Game Equilibrium Models I

Lingua: inglese

Editore: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Springer Dez 2010, 2010

3642081088 / 9783642081088

Da: BuchWeltWeit Ludwig Meier e.K., Bergisch Gladbach, GermaniaBuchWeltWeit Ludwig Meier e.K.

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This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -There are two main approaches towards the phenotypic analysis of frequency dependent natural selection. First, there is the approach of evolutionary game theory, which was introduced in 1973 by John Maynard Smith and George R. Price. In this theory, the dynamical process of natural selection is not modeled explicitly. Instead, the selective forces acting within a population are represented by a fitness function, which is then analysed according to the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy or ESS. Later on, the static approach of evolutionary game theory has been complemented by a dynamic stability analysis of the replicator equations. Introduced by Peter D. Taylor and Leo B. Jonker in 1978, these equations specify a class of dynamical systems, which provide a simple dynamic description of a selection process. Usually, the investigation of the replicator dynamics centers around a stability analysis of their stationary solutions. Although evolutionary stability and dynamic stability both intend to characterize the long-term outcome of frequency dependent selection, these concepts differ considerably in the 'philosophies' on which they are based. It is therefore not too surprising that they often lead to quite different evolutionary predictions (see, e. g. , Weissing 1983). The present paper intends to illustrate the incongruities between the two approaches towards a phenotypic theory of natural selection. A detailed game theoretical and dynamical analysis is given for a generic class of evolutionary normal form games. 344 pp. Englisch.…

Titolo
Game Equilibrium Models I
Autore
Reinhard Selten
Editore
Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Springer Dez 2010
Anno di pubblicazione
2010
Condizione
Neu
Rilegatura
Taschenbuch
Lingua
inglese
ISBN 10
3642081088
ISBN 13
9783642081088
Peso dell'articolo
595 grammi
Dimensioni
244x170x19 mm

BuchWeltWeit Ludwig Meier e.K.

Bergisch Gladbach, Germania

Venditore con 5 stelle

Venditore AbeBooks dal 11 gennaio 2012

Tariffe di spedizione da Germania a U.S.A.

ArticoloDa 5 a 15 giorni lavorativiDa 5 a 15 giorni lavorativi
Primo articoloEUR 23,00EUR 23,00
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