Epistemology

Neta, Ram (Editor)

ISBN 10: 0415579139 / ISBN 13: 9780415579131

Editore: Routledge, 2012

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Dati bibliografici

• Titolo: Epistemology
• Editore: Routledge
• Data di pubblicazione: 2012
• Lingua: Inglese
• ISBN 10: 0415579139
• ISBN 13: 9780415579131
• Rilegatura: Hardcover
• Condizione: Brand New
• Peso: 3,47 chilogrammi

Descrizione articolo

Riassunto

For those working in Epistemology dizzying questions such as the following arise:

• When are beliefs rational, or justified?

• How should we update our beliefs in the light of new evidence?

• Is it possible to gain knowledge, or justification?

• How do we know what we know, and why do we care about whether―and what―others know?

• How can the exploration of pre-Socratic philosophical questions about knowledge assist with the design of twenty-first-century computer interfaces?

Addressing the need for an authoritative and comprehensive reference work to enable users to answer these and other questions, and to make sense of―and to navigate around―an ever more complex corpus of scholarly literature, Epistemology is a new title in Routledge’s acclaimed Critical Concepts in Philosophy series. Edited by Ram Neta, it is a four-volume collection which brings together foundational and the very best cutting-edge scholarship in a unique one-stop ‘mini library’.

Supplemented with a full index, and including an introduction to each volume, newly written by the editor, which places the assembled materials in their historical and intellectual context, Epistemology is destined to be valued by scholars and students as a vital research resource.

Contenuti

PROVISIONAL CONTENTS

Volume I

1. Edmund Gettier, ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’, Analysis, 1963, 23, 121–3.

2. Brian Skyrms, ‘The Explication of "X Knows that p"’, Journal of Philosophy, 1967, 64, 373–89.

3. Peter Unger, ‘An Analysis of Factual Knowledge’, Journal of Philosophy, 1968, 65, 157–70.

4. Fred Dretske, ‘Conclusive Reasons’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1971, 49, 1–22.

5. Peter Klein, ‘A Proposed Definition of Propositional Knowledge’, Journal of Philosophy, 1971, 68, 471–82.

6. David Lewis, ‘Elusive Knowledge’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1996, 74, 549–67.

7. John Hyman, ‘How Knowledge Works’, Philosophical Quarterly, 1999, 49, 197, 433–51.

8. Linda Zagzebski, ‘What is Knowledge?’, in Greco and Sosa (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Blackwell Publishing, 1999), pp. 92–116.

9. Timothy Williamson, Knowledge and its Limits (Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 21–48.

10. John Greco, ‘Knowledge as Credit for True Belief’, in Depaul and Zagzebski (eds.), Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology (Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 111–34.

11. Jonathan Schaffer, ‘Contrastive Knowledge’, in Gendler and Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Vol. 1 (Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 235–72.

12. Ernest Sosa, A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Vol. 1 (Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 22–43.

13. Duncan Pritchard, ‘Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology’ (new for this collection).

14. John Turri, ‘Manifest Failure: The Gettier Problem Solved’, Philosophers’ Imprint (forthcoming).

15 Declan Smithies, ‘The Normative Role of Knowledge’, Noûs (forthcoming).

Volume II

16. Alvin Goldman, ‘What is Justified Belief?’, in Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge (Reidel Publishing, 1979), pp. 1–23.

17. Hilary Kornblith, ‘Justified Belief and Epistemically Responsible Action’, Philosophical Review, 1983, 92, 33–48.

18. William Alston, ‘An Internalist Externalism’, Synthese, 1988, 74, 3, 265–83.

19. Alvin Goldman, ‘Internalism Exposed’, Journal of Philosophy, 1999, 96, 6, 271–93.

20. Jonathan Vogel, ‘Reliabilism Levelled’, Journal of Philosophy, 2000, 97, 11, 602–23.

21. Earl Conee and Richard Feldman, ‘Internalism Defended’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 2001, 38, 1, 1–18.

22. Adam Leite, ‘On Justifying and Being Justified’, Philosophical Issues, 2004, 14, 219–53.

23. John Gibbons, ‘Access Externalism’, Mind, 2006, 115, 457, 19–39.

24. Michael Bergmann, Justification and Awareness (Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 3–105.

25. Martin Smith, ‘What Else Justification Could Be’, Noûs, 2010, 44, 1, 10–31.

26 Juan Comesana, ‘An Evidentialist Reliabilism’, Noûs, 2010, 44, 4, 571–600.

Volume III

27. Bas van Fraassen, ‘Belief and the Will’, Journal of Philosophy, 1984, 81, 5, 235–56.

28. David Christensen, ‘Clever Bookies and Coherent Beliefs’, Philosophical Review, 1991, 100, 2, 229–47.

29. Michell Green and Christopher Hitchcock, ‘Reflections on Reflection’, Synthese, 1994, 98, 2, 297–324.

30. James Joyce, ‘A Non-Pragmatic Vindication of Probabilism’, Philosophy of Science, 1998, 65, 4, 575–603.

31. Ned Hall, ‘How to Set a Surprise Exam’, Mind, 1999, 108, 432, 647–703.

32. Timothy Williamson, Knowledge and its Limits (Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 184–208.

33. Alan Hajek, ‘What Conditional Probabilities Could Not Be’, Synthese, 2003, 137, 3, 273–323.

34. Frank Arntzenius, ‘Some Problems for Conditionalization and Reflection’, Journal of Philosophy, 2003, 100, 7, 356–70.

35. Adam Elga, ‘Reflection and Disagreement’, Noûs, 2007, 41, 3, 478–502.

36. Ram Neta, ‘What Evidence Do You Have’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2008, 59, 1, 89–119.

37. Michael Titelbaum, ‘The Relevance of Self-Locating Beliefs’, Philosophical Review, 2008, 117, 4, 555–606.

38. Jonathan Weisberg, ‘Commutativity or Holism? A Dilemma for Conditionalizers’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2009, 60, 4, 793–812.

39. Rachael Briggs, ‘Distorted Reflection’, Philosophical Review, 2009, 118, 1, 59–85.

40. Roger White, ‘Evidential Symmetry and Mushy Credence’, in Gendler and Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Vol. 3 (Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 161–88.

41. David Lewis, ‘Why Conditionalize?’, in Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings (Routledge, 2011).

42. Matthew Kotzen, ‘Multiple Studies and Evidential Defeat’, Noûs (forthcoming).

Volume IV

43. A. J. Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge (Macmillan, 1956) (extract).

44. G. E. Moore, ‘Certainty’ [1959], in Selected Writings, ed. Baldwin (Routledge, 1993), pp. 147–70.

45. Roderick Chisholm, ‘The Problem of the Criterion’, Theory of Knowledge (Prentice Hall, 1966).

46. Michael Williams, ‘Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Scepticism’, Mind, 1987, 96, 381, 36–61.

47 Barry Stroud, ‘Understanding Human Knowledge in General’, in Clay and Lehrer (eds.), Knowledge and Skepticism (Westview Press, 1989).

48. Robert Fogelin Pyrrhonian, Reflections on Knowledge and Justification (Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 113–204.

49. Keith DeRose, ‘Solving the Skeptical Problem’, Philosophical Review, 1995, 104, 1, 1–52.

50. David Owens, Reason Without Freedom: The Problem of Epistemic Normativity (Routledge, 2000), pp. 9–69.

51. Jim Pryor, ‘The Skeptic and the Dogmatist’, Noûs, 2000, 34, 4, 517–49.

52. Crispin Wright, ‘Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free)?’, Aristotelian Society, 2004, 78, 1, 167–212.

53. Roger White, ‘Problems for Dogmatism’, Philosophical Studies, 2006, 131, 3, 525–57.

54. Nico Silins, ‘Basic Justification and the Moorean Response to the Skeptic’, in Gendler and Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Vol. 2 (Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 108–42.

55. John McDowell, ‘The Disjunctive Conception of Experience as Material for a Transcendental Argument’, in Macpherson and Haddock’ (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge (Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 367–89.

56. Susanna Rinard, ‘Can Philosophy Overturn Common Sense?’, in Gendler and Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Vol. 4 (Oxford University Press, 2011).