Coalition Formation by Sophisticated Players (Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems)

Rapoport, A., J. P. Kahan and S. G. Funk:

ISBN 10: 3540092498 / ISBN 13: 9783540092490

Editore: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1979

Riguardo questo articolo

170 Seiten ex Library Book aus einer wissenschafltichen Bibliothek Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 3209.

Codice articolo 301991

Dati bibliografici

• Titolo: Coalition Formation by Sophisticated Players (Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems)
• Editore: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
• Data di pubblicazione: 1979
• Lingua: Inglese
• ISBN 10: 3540092498
• ISBN 13: 9783540092490
• Rilegatura: Taschenbuch
• Condizione: Gut
• Peso: 3209 grammi
• Cataloghi dei venditori:
  • Alle Bücher

Descrizione articolo

Riassunto

The three major aims of the present study were to (a) test some of the major game-theoretic solutions for n-person games in characteristic function form with data obtained from "rational" players; (b) locate, assess, and explain differences between sophisticated and naive subjects in coalition frequencies and payoff disbursements; and (c) provide a common data base for bargaining process analyses and testing of both present and future models. To this end, five quartets of subjects each partici­ pated in 16 different coalition formation tasks presented as computer-controlled, four-person, characteristic function games with sidepayments. All 20 subjects (a) were relatively mathematically sophisticated, (b) were familiar with the major solution concepts for characteristic function games, (c) could safely assume that their co-players were equally sophisticated and knowledgeable, and (d) possessed a high motivation to maximize reward. The results showed that (a) sophisticated players are less restricted than naive players in coalition choice, (b) their payoffs are less variable and less ~galitarian, (c) these differences between the two populations of sub­ jects increase with the complexity of the game, and (d) for III the four-person, mDstly non-superadditive games played in the present experiment, the bargaining set M~i) accounts more accurately for payoff disbursements than do the competitive bargaining set H~i), the kernel K, and Selten's equal share analysis.

Contenuti

I. Rationality and Coalition Formation Experiments.- 1.1 Players and Rationality.- 1.2 Previous Research Paradigms.- 1.3 Predictability of “Rational” Play.- 1.4 Purposes of the Present Study.- II. Experimental Method.- 2.1 Subjects.- 2.2 Procedure.- 2.2.1 The Coalitions Program.- 2.2.2 Communication Order and Role Assignment.- 2.3 Experimental Games.- III. Experimental Results.- 3.1 Preliminary Examinations.- 3.2 Comparisons with Previous Studies.- 3.3 Tests of the Models.- 3.3.1 The Bargaining Set Ml(i).- 3.3.2 The Competitive Bargaining Set Hl(i).- 3.3.3 The Kernel.- 3.3.4 Equal Share Analysis.- 3.4 Bargaining Process Analysis.- 3.4.1 Messages.- 3.4.2 Tracing Procedure.- IV. Discussion and Conclusions.- References.- Appendix: Game Protocols.