Deterring Cybertrespass And Securing Cyberspace : Lessons From United States Border Control Strategies

Mary Manjikian

ISBN 10: 1387580973 / ISBN 13: 9781387580972

Editore: Lulu.Com, 2018

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nach der Bestellung gedruckt Neuware - Printed after ordering - In recent years, analysts have begun discussing strategies for securing entities in cyberspace-including the files and software belonging to corporations, government institutions, and private individuals. Increasingly, analysts have suggested utilizing two types of deterrence strategies: deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment. In determining how both deterrence strategies might be applied to preventing hostile individuals, states, and nonstate actors from entering cyberspace and inflicting damage there, analysts have borrowed from deterrence strategies that have been framed for a variety of other situations. While the tendency among members of the military community is to look to other military situations- such as nuclear war, or the use of biological or chemical weapons-in which deterrence strategies may have been used, it is my contention that these scenarios are not necessarily the best fit for describing what happens in cyberspace.

Codice articolo 9781387580972

Dati bibliografici

• Titolo: Deterring Cybertrespass And Securing Cyberspace : Lessons From United States Border Control Strategies
• Editore: Lulu.Com
• Data di pubblicazione: 2018
• Lingua: Inglese
• ISBN 10: 1387580973
• ISBN 13: 9781387580972
• Rilegatura: Taschenbuch
• Condizione: Neu
• Dimensioni: 229 L x 152 A x 5 P (millimetri) 229 millimetri di larghezza per 152 millimetri di altezza per 5 millimetri di profondità
• Peso: 136 grammi

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Riassunto

In recent years, analysts have begun discussing strategies for securing entities in cyberspace—including the files and software belonging to corporations, government institutions, and private individuals. Increasingly, analysts have suggested utilizing two types of deterrence strategies: deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment. In determining how both deterrence strategies might be applied to preventing hostile individuals, states, and nonstate actors from entering cyberspace and inflicting damage there, analysts have borrowed from deterrence strategies that have been framed for a variety of other situations. While the tendency among members of the military community is to look to other military situations— such as nuclear war, or the use of biological or chemical weapons—in which deterrence strategies may have been used, it is my contention that these scenarios are not necessarily the best fit for describing what happens in cyberspace.