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Experiments on the Fragility of Cooperation and Mechanisms to Overcome this Problem
Print on DemandDa: BuchWeltWeit Ludwig Meier e.K., Bergisch Gladbach, Germania
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Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -In experimental economics cooperation is frequently modeledby a so-called public-good design. This design tries to depict the problem that cooperation is benefi cial for every participant but that there are individual incentives to free-ride, i.e., to invest no personal effort to increase the common welfare. In public-good experiments cooperation usually breaks down due to imperfect conditional cooperation if measures like sanction possibilities, reputation-building or communication are absent. We contribute to the literature in a number of ways. For example we introduce a new dynamic public-good design to analyze whether subjects behave differently when they do not receive new resources in a multiperiod public-good design. We further provide a monitoring mechanism that mitigates the free-riding problem, in the fi rst study with a linear and in a second study with a non-linear production function. However, the costly implementation of the monitoring in itself represents either a (second-level) step-level public-good or a second-level linear public-good in the latter case. Finally we introduce a limit on punishment. 140 pp. Englisch. Codice articolo 9783869558172
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Experiments on the Fragility of Cooperation and Mechanisms to Overcome this Problem
Print on DemandDa: moluna, Greven, Germania
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Condizione: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. KlappentextrnrnIn experimental economics cooperation is frequently modelednby a so-called public-good design. This design tries to depict thenproblem that cooperation is benefi cial for every participant butnthat there are individual incentives . Codice articolo 118877132
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Experiments on the Fragility of Cooperation and Mechanisms to Overcome this Problem
Editore:
Cuvillier, Cuvillier Jul 2011, 2011
ISBN 10: 3869558172
ISBN 13: 9783869558172
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Da: buchversandmimpf2000, Emtmannsberg, BAYE, Germania
Valutazione del venditore 5 su 5 stelle
Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. Neuware -In experimental economics cooperation is frequently modeledby a so-called public-good design. This design tries to depict the problem that cooperation is benefi cial for every participant but that there are individual incentives to free-ride, i.e., to invest no personal effort to increase the common welfare. In public-good experiments cooperation usually breaks down due to imperfect conditional cooperation if measures like sanction possibilities, reputation-building or communication are absent. We contribute to the literature in a number of ways. For example we introduce a new dynamic public-good design to analyze whether subjects behave differently when they do not receive new resources in a multiperiod public-good design. We further provide a monitoring mechanism that mitigates the free-riding problem, in the fi rst study with a linear and in a second study with a non-linear production function. However, the costly implementation of the monitoring in itself represents either a (second-level) step-level public-good or a second-level linear public-good in the latter case. Finally we introduce a limit on punishment. 140 pp. Englisch. Codice articolo 9783869558172
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Experiments on the Fragility of Cooperation and Mechanisms to Overcome this Problem
Print on DemandDa: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Germania
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Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. nach der Bestellung gedruckt Neuware - Printed after ordering - In experimental economics cooperation is frequently modeledby a so-called public-good design. This design tries to depict the problem that cooperation is benefi cial for every participant but that there are individual incentives to free-ride, i.e., to invest no personal effort to increase the common welfare. In public-good experiments cooperation usually breaks down due to imperfect conditional cooperation if measures like sanction possibilities, reputation-building or communication are absent. We contribute to the literature in a number of ways. For example we introduce a new dynamic public-good design to analyze whether subjects behave differently when they do not receive new resources in a multiperiod public-good design. We further provide a monitoring mechanism that mitigates the free-riding problem, in the fi rst study with a linear and in a second study with a non-linear production function. However, the costly implementation of the monitoring in itself represents either a (second-level) step-level public-good or a second-level linear public-good in the latter case. Finally we introduce a limit on punishment. Codice articolo 9783869558172
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