Discussions of rights are ubiquitous. One constantly hears things such as: “The Chinese are violating Tibetan rights,” “Landlords have a right that their tenants pay their rent,” “Students have a right to be graded fairly,” “Animals have a right not to suffer merely to bring pleasure to humans,” “Abortion violates a fetus’ right to life,” “We violate the rights of future generations when we pollute the water. ” These statements assert that Tibetans, landlords, students, animals, fetuses, and future generations all have rights. Tibetans, landlords, students, animals, fetuses, and future generations do not seem to have much in common. When one presses for clarity, it is very dif?cult to say precisely what a right is. What is it to have a right? That is the question this book seeks to answer. To paint with an overly broad brush, previous answers to this question can be divided into two groups. Some hold interest/bene?t theories of rights while others hold choice/will theories of rights. Perhaps the ?rst person to propose an interest/bene?t theory was Jeremy Bentham. Its most cited contemporary defender is Joseph Raz. The seminal statement of the choice theory was made by H. L. A. Hart. Carl Wellman is perhaps the most able defender of a will theory of rights. The debate between these two groups of theories has been a productive one.
What is it to have a right? Previous answers to this question can be divided into two groups. Some (e.g., Joseph Raz) hold interest/benefit theories of rights while others (e.g., H.L.A. Hart and Carl Wellman) hold choice/will theories of rights. The Concept of Rights defends an alternative to both of the traditional views, the justified-constraint theory of rights. On this view, a person has a right if and only if a feature of that person is a sound justification for others to have a particular sort of normative constraint.
The justified-constraint theory avoids the problems which have bedeviled the interest/benefit theories and the choice/will theories. It also solves the puzzle of the relational nature of rights. On the justified-constraint view, an obligation correlative to a right is to the right-holder when it is a feature of the right-holder that justifies the obligation. The analysis also shows that, as far as the concept of rights is concerned, any sort of individual or group can have rights. The limits on what sorts of things have rights are substantive, not conceptual. Moreover, the justified-constraint solves the problem of the rights of past and future generations. It is a theory which applies, without modification, to past, present and future beings.
"With clear exposition, powerful argument and informed incisive critisms of alternative theories, this book gives a systematic account of an original and important alternative to the best theories of rights in the recent literature."
Carl Wellman, Washington University, St Louis, USA
"The Concept of Rights is a valuable contribution to the literature on rights. Theorists too frequently propose something like a definition of rights and argue from the definition to controversial, substantive conclusions. Rainbolt avoids this mistake with an analysis of rights as justified, relational constraints. This theory gives an account of what is distinctive about rights without begging theoretical questions; he properly leaves these to normative theory.
Rainbolt writes clearly and decisively. Readers may not agree with him, but there will be little doubt about where he stands. This is no small virtue."
William Nelson, University of Houston, Texas, USA
"More systematic, nuanced, and sophisticated than almost all other (Hohfeldian and neo-Hohfeldian analyses of rights talk). His peer in this regard is perhaps Judith Jarvis Thomson."
Richard Arneson, University of California at San Diego, USA
"The most sophisticated [Hohfeldian rights analysis] I have seen."
David Schmidtz, University of Arizona, Tucson, USA
"First-rate book, the best thing on the subject since Sumner and Thomson's books fifteen to twenty years ago."
Christopher W. Morris, University of Maryland, College Park, USA
"Advances the positions of Joseph Raz and H.L.A. Hart, perhaps the two most important legal philosophers of the last century"
Douglas Husak, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, USA
