Clashing Views on Moral Issues

Unit 1 Fundamental Issues in Morality

YES: Gilbert Harman, from “Moral Relativism,” in Gilbert Harman and Judith Jarvis Thomson, eds., Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity (Blackwell, 1996)

NO: Louis P. Pojman, from “The Case Against Moral Relativism,” in Louis P. Pojman and Lewis Vaughn, eds., The Moral Life: An Introductory Reader in Ethics and Literature (Oxford University Press, 2007)

Philosopher Gilbert Harman argues that relativism is true for morality—much as Einstein proved it was true for motion. Just as motion always presupposes some framework in which it occurs (and something can be in motion relative to one person but not to another), morality too always presupposes some framework. Louis Pojman carefully distinguishes what he calls the diversity thesis—that moral rules differ from society to society—from ethical relativism. The diversity thesis is a straightforward description of what are acknowledged differences in the moral beliefs and practices of various human groups. But he argues that moral relativism does not follow from this diversity.

YES: C. Stephen Layman, from The Shape of the Good: Christian Reflections on the Foundations of Ethics (University of Notre Dame Press, 1991)

NO: John Arthur, from “Religion, Morality, and Conscience,” in John Arthur, ed., Morality and Moral Controversies, 4th ed. (Prentice Hall, 1996)

Philosopher C. Stephen Layman argues that morality makes the most sense from a theistic perspective and that a purely secular perspective is insufficient. The secular perspective, Layman asserts, does not adequately deal with secret violations, and it does not allow for the possibility of fulfillment of people’s deepest needs in an afterlife. Philosopher John Arthur counters that morality is logically independent of religion, although there are historical connections. Religion, he believes, is not necessary for moral guidance or moral answers; morality is social.

Unit 2 Gender, Sex, and Reproduction

YES: Don Marquis, from “Why Abortion Is Immoral,” Journal of Philosophy (April 1989)

NO: Jane English, from “Abortion and the Concept of a Person,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy (October 1975)

Professor of philosophy Don Marquis argues that abortion is generally wrong for the same reason that killing an innocent adult human being is generally wrong: it deprives the individual of a future that he or she would otherwise have. Philosopher Jane English (1947–1978) asserts that there is no well-defined line dividing persons from nonpersons. She maintains that both the conservative and the liberal positions are too extreme and that some abortions are morally justifiable and some are not.

YES: Vincent C. Punzo, from Reflective Naturalism (Macmillan, 1969)

NO: Alan H. Goldman, from “Plain Sex,” Philosophy and Public Affairs (Spring 1977)

Philosopher Vincent C. Punzo maintains that the special intimacy of sex requires a serious commitment that is for the most part not required in other human activities. Philosopher Alan H. Goldman argues for a view of sex that is completely separate from any cultural or moral ideology that might be attached to it.

YES: Jeff Jordan, from “Is It Wrong to Discriminate on the Basis of Homosexuality?” Journal of Social Philosophy, vol. 26, no. 1 (Spring, 1995)

NO: David Boonin, from “Same-Sex Marriage and the Argument from Public Disagreement,” Journal of Social Philosophy, vol. 30, no. 2 (Summer 1999)

Philosopher Jeff Jordan defends the claim that there are situations in which it is morally permissible to discriminate against homosexuals, i.e., to treat homosexuals unfavorably. There is a public dilemma (or a clash of views) concerning the moral status of homosexuality and, unless something of overriding importance—such as human rights—is at stake, the government should refrain from favoring one side by publicly recognizing same-sex marriage. Philosopher David Boonin argues directly against Jordan that his argument is unsuccessful. He uses Jordan’s argument to address some of the questions that seem to lie, unanswered, in the background of this issue: In particular, is it correct that homosexuality is immoral? Do people have a right to marry only certain other people? Is opposition to same-sex marriage comparable to opposition to interracial marriage?

YES: Michael J. Sandel, from “The Ethical Implications of Human Cloning,” Perspectives in Biology and Medicine (Spring 2005)

NO: John A. Robertson, from “Human Cloning and the Challenge of Regulation,” The New England Journal of Medicine ( July 9, 1998)

Political philosopher Michael. J. Sandel argues that much of the talk about cloning revolves around a few limited concepts (e.g., rights, autonomy, and the supposed unnaturalness of asexual reproduction) that are inadequate and fail to express what is really wrong with cloning. We need, Instead, to address fundamental questions about our stance toward nature. Law professor John A. Robertson maintains that there should not be a complete ban on human cloning but that regulatory policy should be focused on ensuring that it is performed in a responsible manner.

Unit 3 Law and Society

YES: Autumn Fiester, from “Creating Fido’s Twin,” Hastings Center Report (July/August 2005)

NO: Hilary Bok, from “Cloning Companion Animals Is Wrong,” Journal of Applied Animal Welfare Science (vol. 5, no. 3, 2002)

Autumn Fiester argues in support of cloning animals (in particular, people’s pets). She emphasizes the point that pet owners really care about their pets. One result of this is that they spend large amounts of money on veterinary care for their pets. Cloning their pets could serve as a useful extension of this idea—and also serve as a positive demonstration to society in general that individual pets have intrinsic value and cannot simply be replaced by new pets. Hilary Bok argues that cloning pets is immoral first of all because it causes great harm to animals. The animal that results from the cloning, for example, is much more likely to have physical defects than the animal from which it was cloned. Moreover, the process of cloning itself necessarily involves harm to other animals (e.g., the animal that will carry the new pet to term). Finally, the end result simply does not provide pet owners with what they were looking for.

YES: Lewis Burrows, from “Selling Organs for Transplantation,” The Mount Sinai Journal of Medicine (September, 2004)

NO: James F. Childress, from “Should Congress Allow the Buying and Selling of Human Organs? No,” Insight on the News (May 7, 2001)

Lewis Burrows, M.D., begins with the observation that the need for organs far outstrips the supply: each year, hundreds of patients die while waiting for transplants. Burrows argues that payment to the donor (or, payment to the donor’s family, in cases in which the donor is deceased) would increase the supply of organs, regulations could restrain possible abuses, and a payment-for-organs system could meet relevant medical ethical principles. James F. Childress, professor of ethics and professor of medical education, argues that a free market would cause the loss of important altruistic motivations and would turn organs into commodities; moreover, such an untried market might make fewer—not more—organs available.

YES: Meaghan Cussen and Walter Block, from “Legalize Drugs Now! An Analysis of the Benefits of Legalized Drugs,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology (July 20 00)

NO: Drug Enforcement Administration, from “Speaking Out Against Drug Legalization,” http://www.DEA.gov (May 2003)

Meaghan ...