Composition of Secure Multi-Party Protocols : A Comprehensive Study

Yehuda Lindell

ISBN 10: 354020105X / ISBN 13: 9783540201052

Editore: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2003

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Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - In the setting of multi-party computation, sets of two or more parties with private inputs wish to jointly compute some (predetermined) function of their inputs. General results concerning secure two-party or multi-party computation were first announced in the 1980s. Put briefly, these results assert thatunder certain assumptions one can construct protocols for securely computing any desired multi-party functionality. However, this research relates only to a setting where a single protocol execution is carried out. In contrast, in modern networks, many different protocol executions are run at the same time.This book is devoted to the general and systematic study of secure multi-party computation under composition. Despiteits emphasis on a theoretically well-founded treatment of the subject, general techniques for designing secure protocols are developed thatmay even result in schemes or modules to be incorporated in practical systems. The book clarifies fundamental issues regarding security in a multi-execution environment and gives a comprehensive and unique treatment of the composition of secure multi-party protocols.

Codice articolo 9783540201052

Dati bibliografici

• Titolo: Composition of Secure Multi-Party Protocols : A Comprehensive Study
• Editore: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
• Data di pubblicazione: 2003
• Lingua: Inglese
• ISBN 10: 354020105X
• ISBN 13: 9783540201052
• Rilegatura: Taschenbuch
• Condizione: Neu

Descrizione articolo

Riassunto

In the setting of multi-party computation, sets of two or more parties with private inputs wish to jointly compute some (predetermined) function of their inputs. General results concerning secure two-party or multi-party computation were first announced in the 1980s. Put briefly, these results assert that under certain assumptions one can construct protocols for securely computing any desired multi-party functionality. However, this research relates only to a setting where a single protocol execution is carried out. In contrast, in modern networks, many different protocol executions are run at the same time.

This book is devoted to the general and systematic study of secure multi-party computation under composition. Despite its emphasis on a theoretically well-founded treatment of the subject, general techniques for designing secure protocols are developed that may even result in schemes or modules to be incorporated in practical systems. The book clarifies fundamental issues regarding security in a multi-execution environment and gives a comprehensive and unique treatment of the composition of secure multi-party protocols.

Contenuti

1. Introduction.- 2. The Composition of Authenticated Byzantine Agreement.- 3. Secure Computation without Agreement.- 4. Universally Composable Multi-party Computation.