"While much has been written about the Cold War from the political, diplomatic and overall military perspective, very little has been written about the American warriors who fought and won the war. In
Deterrence, Adams tells the story of the U.S. leaders, commanders, enlisted men of the U.S. military strategic nuclear forces that successfully defeated the Soviet war machine. This book goes a long way toward telling how and why the United States prevailed in the Cold War."
- Keith D. McFarland, PhD, President Emeritus, Texas A&M University~Commerce
"In this notable work, Chris Adams has not only captured the essence of national security through vigilant deterrence, but clearly recognizes and honors the leaders, commanders, service members and families who played critical roles in the defense of our country."
- Lt. General Edgar S. Harris, Jr. USAF, Retired Fmr Vice Commander-in Chief, Strategic Air Command
"I had the privilege of serving with General Chris Adams in Strategic Air Command.During those critical years, SAC's charged "Cold Warriors" and their families were at the center of our deterrent force. Herein, Adams captures the critical mission and importance of those whose professional service behind the scenes made it possible to win the Cold War."
- Jim McCoy, Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force, Retired
Few Americans recognized or paid close attention to the outset of the Cold War and thereafter its enduring years, mainly because it persisted for so long and few alarming situations intruded their daily lives. Only noteworthy events such as SPUTNIK, the shooting down of Gary Powers' U-2 spy plane and the Cuban Crisis brought the potentially threatening circumstances home, and then only briefly until other news items took their place. America has never fallen short of heroes when called upon for the common defense of the nation and the Cold War period of uncertainty called upon America's best and brightest to respond-national leaders, military commanders and an elite force of warriors trained with the most sophisticated war-fighting equipment U.S. technology could provide to create the strategy and deterrent force that endured.
DETERRENCE
AN ENDURING STRATEGYBy CHRIS ADAMSIUNIVERSE, INC.
Copyright © 2009 Chris Adams
All right reserved.ISBN: 978-1-4401-6978-6Contents
Also By Chris Adams.................................................................................................................................viiAuthor's Note.......................................................................................................................................ixPrologue............................................................................................................................................xviiPART ONE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE.....................................................................................................................1Chapter One The Cold War............................................................................................................................3Chapter Two The Forces of Deterrence................................................................................................................15Chapter Three Weapons of Deterrence.................................................................................................................25The Bombers.........................................................................................................................................26The Aerial Tankers..................................................................................................................................49Strategic Reconnaissance............................................................................................................................50The Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM).......................................................................................................53PART TWO HUMAN EVENTS...............................................................................................................................61Chapter Four The Cold War Leaders...................................................................................................................63Harry Truman........................................................................................................................................65"Ike"...............................................................................................................................................70"JFK"...............................................................................................................................................76"LBJ"...............................................................................................................................................82Richard Nixon.......................................................................................................................................84Gerald Ford.........................................................................................................................................90Jimmy Carter........................................................................................................................................91Ronald Reagan.......................................................................................................................................96George H.W. Bush....................................................................................................................................109Chapter Five The Commanders.........................................................................................................................115General George C. Kenney, Commanding General, Strategic Air Command, 1946-1948......................................................................117General Curtis E. LeMay, Commanding General, SAC, 1948-1953, Commander, SAC, 1953-1955, Commander in Chief, SAC, 1955-1957.....................120Admiral Hyman G. Rickover...........................................................................................................................128General Thomas Power, CINCSAC, 1957-1964............................................................................................................134General John D. Ryan, CINCSAC, 1964-1967............................................................................................................138General Joseph J. Nazzaro, CINCSAC, 1967-1968.......................................................................................................141General Bruce K. Holloway, CINCSAC, 1968-1972.......................................................................................................143General John C. Meyer, CINCSAC, 1972-1974...........................................................................................................145General Russell E. Dougherty, CINCSAC, 1974-1977....................................................................................................148General Richard H. Ellis, CINCSAC, 1977-1981........................................................................................................156General Bennie L. Davis, CINCSAC, 1981-1985.........................................................................................................159General Larry D. Welch, CINCSAC, 1985-1986..........................................................................................................161General John T. Chain, CINCSAC, 1986-1991...........................................................................................................163General George L. Butler, CINCSAC, 1991-1992........................................................................................................166PART THREE HEROES...................................................................................................................................169Chapter Six The Cold Warriors.......................................................................................................................171The Aviators........................................................................................................................................173Chapter Seven The Shadow Warriors...................................................................................................................225Paul W. Airey, Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force, 1967-1969....................................................................................227Donald L. Harlow, Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force, 1969-1971.................................................................................227Thomas N. Barnes, Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force, 1973-1977.................................................................................228Robert D. Gaylor, Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force, 1977-1979.................................................................................229James M. McCoy, Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force, 1979-1981...................................................................................229Sam E Parish, Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force, 1983-1986.....................................................................................231James C. Binnicker, Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force, 1986-1990...............................................................................232Gary R Pfingston, Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force, 1990-1994.................................................................................232David J. Campanale, Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force, 1994-1996...............................................................................233Chapter Eight The Civil Warriors....................................................................................................................237Chapter Nine They Also Served.......................................................................................................................241Chapter Ten The Last Full Measure...................................................................................................................245Closing Perspective.................................................................................................................................247Sources.............................................................................................................................................251About the Author....................................................................................................................................261Index...............................................................................................................................................263
Chapter One
THE COLD WAR
"America was not built on fear. America was built on courage, on imagination and an unbeatable determination to do the job at hand."
Harry S. Truman
President Truman, with fearless determination and courage, had led the country through the last days of World War II. He had made the bold decision to drop the atomic bomb on Japan in response to their persistent acts of defiance to surrender.
Troubled by the questionable outcomes of the strategy meetings between Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin during the conflict-he had only been involved in the last of the Big Three conferences at Potsdam-he was, nevertheless, buoyed by traditional American optimism that the war to end all wars was over and world peace had been restored.
It was 1946; only six months had elapsed since the final acts of surrender by Germany and Japan. The earlier optimism quickly wilted when Josef Stalin, emboldened by his personal premise that the Soviet Union had been the virtual conqueror in the war in Europe, coupled with the extraordinary concessions by the United States and its Allies, announced to the Russian people on February 9th that, "Communism and capitalism are incompatible and confrontation will likely come in the 1950s when America is in the depths of post-war depression."
It was obvious that communism and capitalism were manifestly incompatible; there was little doubt that conflict between the West and the New Soviet Union would be inevitable. Less than a month later, on March 5th, Sir Winston Churchill, invited by President Truman to bolster confidence in the future, made a 'friendship' speech at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri. Instead of savoring the end of the war and the defeats of Germany and Japan as Stalin had the month before, he surprised the President and the world with a cautiously perceptive and frankly worded speech, declaring, "From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an Iron Curtain has descended across the Continent."
With World War II still clearly visible in the rear view mirror, Churchill unmistakably interpreted Stalin's intentions. Victorious in their' Great Patriotic War', Stalin had ordered a new "5-year Plan" for Russia: Triple production of all war related materials, delay manufacture of all consumer goods until rearmament was completed and for the Soviet people to prepare for a war with a new enemy, the capitalist West. He predicted that war would likely come soon when the United States fell into the grip of a depression resulting from their postwar doldrums. Many government leaders in Washington were shocked at Stalin's bold statements. Some called his provocative speech a declaration of war. Others in the government and the media discounted the Soviets as a serious threat and condemned Churchill's remarks as enticing confrontation with the Russians. Some shrugged as the United States and Britain successfully carried the World War II effort on two major fronts and supported the major efforts, particularly Russia's, toward securing the victories.
Churchill's words enunciated the stark reality that although one war was over, the dark clouds of another had already begun to gather. Seven years earlier during the period that Stalin and Adolph Hitler were engaged in their ill-fated non-aggression pact, Churchill had characterized his frustration with the Soviets to the British people in a 1939 radio broadcast: "I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma."
World War II had come to an end, but the protracted Cold War period had already begun with its headwaters springing from the three major wartime meetings between the World War II western allied leaders and Josef Stalin. The result of these monumental conferences held at Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam began a convoluted, complex and ultimate failure of an orderly post-war recovery for Eastern Europe. In contrast to the aims of the Allies, the outcomes of the conferences in large part promoted the rapid rise of the Soviet Empire. As the empire quickly expanded, awkward and often flaccid responses by the West served little notice to Stalin.
From the first joint meeting of the Big Three in Tehran in late November and early December 1941, it was obvious from the outset and finally in the end that the negotiations between the U.S. and the UK and Stalin warranted a more astute and tougher stance with the Soviets. In contrast, the following from a joint statement issued by Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin on December 1, 1941 in Tehran: "Emerging from these cordial conferences we look with confidence to the day when all peoples of the world may live free lives, untouched by tyranny and according to their varying desires and their own consciences."
At the Tehran Conference, Roosevelt had set out to establish a warm and cordial relationship with Stalin such as he had with Churchill. Outside Churchill's confidence, Roosevelt 'played-up' heavily to Stalin. He teased and chided Churchill publicly, embarrassing him, much to Stalin's pleasure. During the Conference, Roosevelt accepted Stalin's invitation to stay at the Russian Embassy. Churchill became disturbed by the conduct of his trusted friend and warned him about being under the surveillance of the NKVD. According to Roosevelt's close confidant, Harry Hopkins, it was the President's notion that even if he couldn't convert Stalin to become a Democrat, at least they could develop a working relationship. Following the conference and according to Lord Moran, Churchill's personal physician, Roosevelt's conduct and illusions about Stalin had left the Prime Minister in a state of "black depression."
It appeared that Roosevelt's tactics worked for a while; Stalin agreed to every term put forth by himself and Churchill-The U.S. and Britain would invade France from across the English Channel; General Eisenhower would be named the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe to conduct the invasion operation; Russia would enter the war with Japan as soon as Germany was defeated; China would reclaim Manchuria, the Pescadores and Formosa; Korea would become free and independent and the borders of European countries would be restored to their post-war positions.
Stalin held out on two issues with regard to Poland. He did not want to recognize the Polish government-in-exile in London, and he wanted to retain that portion of Poland deeded to Russia during its earlier collaboration with Hitler. The Western leaders finally gave n to the Polish government-in-exile issue and formally agreed only to the Polish boundary terms. As one observer described: "This miscalculation led the United States into a tragic triumph-a 'victory without peace'." It began the first of many political and geographic moves the Soviets would make toward the domination of the European continent.
The three Allies met again at Yalta in the Crimea during February 4th through the 11th, 1945. The war in Europe was winding down and victory within a few months was in sight. The focus at the Tehran Conference had essentially been on wartime strategy and the Yalta agenda called for final decisions on putting the post-war world in order. Roosevelt arrived at Yalta with a principle tactical issue. He wanted the Soviets to enter the war against Japan. While he had been kept aware of the progress of the development of the atomic bomb, he had been given no absolute assurances that it would be successful. Some of his advisors told him that he could not depend on the bomb being ready ... or even working. His persistence with Stalin on Japan, as it turned out, would have been better left alone. Stalin requested that in return for Russia entering the war with Japan, the Soviets would be given the southern half of Sakhalin Island and the Kurile Islands which Japan had won from Russia in the 1904 War. Russia would also be granted a lease on Port Arthur for a naval base and "pre-eminent interests" in Manchuria, whatever that meant. Roosevelt agreed and urged Chiang Kai-shek to recognize these concessions.
Churchill was also not exempt from miscalculating Stalin and the Soviets in spite of his perceptive observations and tough rhetoric. Prior to the Yalta Conference, he went to Moscow in October 1944 to further negotiate the post-war "division of spheres" in Eastern Europe with Stalin. The two agreed that the British would control Greece, the Russians would get Romania, and they would jointly control Yugoslavia and Hungary.
Roosevelt and the U.S. State Department were furious with the unilateral concessions. As the war in Europe came to an end, Stalin ordered the hard-line communists in the jointly managed governments to move in. Further, as the three Allied leaders began gathering for the Yalta Conference, the Soviets had already overrun the previously agreed to war-fighting demarcation lines in Central Europe.
Churchill was so badly disillusioned with the unfolding events before departing for Yalta that he sent a cable to Roosevelt stating: "This may well be a fateful Conference, coming at a moment when the Great Allies are so divided and the shadow of the war lengthens out before us. At the present time I think the end of this war may well prove to be more disappointing than was the last."
Stalin had become a master at manipulation. Roosevelt and Churchill agreed to most every condition presented to them, only to have Stalin ignore or deny them later. Stalin chided Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary, at one of the conference gatherings: "A 'declaration', I regard as algebra, but an 'agreement' as practical arithmetic."
Stalin's 'practical arithmetic' amounted to a bunker mentality resulting in the clever exploitation of the natural geographical arrangement of the six Eastern European sovereign nations-Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania-as a buffer zone. Churchill had shrewdly characterized the situation-"From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic." Mother Russia would be shielded from the rest of Europe by the Soviet controlled Warsaw Pact nations.
Once an ally who had depended greatly on the United States and the West for support, arms and equipment to defeat the Germans, Soviet leadership with a great sense of empowerment, abruptly signaled to the world that they would now stand alone, control Eastern Europe and exert their ideology across the world as they pleased. They walked out of the Marshall Plan talks, rejected the notion and the agreements that Berlin would be jointly managed while Germany recovered and similarly denounced the Truman Doctrine intended to unify the post-war Europe. The Soviets then tossed down the gauntlet by blockading Western traffic and supplies into Berlin.
Thus what became known as the Cold War began and evolved into a protracted and often perilous journey into history. There had never been such an intense conflict between two highly developed governments which lasted over such an extended period-almost fifty years-without erupting into all-out warfare.
The United States embraced a containment strategy in response to Josef Stalin's declaration to make Soviet communist expansionism his plan for world order. Many prominent American liberals at the time advocated isolationism as a feasible alternative to a containment policy. Some rationalized that the Soviet people had little taste for war after their bloody experiences during World War II and surely would not follow Stalin's lead into another war. As time would tell, there is little doubt that this would have eventually led to a losing strategy given the demonstrated aggressive nature of the post-war Soviet leadership.
The adoption of containment as a declared policy simply implied that the U.S. would thwart any attempts by the Soviet Union to expand their influence beyond those countries deeded to them at the end of the war. It also meant that in order to meet a potential Soviet threat of aggression, the U.S. and the West would have to rearm themselves well beyond the remnants left over from the war. The introduction of the atomic bomb into the war heightened the concern for the technology eventually getting into Soviet hands.
President Roosevelt had kept his vice-president completely in the dark regarding many major issues. Truman had not even been aware of the atomic bomb development project until he was briefed after the former president's death. He learned that Major General Leslie Groves had been placed in charge of the Manhattan Project and had at his side many of the world's foremost physicists to develop an atomic fission weapon. The project had initially begun at the University of Chicago and later moved to the remote area of Los Alamos, New Mexico, in 1943. Dr. Robert Oppenheimer of the University of California became the chief scientist. Two and one half years later, on July 16, 1945, the scientific team successfully detonated the first atomic device near White Sands, New Mexico.
Truman promptly notified Winston Churchill of the successful test, his confidence in the new technology bomb and his intentions to proceed to use the weapon against Japan if surrender could not be negotiated. Churchill was cheered by the news of the new weapon development and in full agreement. The Soviets had steered clear of the war in the Pacific and had not declared war on Japan.
Los Alamos had built two operational bomb devices in addition to the successful test device. The bombs were ready to be handed over to a specially trained B-29 bomber unit of the Twentieth Air Force commanded by a young Major General Curtis E. LeMay on Tinian Island in the Marianas. The President ordered General Carl Spaatz, Commander of the Army Air Corps forces in the Pacific, to plan missions to drop the two bombs on selected targets of his choice on the Japanese mainland if they did not accept an issued surrender order by August 3, 1945. The Japanese responded to the invitation to surrender by stating that it was unworthy of notice and they would battle to the end.
On the morning of August 6, 1945, the first bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, Japan, from a B-29, the Enola Gay, named after the mother of the pilot, Colonel Paul Tibbets. Thereafter and following two days of leaflet drops over major Japanese cities, repeated broadcasts pleaded for the government to surrender. There was no response to the plea and the second bomb was dropped on the city of Nagasaki on August 9th three days after the first.
[Author's Note: Varous sources have cited President Trumanas responding, "No, none at all" to questions regarding any feelings of guilt about ordering the use of atomic weapons against Japan to end the war. During my days at Los Alamos I enjoyed a unique experience with the late actor, Charlton Heston, who worked with us doing 'voice overs' for a number of our technical documentary films. At dinner one evening the conversation moved to the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki; Heston quickly offered his personal experience of the period when he was serving as an Army Air Corps B-25 tailgunner staged on Attu Island as a part of a final aerial assault on Japan. "Had we not dropped those bombs," he lamented, "I would in all likelihood be here this evening, much less the father of my sons. I have no regrets; neither should any one." In 2000 while doing research for a previous book, I urged up the courage to place a phone call to now deceased, retired Brigadier General Paul Tibbets, to verify some information. I caught him on a golf course in Florida where he graciously temporarily halted his game and shared with me several personal insights. Living history!]
The Soviets, caught by surprise but determined not to be left out of U.S. actions in the Pacific, declared war on Japan a few hours before the second bomb was dropped on Nagasaki. The first bomb had completely destroyed the Japanese Second Army Headquarters and a four square mile area around it. An estimated 60,000 people were killed, roughly three times the casualties predicted by Robert Oppenheimer and his Los Alamos scientists. The Nagasaki bomb achieved approximately the same damage, killing 36,000. Within six months, residual deaths from burns and radiation accounted for several thousand more.
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