The Value of Signals in Hidden Action Models: Concepts, Application, and Empirical Evidence - Brossura

Schnedler, Wendelin

Brossura

ISBN 10: 3790801739 ISBN 13: 9783790801736

Casa editrice: Springer, 2013

Riassunto

Since the fundamental work of Walras (1874), markets have received particular attention by economists because they lead to an efficient allocation of goods and services. However, the proper functioning of markets rests on certain assumptions. For instance, the good or ser­ vice which is to be traded must be clearly defined. This elementary requirement is often violated in reality, in particular when services are concerned. Consider the example of railway workers who are hired to lay tracks. A labour contract which stipulates a fixed wage and defines the workers' task as "laying tracks" is rather unspecific. Workers may profit from this vagueness by reducing effort to a comfortable amount -as long as tracks are laid, they do not violate contract conditions. Thus, an im­ precise definition of the service can result in inefficiently low efforts. An obvious solution to this problem is a clearer definition of the ser­ vice, but often this way is barred: To specify, for instance, all actions which are involved in laying tracks and which may vary with weather, surface and other conditions is far too complicated and too costly. In­ deed, labour contracts seldom give a detailed account of the task of a worker. Alternatively to a more precise task description, the wage of the worker could be conditioned on information about the worker's performance. For example, the railway workers might be paid by the length of tracks laid so that they are motivated to exert more effort.

Su questo libro

Dalla quarta di copertina

What happens if A wants to buy a good or service from B, but not all relevant characteristics can be fixed in a contract? This book gives a non-technical overview of various models dealing with this situation. Particular emphasis is put on the problem that the service includes various tasks and B is paid by a performance measure (signal). As a result, B might choose the wrong allocation of effort between tasks. Of course, the wrong allocation entails costs. A method to calculate these costs is suggested and it is explored how and when these costs occur. Some performance measures seem to be less prone to misallocation such as measures of firm performance. Consequently, one expects more use of firm performance measures when misallocation can be a problem. This hypothesis is examined empirically.

Dettagli dell?edizione

• Editore: Springer
• Data di pubblicazione: 2013
• Lingua: Inglese
• ISBN 10: 3790801739
• ISBN 13: 9783790801736
• Rilegatura: Copertina flessibile
• Numero di pagine: 172
• Contatto del produttore: non disponibile
• Persona responsabile: CMN Printpool Inh. Mathis Neumann; https://www.also.com/ec/cms5/en_6000/6000/index.jsp; ; Friedrich-Karl-Str. 9; Hamburg; Germania