9783319356716: Fuzzy Social Choice Theory: 315
Brossura
ISBN 10: 3319356712 ISBN 13: 9783319356716
Casa editrice: Springer, 2016

Sinossi

This book offers a comprehensive analysis of the social choice literature and shows, by applying fuzzy sets, how the use of fuzzy preferences, rather than that of strict ones, may affect the social choice theorems. To do this, the book explores the presupposition of rationality within the fuzzy framework and shows that the two conditions for rationality, completeness and transitivity, do exist with fuzzy preferences. Specifically, this book examines: the conditions under which a maximal set exists; the Arrow’s theorem; the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem and the median voter theorem. After showing that a non-empty maximal set does exists for fuzzy preference relations, this book goes on to demonstrating the existence of a fuzzy aggregation rule satisfying all five Arrowian conditions, including non-dictatorship. While the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem only considers individual fuzzy preferences, this work shows that both individuals and groups can choose alternatives to various degrees, resulting in a social choice that can be both strategy-proof and non-dictatorial. Moreover, the median voter theorem is shown to hold under strict fuzzy preferences but not under weak fuzzy preferences. By providing a standard model of fuzzy social choice and by drawing the necessary connections between the major theorems, this book fills an important gap in the current literature and encourages future empirical research in the field.

Le informazioni nella sezione "Riassunto" possono far riferimento a edizioni diverse di questo titolo.

Dalla quarta di copertina

This book offers a comprehensive analysis of the social choice literature and shows, by applying fuzzy sets, how the use of fuzzy preferences, rather than that of strict ones, may affect the social choice theorems. To do this, the book explores the presupposition of rationality within the fuzzy framework and shows that the two conditions for rationality, completeness and transitivity, do exist with fuzzy preferences. Specifically, this book examines: the conditions under which a maximal set exists; the Arrow s theorem; the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem; and the median voter theorem. After showing that a non-empty maximal set does exists for fuzzy preference relations, this book goes on to demonstrating the existence of a fuzzy aggregation rule satisfying all five Arrowian conditions, including non-dictatorship. While the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem only considers individual fuzzy preferences, this work shows that both individuals and groups can choose alternatives to various degrees, resulting in a social choice that can be both strategy-proof and non-dictatorial. Moreover, the median voter theorem is shown to hold under strict fuzzy preferences, but not under weak fuzzy preferences. By providing a standard model of fuzzy social choice and by drawing the necessary connections between the major theorems, this book fills an important gap in the current literature and encourages future empirical research in the field.

Le informazioni nella sezione "Su questo libro" possono far riferimento a edizioni diverse di questo titolo.

Editore
Springer
Data di pubblicazione
2016
Lingua
Inglese
ISBN 10 
3319356712
ISBN 13 
9783319356716
Rilegatura
Copertina flessibile
Numero di pagine
204
Contatto del produttore
non disponibile
Persona responsabile
CMN Printpool Inh. Mathis Neumann
https://www.also.com/ec/cms5/en_6000/6000/index.jsp

Friedrich-Karl-Str. 9
Hamburg
Germania

Altre edizioni note dello stesso titolo

9783319051758: Fuzzy Social Choice Theory: 315

Edizione in evidenza

ISBN 10:  331905175X ISBN 13:  9783319051758
Casa editrice: Springer-Nature New York Inc, 2014
Rilegato