The Development of Husserl's Thought

Although this book is a translation from Dutch, the chief obstacle to be overcome was Husser!'s (German) technical terminology. As I sought English equivalents for German phenomenological terms, I made thankful use of Dorion Cairns' Guidefor Translating Husserl as well as existing translations of Husser!'s works, especially J. N. Findlay's rendering of Logische Untersuchungen. Since the technical terminology in the various translations and English studies of Husser! is far from uniform, I had to devise my own system of equivalents for key Husserlian terms. As I translated the quotations from Husserl's works into English, I did consult the available translations and draw on them, but I endeavored to keep the technical vocabulary uniform -sometimes by fresh translations of the passages quoted and sometimes by slight alterations in the existing translations. I made these changes not so much out of any basic disagreement with other translators as out of a desire to keep the terminology uniform throughout the book. 1 For the benefit of German and French readers not entirely at home with the English phenomeno logical vocabulary, I have included a small translation table in which my English equivalents for some central German terms are listed. Words with cognates or well-established phenomenological terms as their English equivalents have not been included. Finally, I should like to express my thanks to Prof.

One Philosophy as Descriptive Psychology.- I. Acts, Contents and the Relations between Them.- Section 1. The Intentional Relation to the Object.- § 1. The Distinction between Act and Content.- § 2. Acts of a Higher Order.- § 3. Symbolic or Non-genuine Presentations.- I. In Philosophie der Arithmetik.- II. In “Psychologische Studien zur elementaren Logik”.- Section 2. Contents.- § 1. The Immanence of Contents.- I. In Brentano’s Thought.- II. In Philosophie der Arithmetik.- III. In “Psychologische Studien zur elementaren Logik”.- § 2. The Division of Contents — Abstract and Concrete Contents.- § 3. Formal or Categorial Properties — Objects of a Higher Order?.- Section 3. The Relation between Act and Content.- § 1. Are Acts Creative?.- § 2. The Correlation between Act and Object.- § 3. Perception and Evidence.- § 4. The Relation to the “Real” Object and the “Intentional” Object.- I. Brentano.- II. Husserl.- Summary of Chapter I.- II. Genetic and Descriptive Psychology.- § 1. Genetic and Descriptive Psychology in Brentano’s Thought.- I. Genetic Psychology.- II. Descriptive Psychology.- § 2. Genetic and Descriptive Psychology in the Thought of the Early Husserl.- III. Philosophy as Analysis of Origins.- § 1. The Analysis of Origins in Arithmetic.- § 2. What is Analysis of Origins?.- § 3. The Basis for Abstraction — the Origin.- § 4. The General Concept.- § 5. Abstraction.- IV. The A Priori Sciences and the Problem of their Founding.- § 1. Brentano’s Theory of the A Priori Sciences.- § 2. Husserl’s Theory of the A Priori Sciences.- § 3. Logic and Psychology.- V. Brentano and Husserl.- § 1. Husserl’s Student Years — the Encounter with Brentano.- § 2. Brentano’s Development.- I. The Positivistic Period.- II. Phenomenological Tendencies.- III. Some Problems.- VI. Preliminary Conclusions.- § 1. Philosophy as Descriptive Psychology — Forms of Psychologism.- § 2.Some Critical Observations.- Two Philosophy as Descriptive Eidetic Psychology.- I. Acts, Objects and the Relations between Them.- Section 1. Acts.- § 1. Introduction — the Natural and Phenomenological Thougt-Stances.- § 2. Significative Acts.- § 3. “Imaginal” or Imaginative Acts.- § 4. Perceptual Acts.- § 5. More Analysis of Acts.- I. The Essential Elements of Acts — Quality and Matter.- II. The Non-essential Elements of Acts — the Sensations.- III. The Connection between the Acts — Knowledge.- § 6. Categorial Acts.- § 7. General Presentations or Acts of Ideation.- § 8. The Natural and Phenomenological Attitudes — a Provisional Summary.- Section 2. The Transcendent Object.- Section 3. The Relations between Acts and Contents.- § 1. The Concept of Constitution.- § 2. The Correlation between the Act and the Object.- § 3. The Theory of Perception.- I. Adequate and Non-adequate Perception.- II. The Phenomenological Point of Departure — “Presupposition-lessness”.- III. The Suspension of the Question of Existence (Epoché).- § 4. Theory of Knowledge as a “Psychology of Reason”.- I. Two Questions.- II. A First Answer.- III. The Possibility of a Second Answer.- IV. A Second Answer.- § 5. The Intentional Object and the “Real” Object.- I. Husserl and the Scholastic Schema.- II. The “Real” Object and the Physical Object.- § 6. The Natural and Phenomenological Attitudes in LU — Conclusion.- II. Genetic and Descriptive Psychology.- § 1. Genetic Psychology.- § 2. Descriptive Psychology.- § 3. The Two Functions of Descriptive Psychology.- § 4. Husserl’s Criticism of Explanatory Psychology.- § 5. Two Kinds of Methods (Ontologies) — Naturalistic and Phenomenological.- § 6. Conclusions of Chapters I and II.- III. The New Theory of Abstraction.- § 1. Recapitulation of the Problem.- § 2. General Presentation: Meaning and Intuiting.- § 3. Comparison: Identity and Similarity.- § 4. Attention and the Intuition of Essences.- § 5. “Grounded Purely in Concepts” — Evidence.- § 6. The Eidetic Reduction.- § 7. Two Kinds of Abstraction.- § 8. Two Kinds of Categorial Abstraction — Two Kinds of Logic.- § 9. Eidos and Fact.- I. The Identity of the Eidos.- II. The Universality of the Eidos.- III. Application.- IV. The Extent of the Realm of Ideas.- §10. Husserl’s “Platonism” or “Realism”.- IV. Logic and Psychology.- § 1. Statement of the Problem.- § 2. The Psychological Concept and the Logical Concept.- § 3. The Laws of Logic.- V. Philosophy as Analysis of Origins.- Section 1. The Philosophical Clarification of Arithmetic.- Section 2. The Philosophical Clarification of Pure Logic.- § 1. The Philosophy of Pure Logic.- § 2. The Origin of the Fundamental Concepts of Logic.- § 3.The Problem of the Relation between the Prolegomena and the Six Investigations.- I. The Problem.- II. Pure Logic and Descriptive Psychology.- III. Some Critical Observations.- VI. Conclusions.- § 1. Phenomenology as Descriptive Eidetic Psychology.- § 2. Forms of Psychologism.- Intermezzo from Descriptive Psychology to Transcendental Phenomenology.- I. The Negative Aspect of the Reduction — The Epoche.- § 1. The Suspension of all Transcendencies.- § 2. The Implications of this Suspension.- § 3. Conclusions.- II. The Positive Aspect of the Reduction — The Residue.- § 1. Consciousness — Real Immanence.- § 2. Essences — Pure Immanence.- § 3. The Givenness of the Noema.- I. The Second Extension of the Phenomenological Sphere.- II. The Correlativity Theme and the Problem of Transcendence.- III. From Descriptive Psychology to Transcendental Phenomenology.- Three Philosophy as Transcendental Phenomenology.- I. An Analysis of the Phenomenological Fundamental Consideration.- § 1. The Introduction of the Transcendental Epoché.- § 2. Phenomenological Meditation — Its Problem, Goal and Method.- § 3. The First Phase — Consciousness as a Monadological Unity.- § 4. Intermezzo — Transition to the Second Phase.- § 5. The Second Phase — The Presumptive Being of the Thing and the Absolute Being of Consciousness.- § 6. The Experiment of World-Annihilation.- § 7. The Meaning of the Terms “Absolute” and “Relative”.- I. The Concepts “Absolute” and “Relative” in LU.- II. The Concepts “Absolute” and “Relative” in Ideen I.- III. Provisional Conclusions.- § 8. Eidetic and Factual Necessity.- § 9. Consciousnesss as the Necessary Condition and Sufficient Reason of the World.- §10. The World as Presumptive.- §11. Conclusion of the Second Phase.- §12. Interpreting the Transcendental Epoché.- I. The Introduction of the Epoché.- II. The Interpretation of the Epoché.- §13. The Problem of the “Ways” to Transcendental Phenomenology.- §14. Two Interpretations — Stumpf and Ricoeur.- I. Stumpf.- II. Ricoeur.- §15. Two Assumptions.- §16. The Meaning of the Fundamental Consideration as Fundamental Ontology.- I. The Naturalistic World-Picture.- II. The Phenomenological View.- §17. The Naturalistic Attitude and the Personalistic Attitude in Ideen II.- II. Psychological and Transcendental Epistemology.- § 1. Husserl’s Transcendental Idealism.- I. No “Thing in Itself”.- II. The Traditional Problem of Knowledge.- III. Husserl’s Solution.- IV. Comparison with Logische Untersuchungen.- V. The Concept of Constitution.- § 2. The Thing in Itself and Natural Science.- I. The Thing of Physics in Ideen I.- II.Comparison with Logische UntersuchungenandKrisis.- § 3.The Psychological and Transcendental Concepts of the Noema.- I. The Introduction of the Concept of the Noema.- II. Intermezzo — The Psychological Epoché and the Transcendental Epoché.- III. The Way from Psychology.- § 4. Noetic-Noematic Parallelism and the Phenomenology of Reason.- I. Noetic-Noematic Parallelism.- II. Phenomenology of Reason.- III. Psychology and Transcendental Phenomenology.- Section I. Transcendental Phenomenology and Descriptive Psychology.- § 1. The Agreement between Descriptive Psychology and Transcendental Phenomenology.- § 2. The Difference between Descriptive Psychology and Transcendental Phenomenology.- § 3. The Relation between Psychological Consciousness and Transcendental Consciousness (Ego).- Section II. Transcendental Phenomenology and Empirical Psychology.- § 1. The Limits and Possibilities of Empirical Psychology.- § 2. Empirical Psychology and Phenomenological Philosophy.- IV. Transcendental Phenomenology and the A Priori Sciences.- § 1. Mundane Eidetics and Transcendental Phenomenological Eidetics.- § 2. Philosophy of Pure Logic.- V. Conclusion.- § 1. Husserl’s Defense of the Ideal.- § 2. The Turn to Transcendental Idealism.- Translation Table.- Name Index.