Titolo: Business Associations and the Financing of Political Parties: "A Comparative Study of the Evolution of Practices in Germany, Norway and Japan"
Editore: Springer 2013-10-04
Data di pubblicazione: 2013
Lingua: Inglese
ISBN 10: 9401182272
ISBN 13: 9789401182270
Rilegatura: Paperback
Condizione: New

Descrizione articolo

Riassunto

Students of government and social power recognize that wherever governmental systems embrace popular elections, the functions and mechanisms of political finance constitute inevitable links of influence between economic structures and political processes. The transmu� tation of economic power into political power has been of historic concern from ancient philosophers to modern political scientists. Efforts to discern and interpret the political roles of those engaged in funding candidates and political parties have intensified in recent years. Attention given the subject has deepened substantially in the United States since World War II and, while there have been differ� ences in range and quality, serious analytical interests have also developed in numerous other nations around the world. These trends have been accompanied by increasingly more energetic and sophisti� cated attempts at comparative analysis. Problems in transnational studies of political processes have always been formidable. The comparative study of political finance has been retarded by difficulties in defining units of analysis that make it possible to identify in some measurable way the effects of political fmance in precise phases of the governing process, e. g. , in the per� suasion of voters, in party nominating processes, in executive decision� making. Cash transactions, even when known with confidence, consti� tute only a partial aspect of political finance. Other shades of economic power may be equally relevant, involving services or goods directly provided, credits and other economic benefits extended or withheld, and the exercise of less tangible but equally potent influence.

Contenuti

I: Origins and Contexts.- Factors Shaping the Growth of Business Associations and their Involvement in Political Finance.- A. The Expansion of Associations and their Political Roles in the Setting of Industrializing Societies.- Associational Membership and Commitment.- Unions, Employers and the State.- Articulation Styles.- B. Types of Political Support Chanelling Structures and their Utilization by Entrepreneurs.- Conveyers, Sponsors and Parallel Action Organizations.- Loyalties to Parties and Associations.- II: Germany.- How German Business Associations Came to Innovate Manifold Political Finance Techniques.- A. A Historical Pattern of Rivalry Between Parties and Associations.- 1. The Cartel Tradition and the Role of Associations in Social and Political Mobilization.- The Emergence of Peak Associations.- The Repression of Labor’s Political Organizations.- Working-Class Patterns of Political Finance.- Prototypes for Political Financing by Business.- 2. Conveyers, Sponsors and Parallel Action Organizations as Coalition-Mongers in Wilhelmine Germany.- The Reichsverband Against Social Democracy.- The Industrial Election Fund.- The Hansabund.- 3. Business Associations as Shapers of Entrepreneurial Ideologies Before and After the Third Reich.- An “Industrial Nobility”.- Heterogeneous Weimar Party Finance Patterns.- Stresemann’s Experience.- Entrepreneurs as a Post-war Political Elite.- B. The Business Conveyers as Coalition-Reinforcers of the Adenauer Era and the Reasons for their Decline.- 1. The Peak Industry and Business Associations as Founders of the Complex Conveyer Systems of the 1950’s.- The Attitudes of the Parties.- Business Association Discipline.- The BDI’s Leadership Role.- The Offensive Nature of Conveyer Goals.- Quota-Setting and Collections.- 2. The High Utility of Financial Resources in the Shaping of German Voting Behavior during the Adenauer Era.- The Tax-favored “Civic” Conveyers.- The “Family” of Coalition Support-Channellers.- The Voters’ Predispositions.- Adenauers’ Campaign Successes.- How Conveyer Funds were Invested.- 3. The Widening Rift Between Conveyers and Parties and the Resort to the State Finance Alternative.- The Position of the Minor Party Leaders.- Conveyers and Party Secretaries.- Demands on Ministers.- The Introduction of State Subsidies.- 4. The Embattled Public Subsidies and their Conversion into Support Pillars of the Post-Erhard CDU-SPD Coalition.- Control Techniques.- The Pyramiding of State Finances.- The Attack on the Constitutionality of State Finance.- Party Finance Formulas and the Grand Coalition.- III: Norway.- Why Norwegian Business Associations Have Generally Avoided Political Finance Roles.- A. A Historical Pattern of Intense but Limited Associational Activity.- 1. Industrialization in a Context of Early Franchise Extension and Associational Development.- Mutual Acceptance of the Peak Associations.- The Unions’ Tradition of Solidarity.- 2. Class Conflicts and Business’ Political Role During the Interwar Period of Party System Instability.- Alliance-Building by the Left.- Traditions of Investment Channelling.- The Fedrelandslaget.- Decentralized Party Finance.- Support Transfer Limits.- 3. Political Socialization Patterns and Values of Norwegian Entrepreneurs.- Early Reactions against Employers’ Abuse of Powers.- Businessmen and Labour’s Economic Policies.- Keeping Organizational Power Latent.- B. The Contemporary Experiences of Libert as as an Exception that Proves the Rule.- 1. The Founding of Libertas in 1947 and the Circumstances of Its Retreat from a Conveyer Role.- The Reticence of the Peak Associations.- The Shipowners’ Initiative.- Libertas’ Activities.- Labour Prompts an Official Investigation.- Libertas Discontinues Party Finance.- 2. The Low Utility of Financial Supports in the Context of Party Mobilization and Recruitment Processes.- Strength of the Party Press.- Inexpensive Campaign Techniques.- Party Defenses Against Outsiders.- Ultra-Stable Voting Patterns.- 3. Libertas’ Ambitious “Parallel-Action” Activities and Resulting Conflicts With Party Leaders.- Trends in Party Membership.- Expenditures by the Parties and Libertas.- Aid and Discomfort for the Conservatives.- De Lange’s Call for “The Will to Power”.- 4. Libertas’ Indirect Contributions Toward Reintroducing Effective Competition to Norwegian Politics.- The Impact of Cross-Pressures.- Labour’s Achilles’ Heel.- Disclosure and Party Finance.- Labour’s Loss of the 1965 Elections.- Forming the Coalition.- IV: Japan.- How Even a Giant Conveyer is Limited in its Impact on Japanese Party Politics by the Timidity of the Self-Effacing Entrepreneur.- A. The Historical Pattern of Japanese Business Behavior in Associations.- 1. Slow Development of the Japanese Associational Structure Is Due to Conscious Reliance on Informal Dependency Relations.- Early Business Associations.- Early Labor Associations.- Government Intervention.- 2. Entrepreneurs Reincorporate Some Feudal Practices in the Most Modern Business Organization.- Organic View of Society.- Feudal Carryover.- Concentration Pattern.- Investment Channeling.- Intra-Organizational Relationships.- 3. The Big Zaibatsu Combines Tend to Dominate the Political As Well As the Economic Organization of Business.- Traditional Nature of Political Financing.- Leader-Maintenance Groups.- Zaibatsu Sponsors.- Parallel Action Organization.- Anachronism of Business behavior.- 4. Political Socialization Makes the Leading Entrepreneurs Take A Diffident Self-Effacing Role in Party Politics.- Youthful Experiences.- Young Adult Experiences.- Middle Age Experiences.- Later Middle Age Experiences.- Present Attitudes.- B. The Contemporary Experience of More Higly Specialized Business Organization.- 1. The Federation of Economic Organizations Establishes a Money Conveyer to Finance Greater Conservative Party Unity and Strength.- The Limited Role of Postwar Business Associations.- The Weakness of Labor Associations.- The Alarming Decline of the Pro-Business Conservatives After Independence.- Business Establishes a Conveyer to Finance Conservative Union.- 2. The Failure of the Kondankai Financing to Change Political Attitudes and behavior.- Party Financing by the Small Japanese Sponsors and Conveyers.- The Kondankai’s Financing Is Too Influenced by Existing Methods.- Use of Conveyer Funds.- The Questionable Utility of the Conveyer at Its Height.- 3. Conveyer Support Produces Only Formal Party Unity Rather Than a United and Popular Conservative Party.- Business Pressure For Party Union and Reform in 1955.- Hesitant Business Intervention in Party Leadership.- Kondankai Stops Short of Bringing Internal Party Unity.- New Method of Party Financing Replaces the Kondankai.- 4. The Limitations of the Conveyer Illuminate the Weakness of the Japanese Party System.- Separation of the Spheres of State and Economy.- The Weakness of Disclosure and Electoral Laws.- The Provocative Financial Relations of Parties and Business.- V: Comparative Analyses.- How National Party and Interest Group Patterns Affected the Efficacy and Viability of Conveyers.- A. Factors Affecting Involvement of the Associational Tiers and the Participation of Member Firms.- Varying Support Transfer Models.- “Defensive” and “Offensive” Goals.- Membership Solidarity.- Peak Association Involvement.- B. Characteristics of Electorates and Persuasion Techniques Which Shaped the Utility of Financial Supports.- Sources of Party Campaign Supports.- The Partisan Identification of Voters.- Political Communication Techniques.- The Political Cultures.- The Effective German Conveyers.- C. Coalition “Costs” Which Led Various Party Elites to Reevaluate the Conveyer Arrangement.- The Coalition Leaders.- The Minor Party (Faction) Leaders.- Ministers and Parliamentarians.- The Party Managers.- The Public Relations Men.

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