Descriptive Theories of Bargaining : An Experimental Analysis of Two- and Three-Person Characteristic Function Bargaining

Gerald R. Uhlich

ISBN 10: 3540524835 / ISBN 13: 9783540524830

Editore: Springer, Springer, 1990

Riguardo questo articolo

Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - The aim of this book is the presentation of two new descriptive theories for experimental bargaining games and a comparison with other descriptive and normative theories. To obtain data it was necessary to develop two sets of computer programs for computer controlled ex periments. Moreover, data obtained by other researchers, which are available to us will be included in this study. The use of laboratory experiments in economics was introduced by THURSTONE [1931] in the field of utility theory. CHAMBERLIN [1948] was the first person to establish an expe rimental market for the purpose of testing a theory. The first experiment on characteristic function games was done by KALISH, MILNOR, NASH, and NERING [1954]. Today the use of experiments in controlled laboratory settings has become widespread. Earlier, economists went into the field to observe phenomena as the behavior of individuals, corporations and nations in action, then they formulated theories to explain what they saw. But unlike natural scientists, economists have not been able to test their theories under controlled conditions. Now experimental economists are able to replicate their results. Replication is very proble matic for field studies, because rarely the same conditions can be established again. Moreover, experimenters are able to test theories for situations described by simplified models which are not observable in the real world.

Codice articolo 9783540524830

Dati bibliografici

• Titolo: Descriptive Theories of Bargaining : An Experimental Analysis of Two- and Three-Person Characteristic Function Bargaining
• Editore: Springer, Springer
• Data di pubblicazione: 1990
• Lingua: Inglese
• ISBN 10: 3540524835
• ISBN 13: 9783540524830
• Rilegatura: Taschenbuch
• Condizione: Neu
• Dimensioni: 244 L x 170 A x 11 P (millimetri) 244 millimetri di larghezza per 170 millimetri di altezza per 11 millimetri di profondità
• Peso: 329 grammi

Descrizione articolo

Riassunto

The aim of this book is the presentation of two new descriptive theories for experimental bargaining games and a comparison with other descriptive and normative theories. To obtain data it was necessary to develop two sets of computer programs for computer controlled ex­ periments. Moreover, data obtained by other researchers, which are available to us will be included in this study. The use of laboratory experiments in economics was introduced by THURSTONE [1931] in the field of utility theory. CHAMBERLIN [1948] was the first person to establish an expe­ rimental market for the purpose of testing a theory. The first experiment on characteristic function games was done by KALISH, MILNOR, NASH, and NERING [1954]. Today the use of experiments in controlled laboratory settings has become widespread. Earlier, economists went into the field to observe phenomena as the behavior of individuals, corporations and nations in action, then they formulated theories to explain what they saw. But unlike natural scientists, economists have not been able to test their theories under controlled conditions. Now experimental economists are able to replicate their results. Replication is very proble­ matic for field studies, because rarely the same conditions can be established again. Moreover, experimenters are able to test theories for situations described by simplified models which are not observable in the real world.

Contenuti

1. Introduction.- 2. Notations and Definitions of Characteristic Function Games.- 2.1 Measurement of Predictive Success.- 2.2 Prominence Level.- 3. Two-Person Bargaining Games.- 3.1 Programs for Computer-Controlled Two-Person Bargaining Games.- 3.1.1 System Requirements.- 3.1.2 The Two-Person Bargaining Master-Program.- 3.1.3 The Two-Person Bargaining Terminal-Program.- 3.2 Experimental Design.- 3.2.1 Experimental Procedure.- 3.2.2 The Data Base.- 3.3 The Negotiation Agreement Area.- 3.3.1 Power, Justice Norms and Aspirations.- 3.3.2 A Descriptive Theory.- 3.4 Evaluation of Two Pilot Experiments.- 3.4.1 General Results.- 3.4.2 Comparison of Different Point-Solution Concepts.- 3.4.3 Comparison of Different Area Theories.- 3.5 Summary on Two-Person Games.- 4. Three-Person Bargaining Games.- 4.1 Programs for Computer-Controlled Three-Person Bargaining Games.- 4.1.1 System Requirements.- 4.1.2 The Three-Person Bargaining Master-Program.- 4.1.3 The Three-Person Bargaining Terminal-Program.- 4.2 Experimental Design.- 4.2.1 Experimental Procedure.- 4.2.2 The Data Base.- 4.3 Theories of Coalition Formation.- 4.3.1 The Core.- 4.3.2 Bargaining Set.- 4.3.3 Equal Excess Theory.- 4.3.4 Equal Division Payoff Bounds.- 4.3.5 Proportional Division Payoff Bounds.- 4.4 Experimental Results.- 4.4.1 Overall Comparisons.- 4.4.2 Games with Zero and Positive Payoffs to the One-Person Coalitions.- 4.4.3 Additional Hypotheses.- 4.4.4 The Relevance of the Core in Games with a Thick Core.- 4.4.5 Experience of Negotiators in Bargaining Games.- 4.5 Summary on Three-Person Games.- 5. Summary and Conclusion.- A. Introduction to the Rules and the Experimental Apparatus of a Two-Person Bargaining Experiment.- B. Introduction to the Rules and the Experimental Apparatus of a Three-Person Bargaining Experiment.- C. Listing of All Results.- References.