist only in the propaganda of neoliberal sycophants) nor, of course, to make democracy prevail throughout the world.

Europe in particular, but also the rest of the world, will have to choose between two strategies: either to invest their 'surplus capital' ('savings') in financing the US consumption, investment and military expenditure deficit; or to use the surplus as a boost for the economy in their own countries. As it is, the transfusion requires Europeans to bow to 'deflationary' policies (a term improperly used in mainstream economics: I would prefer to say 'stagnationary'), the function of which is to release a surplus of exportable savings. It makes a (still weak) recovery in Europe depend on the artificially sustained recovery of the United States. Conversely, the mobilization of this surplus for local jobs in Europe would provide a simultaneous boost to consumption (by reviving the social dimension of economic management devastated by the neoliberal virus) and investment (especially in new technology and R&D, or even military expenditure, by putting an end to the US 'advantage' in this field). This kind of response to the challenge would establish a new equilibrium of social relations in favour of the working classes; conflicts between countries would thus be combined with social struggles. In other words, the US–Europe opposition is not fundamentally about a clash of interests between the dominant segments of capital in the different partners.

The neoliberal option for Europe, reinforced by a supposedly 'nonpolitical' management of its common currency (the euro), is a major handicap for any strategy to lift the continent clear of stagnation. This absurd monetary policy suits Washington down to the ground, since the US currency (the dollar) is managed in a quite different, thoroughly political manner that has nothing to do with neoliberal dogma. Combined with the possibility that Washington will gain exclusive control over the world's oil reserves, it ensures that what I call the oil/dollar standard will remain in the end the sole international monetary instrument, relegating the euro to the status of a subaltern regional currency.

The political conflict that might oppose Europe (or some major European countries) to the United States does not stem from fundamental disagreements expressing a clash of interests between dominant capitals. I would locate it, rather, within the conflict between different 'national interests' and profoundly different political cultures. My answer to whether the triad is united or fragmented may therefore be summarized in a single sentence. The dominant economic tendency operates in favour of triad unity, whereas politics points towards the break-up of triad unity, because of the diversity of national interests and political cultures.

The shifting sands of the European project

Up to now, all the governments of European countries have rallied to the theses of economic liberalism. This has meant nothing less than the eclipse of the European project, a dilution both economic (the advantages of the EU dissolved into globalization) and political (disappearing political and military autonomy). As things stand today, there is no European project. It has been replaced with a North Atlantic (or triad) project under American command.

Wars 'made in the USA' have certainly woken public opinion (especially in Europe against the latest war, in Iraq) and even some governments (especially the French, but also the German, Russian and Chinese). Yet these same governments have not reconsidered their loyal attachment to the requirements of 'liberalism'. This adds up to a major contradiction, which will have to be overcome in one way or the other: either by bowing to Washington's demands or by making a real break that puts an end to Atlanticism.

My main political conclusion from this analysis is that Europe cannot break out of Atlanticism so long as the political alliances that define its ruling blocs remain centred on dominant transnational capital. Only if social and political struggles succeed in changing the make-up of those blocs and imposing new compromises between capital and labour will Europe be able to take some distance from Washington and make possible a renewal of the European project. This being so, Europe could — and should — also strike out independently in the sphere of relations with the East and South, taking a different path that goes beyond the mere requirements of collective imperialism and begins the long march 'beyond capitalism'. In other words, either Europe will be a left Europe (in a serious sense of 'left') or we can forget about any 'European project'.

The European project was conceived after the Second World War as part of the US Atlantic project, in the spirit of the 'cold war', and the European bourgeoisies, weakened and fearful of their own working classes, signed up to it more or less unconditionally.

Despite the dubious origins, however, the actual deployment of the project has gradually modified a number of important factors and challenges. The countries of Western Europe have succeeded in 'catching up' the United States both economically and technologically, or have the means to do so. The Soviet 'enemy' is no longer there. And the violent hostilities that marked European history for a century and a half have given way to reconciliation among the three main continental countries, France, Germany and Russia. All these trends are positive, and contain an even more positive potential. It is true that economic liberalism has inspired the basis of the project, but until the 1980s this was tempered by a 'social-democratic historic compromise' that forced capital to adapt to the demand for social justice expressed by the working classes. Since then, the project has developed in a new social framework inspired by American-style anti-social liberalism.

(Continues...)

Excerpted from Beyond Us Hegemony? by Samir Amin, Patrick Camiller. Copyright © 2006 Samir Amin. Excerpted by permission of Zed Books Ltd.
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Dettagli dell'edizione

• Editore: Zed Books
• Data di pubblicazione: 2006
• Lingua: Inglese
• ISBN 10: 1842777092
• ISBN 13: 9781842777091
• Rilegatura: Copertina flessibile
• Numero di pagine: 191
• Contatto del produttore: non disponibile
• Persona responsabile: gpsr@libri.de; gpsr@libri.de; ; Friedensallee 273; Hamburg; 22763; Germania