Demography and Security
Proceedings of a Workship, Paris, France, November 2000By Brian Nichiporuk Julie DaVanzo Stephan De SpiegeleireRand Corporation
Copyright © 2001 Rand Corporation
All right reserved. ISBN: 978-0-8330-3065-8Contents
PREFACE.......................................................................................................................................iiiINTRODUCTION Laurent Murawiec and David Adamson, RAND........................................................................................1SUMMARIES OF CONFERENCE PAPERSA Framework for Examining the Relationship Between Demographic Factors and Security Issues Brian Nichiporuk, RAND............................6Dire Demographics: Population Trends in Russia Julie DaVanzo, RAND...........................................................................9Security Implications of Demographic Factors in the Middle East Brian Nichiporuk, RAND.......................................................12The Decolonization of Europe Jean-Claude Chesnais, INED......................................................................................14An Amateur's Musings: Questions to Demographers Laurent Murawiec, RAND.......................................................................16Demographic Variations and Their Global Implications Philippe Bourcier de Carbon, INED.......................................................18Effects of Immigration on Domestic Stability in Sending Countries: Three Case Studies Stephan DeSpiegeleire, RAND Europe.....................19War: From Countryside to Urban Settings General Eric de la Maissoneuve, Socit de Stratgie.................................................21Fifty Years of Ethnic Conflict and Cohesion: 1945-1994 Nol Bonneuil, INED...................................................................22APPENDIX List of Participants................................................................................................................23
Chapter One
A Framework for Examining the Relationship Between Demographic Factors and Security Issues
Brian Nichiporuk, RAND
This presentation offered a general framework for considering the relationship between demographic factors and security issues. It examined (1) global demographic trends, (2) the security implications of these, and (3) the policy implications for the United States and other Western nations.
Global Demographic Trends
Fertility trends in the industrialized world and those in the less industrialized countries have begun to diverge sharply in recent years. The developed nations are characterized by chronic low fertility. The low rates in European nations such as Spain, Italy, and France-as well as those in some Asian nations, notably Japan-seem to have no parallels in history. Pronatalist policies have been unsuccessful in increasing fertility rates significantly. The developing world is bifurcating into two types of countries-those lowering their fertility rates (for example, Brazil and Indonesia) and those with continuing high fertility rates, which are mostly in sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and Central America.
As a result, the weight of global population is shifting away from the developed world toward the developing world. The top four most populous nations (China, India, the United States, and Indonesia) will remain the same over the next 20 years, but the bottom six in the top ten will change significantly. Japan and Russia may disappear from that list, while Nigeria, Pakistan, and Bangladesh will likely move up; perhaps Ethiopia will move up as well. In addition, there will still be robust population growth in the developing world overall. Demographic growth and pressures will be greatest between now and 2025, when growth is likely to abate.
A second important trend is urbanization. Over half of the world's population now lives in urban areas, and urban concentrations in many nations are becoming disproportionately large. Projections suggest that more than 20 megacities (cities of 10 million or larger) will exist by 2015.
A third trend is also cause for concern: The number of refugees (moving across borders) continues to be problem, amounting to over 14.4 million in 1995, the latest year for which information is available.
Security Implications
These trends suggest three potential changes in the global security environment.
(1) Changes in the nature of conflict. There is likely to be an increased prevalence of urban conflict (also discussed in the paper by de la Maissoneuve, below). Urban conflict tends to be attractive to insurgents and guerrilla forces, in part because it can equalize conflict between technologically sophisticated and less sophisticated armed forces.
Ethnic diasporas are also likely to see their influence increase. Information technology, such as the Internet, is creating more opportunities for emigrant populations to influence conflict in home countries very quickly. The Tamil diaspora and Kosovar Albanians provide examples of this.
In addition, water is likely to become increasingly important as a strategic tool in some areas of the world, especially where water systems are overburdened.
(2) Changes in sources of national power. Differential fertility rates also have implications for sources of military power in low- and high-fertility states. Low-fertility states will be increasingly forced to substitute technology for manpower. By contrast, militaries of high-fertility states will build a two-tiered force structure, with a smaller elite force and larger but less-skilled and less well-equipped force.
(3) Changes in sources of conflict. It does not appear that demographic forces will necessarily change the conventional balances of power. Changes in population growth rates are less of a factor in shifting this balance than they were 40 or 50 years ago. Instead, a major new demographic factor that will influence conflict is refugee flows (for example, the flow of Kosovars into Macedonia).
In addition, relatively young populations-"youth bulges" in the population pyramid-increase the tendency toward violence. This risk is present in many Middle Eastern nations, such as Egypt and Libya. Historically, it was an important factor in the Algerian civil war.
Differential growth rates in neighboring culture groups or populations can also lay the groundwork for ethnic conflict. In Bosnia, for example, fears of Muslim growth in control, fueled by collapse of the Yugoslav state apparatus, fueled ethnic strife (see the paper by Bonneuil for further discussion of ethnic conflict).
Implications for United States and Western Nations
There are three principal security-related steps the United States and its Western allies can take to respond to these trends:
1. Increase information collection and analysis of indicators of impending conflict, especially on warning signs related to refugee flows.
2. Conduct more analysis on the security effects of nonmilitary foreign aid, such as development funding. Have these had stabilizing effects and strengthened moderate regimes? If so, how are these effects to be measured?
3. Increase planning for urban warfare. In the near term, training is the most important issue. Over the long-term, new capabilities, such as unmanned aerial vehicles, will be vital to help militaries adapt successfully to the urban setting.
Dire Demographics: Population Trends in Russia
Julie DaVanzo, RAND
This presentation discussed Russia's demographic situation, particularly recent population loss; reviewed some explanations for these trends and their plausibility; and explored broad policy implications of the current situation. Recent demographic trends in Russia have caused widespread concern among Russian policymakers and the general public. Three trends are causing the greatest concern: low fertility and consequent population loss; historically high abortion rates; and falling life expectancy and increased mortality.
Population Loss and Low Fertility
The dissolution of the Soviet Union caused Russia's global population status to change: Once part of the third most populous nation in the world (the USSR), Russia was only the 6th most populous in 2000. By 2010, Russia's population is projected to decline from 145 million to 142 million, which will place it 9th among the world's nations. Fertility rates in Russia declined throughout the 20th century. From 7 children per woman in 1900, the total fertility rate fell to 1.17 in 1999. Though sharp, these declines are not sharply distinct from those in other industrialized nations, many of which (including France, Spain, Italy, and Japan) are experiencing birth rates below replacement level (2.1 children per woman). Nonetheless, Russia's current fertility rate places it among the lowest in the world.
High Abortion Rates
Only Cuba, Romania, and Vietnam-all countries that also have a Communist history-have higher rates of abortion than Russia. About 7 in 10 pregnancies in Russia end in abortion; by comparison, in the United States, less than 3 in 10 do. High rates of abortion in Russia lead to health problems: Two in three Russian women who have abortions suffer health complications that require medical care or hospitalization, placing a burden on an already weak health care system. Abortion rates have dropped since contraception became more widely available after the fall of communism, but continue to pose public health concerns.
Falling Life Expectancy and Increasing Mortality
The most worrisome trend is the downturn in life expectancy and the increase in rates of mortality. The health and mortality of a population can be summarized by life expectancy at birth-the number of years a child born in a particular year can be expected to live if at each age he or she experiences the age-specific death rates of that year. Since 1970, life expectancy for Russian women, once nearly equivalent to that for U.S. women, has stagnated or declined slightly. Today, life expectancy for Russian women is about 8 years lower than that for U.S. women. The situation is even worse for men. In the early 1990s, life expectancy for Russian men declined sharply. Today, life expectancy for Russian men is 14 years lower than that for U.S. men. Male life expectancy in Russia is now lower than that for Mexico, Indonesia, the Philippines, Egypt, and Iraq. Russian males born today can expect to live an average of about 60 years. Russian females have a life expectancy of about 72 years. This difference of 12 years in life expectancy is the largest differential by sex in the world.
What accounts for these life expectancy and mortality trends? Several explanations have been proposed for these alarming mortality trends:
Environmental degradation?
No. Environmental problems cannot explain mortality variations, why mortality rates are higher for men than for women, or why they rose most for people of working age.
Varying levels of alcohol consumption?
Yes. Mortality trends in the 1980s and 1990s are directly related to trends and patterns of alcohol consumption
Deterioration of the health care system?
Yes, in the long term; but health care is less important for short-term changes.
Consequences of economic changes?
Yes, somewhat. The contraction of the Russian economy during the 1990s (when GDP per capita fell by 40 percent), poverty, and the stress caused by the transformation do seem to help explain the decrease and variations in life expectancy in the 1990s.
Addressing Health and Population Concerns
There are several measures that can be undertaken now to address population and health issues in Russia.
Increased access to contraceptives can help Russia continue to cut its abortion rates and curb maternal health problems and deaths attributable to illegal abortions.
Russia can strengthen and expand public health education programs, including those to reduce tobacco and alcohol consumption.
The health care system is outdated and needs to be improved.
Most likely, addressing Russia's demographic problems will require broad solutions. Pronatalist policies have had little effect. An antialcohol campaign during Gorbachev's tenure was effective but unpopular. Immigration is unlikely to offset population decline and is politically sensitive.
Many of Russia's demographic problems or their consequences can be addressed, but these require stability and resources, both on the part of the government and individuals. The deepest demographic problems will likely be solved only by long-term economic stability and resulting improvements in public finance. Several former communist states of eastern Europe that faced similar problems brought their mortality rates under control once they achieved macroeconomic stability, particularly sustained, noninflationary growth.
Security Implications
The steady decline in the number of births in Russia since 1987 means that the number of Russians of military age will soon be shrinking. This occurrence may raise concerns for the international community. Despite current plans to cut personnel to boost military spending per member, it is unclear to what extent Russia will be able to modernize its military. Its weak economy may prevent Russia from expending much capital on new military technology, and its peculiar position in the international community may prevent it from allying with wealthier nations for joint development of new military hardware and technology. At the same time, Russia may have trouble defending its huge land mass, as well as its more than 12,000 miles (20,000 km) of borders if military forces are reduced. Such pressures may force Russia to rely on weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, for its security.
Security Implications of Demographic Factors in the Middle East
Brian Nichiporuk, RAND
Population Trends in the Middle East
Population trends in the Middle East-defined broadly to include the area from the Persian Gulf to Turkey and Egypt-have several important implications for the region's security.
1. Population growth and fertility rates remain robust in most Middle East nations. Only Turkey and Israel have fertility rates below 3.0 children per woman.
2. The populations of most Middle East states are relatively young, and many states host sizable ethnic minority groups.
3. The area's population is becoming increasingly urbanized.
4. Population flows within the region have created mixed settlement regions, where there are large ethnic diasporas and increasing transborder mobility.
5. Population pressures in the region confront many states with shortages of fresh water.
6. The region is characterized by extensive guest worker flows from labor-exporting countries like Egypt to labor-importing countries like Saudi Arabia.
External factors are also creating a volatile backdrop. Notably, these include fluctuations in oil prices and the many leadership transitions in the area, including those in Jordan, Iran, Morocco, and Bahrain.
Security Implications
What are the main security implications of these trends? Three are most prominent:
First, the nature of conflict may be affected. Growing urbanization increases the likelihood that conflicts will be either urban-centered or have an important urban component. In addition, during crises, water has the potential to become a weapon in conflicts between neighboring states.
Second, the sources of nations' military power could be affected. Traditionally, populous states with high birth rates and large youth populations have drawn on their plentiful supply of young manpower to populate large, manpower-intensive armies. However, it is becoming more difficult to translate burgeoning populations into a source of effective military power. There are three reasons for this:
Technologies associated with the information revolution in military affairs technology (information processing, sensors, targeting tools) are increasingly available and significant.
The open desert terrain found in much of the Middle East favors technology-intensive forces over traditional conventional forces.
Technology-intensive forces require good logistics, training, and integration for effectiveness.
As a result, conventional Middle East balances of power are becoming less sensitive to differential population size/growth. Furthermore, there are incentives to depend on weapons of mass destruction and a small number of elite conventional warfare divisions (e.g., Iraq's Republican Guards) for external conflicts.
Sources of conflict may also shift. Large youth populations and urbanization are contributing to higher levels of perceived relative deprivation in many Arab states. Some of these states are experiencing shortages of housing and land, underemployment, strained infrastructures, and pollution.
In this kind of environment, certain "triggering mechanisms" can be catalysts for spontaneous violence, including sudden price hikes for basic food stuffs, mass transit, and education. These events are often due to external variables (such as International Monetary Fund directives). For example, in 1988 food price increases triggered violence in Algeria; likewise, "bread riots" occurred in Jordan in 1996. The resulting unrest from such an event could lead to revolution or civil war, depending on the strength of strength of Islamist organizations, the level of political alienation among the "masses," and the rate of ongoing social change.
Friction in majority-minority relations may also emerge as a source of conflict, as in the case of the strife between Coptic Christians and Muslims in Egypt.
The Decolonization of Europe
Jean-Claude Chesnais, INED
Are numbers still an important issue when considering the relationship between population and national security? This paper examines this question by looking at historical trends. It combines two approaches: one historical, the other analytical.
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