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Equity, Efficiency and Evolutionary Stability in Bargaining Games with Joint Production: 483 - Brossura

Königstein, Manfred

 
9783540669555: Equity, Efficiency and Evolutionary Stability in Bargaining Games with Joint Production: 483
Brossura
ISBN 10: 3540669558 ISBN 13: 9783540669555
Casa editrice: Springer-Verlag, 2000

Sinossi

Result 1.10 Simple equity standards were superior to more complex ones, even though the latter might be economically more relevant. Result 1.11 Equity based on quantity (input) and return (output) was most successful and received a hit rate of almost i within a range of 10%, i.e., within a distance of ±5% of the predicted share. Result 1.12 A substantial share of observations is consistent with egalitarian considerations. 1.7 Summary The study investigates the predictive power of equity theory and strategic concepts within ultimatum bargaining with advance produc­ tion. This is different from many other experimental studies on non­ cooperative bargaining games, since usually the ressource to be dis­ tributed between the subjects is given by the experimenter. Here, the "pie" is produced via joint production effort. This scenario is more general than bargaining without production, and we think it is more natural as well. The description of the raw data showed that the production choices are considerably dispersed, but nevertheless systematically biased to­ ward the respective player's efficient production level. The distribu­ tions of demanded return shares and demanded surplus shares partly replicated findings of other studies; namely, a low percentage of high demands and a considerable proportion of equal surplus splits. But, they also indicate that "advance production" compared to "no pro­ duction" should be considered an important treatment in studies on ultimatum bargaining.

Le informazioni nella sezione "Riassunto" possono far riferimento a edizioni diverse di questo titolo.

Dalla quarta di copertina

Result 1.10 Simple equity standards were superior to more complex ones, even though the latter might be economically more relevant. Result 1.11 Equity based on quantity (input) and return (output) was most successful and received a hit rate of almost i within a range of 10%, i.e., within a distance of ±5% of the predicted share. Result 1.12 A substantial share of observations is consistent with egalitarian considerations. 1.7 Summary The study investigates the predictive power of equity theory and strategic concepts within ultimatum bargaining with advance produc­ tion. This is different from many other experimental studies on non­ cooperative bargaining games, since usually the ressource to be dis­ tributed between the subjects is given by the experimenter. Here, the "pie" is produced via joint production effort. This scenario is more general than bargaining without production, and we think it is more natural as well. The description of the raw data showed that the production choices are considerably dispersed, but nevertheless systematically biased to­ ward the respective player's efficient production level. The distribu­ tions of demanded return shares and demanded surplus shares partly replicated findings of other studies; namely, a low percentage of high demands and a considerable proportion of equal surplus splits. But, they also indicate that "advance production" compared to "no pro­ duction" should be considered an important treatment in studies on ultimatum bargaining.

Le informazioni nella sezione "Su questo libro" possono far riferimento a edizioni diverse di questo titolo.

Editore
Springer-Verlag
Data di pubblicazione
2000
Lingua
Inglese
ISBN 10 
3540669558
ISBN 13 
9783540669555
Rilegatura
Copertina flessibile
Numero di pagine
197
Contatto del produttore
non disponibile
Persona responsabile
non disponibile