Duty and Inclination the Fundamentals of Morality Discussed and Redefined with Special Regard to Kant and Schiller

Reiner Hans Reiner H.

ISBN 10: 9024728185 / ISBN 13: 9789024728183

Editore: Springer, 1983

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• Titolo: Duty and Inclination the Fundamentals of Morality Discussed and Redefined with Special Regard to Kant and Schiller
• Editore: Springer
• Data di pubblicazione: 1983
• Lingua: Inglese
• ISBN 10: 9024728185
• ISBN 13: 9789024728183
• Rilegatura: Rilegato
• Condizione: New

Descrizione articolo

Riassunto

The preceding Preface, which Professor William Frankena had the great kindness to write as an introduction for the readers of the present English translation of my major work, still requires several supplementary com­ ments on my part. Professor Frankena rightly considered it to be an advan­ tage to introduce the English-speaking world to my moral philosophy through its presentation in this book. As an introduction to my moral philosophy, Professor Frankena provided a concise formulation of the fun­ damental ideas of my ethics by quoting from an article I had just recently published. Several points worth mentioning remain. Firstly, it is necessary to distinguish the two editions of the text here translated. The first edition was published in 1951 by Anton Hain in Meisenheim am Glan, under the title Pflicht und Neigung (Duty and In­ clination), with the subtitle Die Grundlagen der Sittlichkeit, erOrtert und neu bestimmt mit besonderem Bezug auf Kant und Schiller (The Fun­ damentals of Morality, Discussed and Redefined with Special Regard to Kant and Schiller). In 1974, a revised and enlarged second edition was published by the same publisher and was entitled Die Grundlagen der Sitt­ Iichkeit (The Fundamentals of Morality). Of this second edition, the first four chapters have been translated in the present volume, along with four more recent essays.

Contenuti

I. Duty and Inclination.- § 1 Introduction.- A Ethico-Historical and Critical Part.- 1. Kants Systems of Ethics in Its Relation to Schiller’s Ethical Views.- § 2 Some Main Features of Kant’s Ethics.- § 3 The Part Feeling Plays in Morality.- § 4 Schiller’s Views on Kant’s Ethics.- § 5 Kant’s Answer to Schiller.- § 6 Were Kant and Schiller Really of One Mind?.- § 7 The Question Whether Kant or Schiller was Right.- 2: A Critique of the Groundwork of Kant’s Ethics.- § 8 A Preliminary Discussion of the Relevance of Questions about Method to a Critique of a Philosophical System.- § 9 The Method of Kant’s Ethics and the Extreme Limit He Sets on Our Ethics Insight.- § 10 A Critique of the Method of Kant’s Ethics.- § 11 Some Main Points of a Critique of Kant’s System of Ethics.- 1. The Moral Good as the Good in Itself.- § 12 Some Main Points of a Critique of Kant’s System of Ethics.- 2. The Moral Law and Its Formula.- § 13 Some Main Points of a Critique of Kant’s System of Ethics.- 3. Morality and Freedom.- B Systematic Part.- 3: The Method Required in Ethics.- § 14 The Part that Experience and Induction Play in the Method of Ethics.- § 15 The Method and Task of Ethics.- § 16 Ethics’ Method Applied.- 4: The Origins of the Moral Ought and Its Relations to Inclination and Willing.- § 17 The Phenomena of Consciousness of the Moral Ought.- § 18 The Place of Conscience in the Human Personality and in Human Freedom.- § 19 The Nature and Concept of Willing. Willing as a Judgement by the Will and the Ought-to-Be.- § 20 Judgements by the Will, Striving and Inclination. The Objectivity of the Ought-to-Be and the Concept of Value.- § 21 Critical Excursus: The Relations of Heidegger and Thomism to the Concept and Datum of Value.- § 22 The Origin of the Ought-to-Do (Ought-to-Conduct-Oneself- so) from the Objective Ought-to-Be. A Sense of esponsibility and a Sense of Honor as the Corresponding Subjective Sources.- § 23 The Moral Ought in Its Primary, Axionomic (Not Fully Autonomous) Form.- § 24 The Secondary Non-Autonomous Moral Ought, Which is Grounded on a Relation to an Authority.- § 25 On the Question Whether There are Non-Strict Moral Demands and a Sphere of the Morally Permissible.- § 26 Corroborations of the Objectivity of Conscience. The Autonomization of the Axionomic Moral Ought.- § 27 Structures and Effects Intrinsic to the Autonomous Moral Ought.- § 28 The Relation of a Sense of Honor to an Autonomized Consciousness of the Ought.- § 29 Duty and Inclination: Moral Obligation and Volition.- § 30 The Natures of the Moral Good and Evil, Especially in Their Relation to the Moral Ought.- § 31 The Morality of Conduct (Sittlichkeit des Verhaltens) and the Morality of Being (Sittlichkeit des Seins).- § 32 The First Fundamentals of Morality.- II. On the Adaption of the Phenomenological Method to, and Its Refinement as a Method of, Ethics. (Zeitschrift fur Philo- sophische Forschung 29 (1975), pp. 108–117.).- III. Is Value Ethics Out of Date? (Zeitschrift fur Philosophische Forschung 30 (1976), pp. 93–98.).- IV. The Golden Rule and Natural Law. (Studia Leibnitiana 8 (1977), pp. 231–254.).- V. Good and Value, The Philosophical Relevance of the Concept of Value.- Name index.