Exceeding Our Grasp : Science, History, And the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives

Stanford, P. Kyle

ISBN 10: 0195174089 / ISBN 13: 9780195174083

Editore: Oxford University Press, 2006

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Dati bibliografici

• Titolo: Exceeding Our Grasp : Science, History, And the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives
• Editore: Oxford University Press
• Data di pubblicazione: 2006
• Lingua: Inglese
• ISBN 10: 0195174089
• ISBN 13: 9780195174083
• Rilegatura: Rilegato
• Condizione: New

Descrizione articolo

Riassunto

The incredible achievements of modern scientific theories lead most of us to embrace scientific realism: the view that our best theories offer us at least roughly accurate descriptions of otherwise inaccessible parts of the world like genes, atoms, and the big bang. In Exceeding Our Grasp, Stanford argues that careful attention to the history of scientific investigation invites a challenge to this view that is not well represented in contemporary debates about the nature of the scientific enterprise.
The historical record of scientific inquiry, Stanford suggests, is characterized by what he calls the problem of unconceived alternatives. Past scientists have routinely failed even to conceive of alternatives to their own theories and lines of theoretical investigation, alternatives that were both well-confirmed by the evidence available at the time and sufficiently serious as to be ultimately accepted by later scientific communities. Stanford supports this claim with a detailed investigation of the mid-to-late 19th century theories of inheritance and generation proposed in turn by Charles Darwin, Francis Galton, and August Weismann. He goes on to argue that this historical pattern strongly suggests that there are equally well-confirmed and scientifically serious alternatives to our own best theories that remain currently unconceived. Moreover, this challenge is more serious than those rooted in either the so-called pessimistic induction or the underdetermination of theories by evidence, in part because existing realist responses to these latter challenges offer no relief from the problem of unconceived alternatives itself.
Stanford concludes by investigating what positive account of the spectacularly successful edifice of modern theoretical science remains open to us if we accept that our best scientific theories are powerful conceptual tools for accomplishing our practical goals, but abandon the view that the descriptions of the world around us that they offer are therefore even probably or approximately true.

Informazioni sull?autore

P. Kyle Stanford is an Associate Professor in the Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science at the University of California, Irvine. He obtained his Ph.D. in 1997 from the Department of Philosophy and the Science Studies Program at the University of California, San Diego. His articles on the history and philosophy of science have appeared in The Journal of Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, and elsewhere. This is his first book.