Fiscal Rules, Bailouts, and Reputation in Federal Governments

Lingua: inglese

Editore: GRIN Verlag Sep 2019, 2019

3668969132 / 9783668969131

Da: BuchWeltWeit Ludwig Meier e.K., Bergisch Gladbach, GermaniaBuchWeltWeit Ludwig Meier e.K.

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Venditore AbeBooks dal 11 gennaio 2012

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This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -Seminar paper from the year 2019 in the subject Economics - Other, grade: 1.0, University of Mannheim (Department of Economics), course: Topics on Monetary Union, language: English, abstract: The question of why regions, that cooperate in a federal union, overborrow-meaning that they issue more debt than would be beneficial from a point-of-view of intertemporal efficiency-is of utmost relevance in many contexts. Traditionally, the role of fiscal rules (i.e. caps on debt issuance levels with punishment payments upon violation) has been emphasized in overcoming the root of the problem: that central authorities in federal unions cannot commit to not use their funds to bail out overindebted members at the expense of other members. Dovis & Kirpalani, however, ask an important question: what happens if the central authority also cannot commit to enforcing the fiscal rules In their paper, they show that if the central authority has a low reputation (i.e. low probability of enforcing the fiscal rules and the no-bailout-clause), fiscal rules are not only ineffective, but they can even lead to a higher debt issuance and exacerbate the overborrowing problem.This report aims at outlining Dovis & Kirpalani's reasoning for their central claim, thus sketching out their proofs and providing intuition for their results. Furthermore, a short assessment of their paper is provided, centering on validity and possible extensions. 24 pp. Englisch.…

Codice articolo 9783668969131

Titolo
Fiscal Rules, Bailouts, and Reputation in Federal Governments
Autore
Ulrich Roschitsch
Editore
GRIN Verlag Sep 2019
Anno di pubblicazione
2019
Condizione
Neu
Rilegatura
Taschenbuch
Lingua
inglese
ISBN 10
3668969132
ISBN 13
9783668969131
Peso dell'articolo
51 grammi
Dimensioni
210x148x3 mm

BuchWeltWeit Ludwig Meier e.K.

Bergisch Gladbach, Germania

Venditore con 5 stelle

Venditore AbeBooks dal 11 gennaio 2012

Tariffe di spedizione da Germania a U.S.A.

ArticoloDa 5 a 15 giorni lavorativiDa 5 a 15 giorni lavorativi
Primo articoloEUR 23,00EUR 23,00
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BuchWeltWeit Ludwig Meier e.K.

Germania