"It is not thought as such that can move anything, but thought which is for the sake of something and is practical." This discerning insight, which dates back more than 2000years to Aristotle, seems to have been ignored by most psycholo gists. For more than 40years theories of human action have assumed that cogni tion and action are merely two sides of the same coin. Approaches as different as S-O-R behaviorism,social learning theory, consistency theories,and expectancy value theories of motivation and decision making have one thing in common: they all assume that "thought (or any other type of cognition) can move any thing," that there is a direct path from cognition to behavior. In recent years, we have become more and more aware of the complexities in volved in the relationship between cognition and behavior. People do not always do what they intend to do. Aside from several nonpsychological factors capable of reducing cognition-behavior consistency, there seems to be a set of complex psychological mechanisms which intervene between action-related cognitions, such as beliefs, expectancies, values, and intentions,and the enactment of the be havior suggested by those cognitions. In our recent research we have focused on volitional mechanismus which presumably enhance cognition-behavior consistency by supporting the main tenance of activated intentions and prevent them from being pushed aside by competing action tendencies.
Le informazioni nella sezione "Riassunto" possono far riferimento a edizioni diverse di questo titolo.
1. Introduction and Overview.- I. Cognitive and Motivational Determinants of Action.- 2. From Intentions to Actions: A Theory of Planned Behavior.- Predicting and Explaining Volitional Behavior: A Theory of Reasoned Action.- Empirical Support.- The Intention-Behavior Relation.- Plans, Goals, and Actions.- A Theory of Planned Behavior.- Summary and Conclusions.- 3. Knowing What to Do: On the Epistemology of Actions.- A Theory of Lay Epistemology.- Conclusion.- 4. The Pursuit of Self-Defining Goals.- A Central Distinction: Self-Defining vs. Non-Self-Defining Goals.- A Theory of Symbolic Self-Completion.- Self-Symbolizing: The Cognition-Behavior Relation.- The Relation Between Self-Report and Behavior.- Self-Symbolizing : The Interference with Goals That Are Not Self-Defining.- Summary.- II. Self-Regulatory Processes and Action Control.- 5. Historical Perspectives in the Study of Action Control.- Overview of Early Theories of Volition.- Ach’s Psychology of Volition.- 6. Volitional Mediators of Cognition-Behavior Consistency; Self Regulatory Processes and Action Versus State Orientation.- A Theoretical Framework.- Empirical Evidence.- Conclusion.- 7. Dissonance and Action Control.- The Relevance of the Theory of Cognitive Dissonance for Processes of Action Control.- Implications for the Theory of Cognitive Dissonance.- Conclusion.- 8. Action Control and the Coping Process.- Coping with Life Crises: The Gap Between Theory and Practice.- Action Control and the Coping Process.- Coping with Undesirable Life Events: Implications for the Theory of Action Control.- Conclusions and Implications.- III. Problem-Solving and Performance Control.- 9. Mechanisms of Control and Regulation in Problem Solving.- Requirements of a Theory of Problem-Solving.- Models of Cognitive Control in Problem Solving.- Models of Planning: A Metacognitive Activity.- Empirical Results: Evidence for Executive Control.- 10. Thinking and the Organization of Action.- The Organization of Behavior: A General Picture.- Heuristic Processes: Their Elements and Determinants.- Conclusion.- 11. A Control-Systems Approach to the Self-Regulation of Action.- A Control-Systems Model of Self-Regulation.- Reassertion and Giving Up: Helplessness and Alternative Interpretations.- Applications ineffective Self-Management, and Behavior Change.- Conclusion.- 12. From Cognition to Behavior: Perspectives for Future Research on Action Control.- From Predictive to Explanatory Models.- From Molar to Molecular Levels of Analysis.- From Simple Cases to Psychologically Representative Behavior.- From Associationistic to Dynamic Models.- From “Cognition-Behavior Consistency” to “Motivational Stability”.- Conclusion.- Author Index.
Book by None
Le informazioni nella sezione "Su questo libro" possono far riferimento a edizioni diverse di questo titolo.
Da: Ammareal, Morangis, Francia
Softcover. Condizione: Bon. Ancien livre de bibliothèque avec équipements. Edition 1985. Ammareal reverse jusqu'à 15% du prix net de cet article à des organisations caritatives. ENGLISH DESCRIPTION Book Condition: Used, Good. Former library book. Edition 1985. Ammareal gives back up to 15% of this item's net price to charity organizations. Codice articolo G-728-797
Quantità: 1 disponibili
Da: Lucky's Textbooks, Dallas, TX, U.S.A.
Condizione: New. Codice articolo ABLIING23Mar3113020234318
Quantità: Più di 20 disponibili
Da: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Regno Unito
Condizione: New. In. Codice articolo ria9783642697487_new
Quantità: Più di 20 disponibili
Da: BuchWeltWeit Ludwig Meier e.K., Bergisch Gladbach, Germania
Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -'It is not thought as such that can move anything, but thought which is for the sake of something and is practical.' This discerning insight, which dates back more than 2000years to Aristotle, seems to have been ignored by most psycholo gists. For more than 40years theories of human action have assumed that cogni tion and action are merely two sides of the same coin. Approaches as different as S-O-R behaviorism,social learning theory, consistency theories,and expectancy value theories of motivation and decision making have one thing in common: they all assume that 'thought (or any other type of cognition) can move any thing,' that there is a direct path from cognition to behavior. In recent years, we have become more and more aware of the complexities in volved in the relationship between cognition and behavior. People do not always do what they intend to do. Aside from several nonpsychological factors capable of reducing cognition-behavior consistency, there seems to be a set of complex psychological mechanisms which intervene between action-related cognitions, such as beliefs, expectancies, values, and intentions,and the enactment of the be havior suggested by those cognitions. In our recent research we have focused on volitional mechanismus which presumably enhance cognition-behavior consistency by supporting the main tenance of activated intentions and prevent them from being pushed aside by competing action tendencies. 304 pp. Englisch. Codice articolo 9783642697487
Quantità: 2 disponibili
Quantità: Più di 20 disponibili
Da: Books Puddle, New York, NY, U.S.A.
Condizione: New. pp. 304. Codice articolo 2648032579
Quantità: 4 disponibili
Da: preigu, Osnabrück, Germania
Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. Action Control | From Cognition to Behavior | Julius Kuhl (u. a.) | Taschenbuch | xiv | Englisch | 2012 | Springer | EAN 9783642697487 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg, juergen[dot]hartmann[at]springer[dot]com | Anbieter: preigu. Codice articolo 106330902
Quantità: 5 disponibili
Da: buchversandmimpf2000, Emtmannsberg, BAYE, Germania
Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -'It is not thought as such that can move anything, but thought which is for the sake of something and is practical.' This discerning insight, which dates back more than 2000years to Aristotle, seems to have been ignored by most psycholo gists. For more than 40years theories of human action have assumed that cogni tion and action are merely two sides of the same coin. Approaches as different as S-O-R behaviorism,social learning theory, consistency theories,and expectancy value theories of motivation and decision making have one thing in common: they all assume that 'thought (or any other type of cognition) can move any thing,' that there is a direct path from cognition to behavior. In recent years, we have become more and more aware of the complexities in volved in the relationship between cognition and behavior. People do not always do what they intend to do. Aside from several nonpsychological factors capable of reducing cognition-behavior consistency, there seems to be a set of complex psychological mechanisms which intervene between action-related cognitions, such as beliefs, expectancies, values, and intentions,and the enactment of the be havior suggested by those cognitions. In our recent research we have focused on volitional mechanismus which presumably enhance cognition-behavior consistency by supporting the main tenance of activated intentions and prevent them from being pushed aside by competing action tendencies.Springer-Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg 304 pp. Englisch. Codice articolo 9783642697487
Quantità: 1 disponibili
Da: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Germania
Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - 'It is not thought as such that can move anything, but thought which is for the sake of something and is practical.' This discerning insight, which dates back more than 2000years to Aristotle, seems to have been ignored by most psycholo gists. For more than 40years theories of human action have assumed that cogni tion and action are merely two sides of the same coin. Approaches as different as S-O-R behaviorism,social learning theory, consistency theories,and expectancy value theories of motivation and decision making have one thing in common: they all assume that 'thought (or any other type of cognition) can move any thing,' that there is a direct path from cognition to behavior. In recent years, we have become more and more aware of the complexities in volved in the relationship between cognition and behavior. People do not always do what they intend to do. Aside from several nonpsychological factors capable of reducing cognition-behavior consistency, there seems to be a set of complex psychological mechanisms which intervene between action-related cognitions, such as beliefs, expectancies, values, and intentions,and the enactment of the be havior suggested by those cognitions. In our recent research we have focused on volitional mechanismus which presumably enhance cognition-behavior consistency by supporting the main tenance of activated intentions and prevent them from being pushed aside by competing action tendencies. Codice articolo 9783642697487
Quantità: 1 disponibili
Da: Revaluation Books, Exeter, Regno Unito
Paperback. Condizione: Brand New. reprint edition. 286 pages. 8.75x6.00x0.75 inches. In Stock. Codice articolo x-3642697488
Quantità: 2 disponibili